











Title of Document: AN EVALUATION OF ACTIVE LABOR 
MARKET POLICIES IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES: THE MEXICAN CASE 
  
 Yyannú Cruz Aguayo, Doctor of Philosophy, 
2007 
  
Directed By: Professor Peter Reuter 
Professor Jeffrey Smith 




 One of the major problems in developing countries is that of unemployment and 
underemployment. Thus the use of active labor market policies constitutes a very 
significant part of the policy debate. This dissertation analyzes the training component of 
one such policies in Mexico:  PROBECAT-SICAT (P/S).   
First, we provide an overview of some of the institutional elements that are likely 
to have a bearing in the design, functioning and effects of P/S – in particular those related 
to the decentralized operation and funding of the program. We find that there is some 
room for a more explicit definition of the mechanisms that establish the checks and 
controls to reduce misuse of resources. We suggest the inclusion of indicators of job 
quality as a concrete objective of the program. 
In the second part of the dissertation, using semi-parametric techniques, we obtain 
the average treatment effect of the program on its participants. We use a set of variables 
  
that capture characteristics of job formality, and find evidence that male and female 
trainees do increase their probabilities of employment and of employment with health 
benefits. In addition, we find that, on average, female trainees tend to find employment in 
more informal jobs than their male counterparts.  
The last part of the dissertation consists of an impact evaluation of P/S by training 
type. We find evidence that participating in mixed training in medium increases the 
trainees’ probability of employment per se and employment with desirable ‘formal’ 
characteristics, such as health and housing benefits, a written contract, etc., with respect 
to any other training type. Secondly, the mixed training in micro and small enterprises is 
superior to the training for self-employment and in-classroom training. Moreover, we 
find evidence that female participants increase their chances of obtaining jobs with 
informal characteristics if they choose to participate in training for self-employment with 
respect to participation in-classroom training.  
We conclude that even with institutional shortcomings, the program seems to 
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
  One of the major problems in developing countries is that of employment, or 
rather unemployment and underemployment. There are also complications of ensuring 
social justice and the integration of backward areas and segments of population into the 
economic mainstream of the country. Further, in countries with troubled political pasts, 
the government also likes to signal their good intentions to the public. Thus the use of 
active labor market policies (ALMP), and similar programs, to increase employment and 
employability of the population constitute a very significant part of the policy debate, 
particularly for developing countries. 
The main objective of the Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) is to decrease 
the risk of unemployment and underemployment, and to raise workers’ labor income. 
OECD economies have a long tradition of implementing and evaluating ALMPs; an 
important proportion of these programs are the training and retraining components, 
representing 36% of overall expenditures in OECD countries (Betcherman et al.). 
Recently, transitioning and developing countries have started following the lead of the 
economically developed countries in this field. Governments throughout Latin America 
and other developing regions have put into operation a diverse set of direct policies to 
promote employment.  One of the important components of such policies is the training 
programs aimed at incrementing the employability
1
 of its trainees.   
                                                 
1
 Definition of employability, from  http://www.employment-
studies.co.uk/summary/summary.php?id=emplblty 
“…employability is about being capable of getting and keeping fulfilling work. More comprehensively, 
employability is the capability to move self-sufficiently within the labour market to realise potential 
through sustainable employment. For the individual, employability depends on the knowledge, skills and 
attitudes they possess, the way they use those assets and present them to employers and the context (eg 
personal circumstances and labour market environment) within which they seek work…” 
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The training component of the ALMPs in Mexico, SICAT (Sistema de 
Capacitación para el Trabajo or Labor Training System), is one of the most important 
active labor market policies of the country, functioning as a decentralized training 
program for the unemployed and underemployed.
2
  The program was created in the early 
1980s under the name of PROBECAT (Programa de Becas de Capacitación para 
Desempleados), and its main objective was to reduce the impact of the debt crisis on the 
labor market. PROBECAT existed as such for 17 years, from 1984 to 2001, financed first 
by the Mexican government (until 1986), then receiving funds from the World Bank 
(1987 to 1996), and finally being supported by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(since 1997). The main goal of the program has been to upgrade the skills of the 
unemployed and underemployed to meet the requirements of potential employers.  
How to measure its effectiveness, in terms of methods and outcome variables, is 
not clear, and the diverse effects of the  program found in the previous literature, make 
this still an unresolved question.  
This dissertation can broadly be divided in two parts: institutional analysis and 
impact evaluation. 
In the first part I conduct an institutional analysis of the PROBECAT/SICAT  
(P/S) programs by putting forward a description of the environment in which it operates. 
In particular, I study the decentralized nature of the program and consider its potential 
effects. Using interviews with officials in charge of the programs, unpublished 
documents, and other official releases this study provides a better understanding of the 
                                                 
2
 The Labor Department defines underemployment as: monthly income of less than two minimum wages 
(determined by zone) and/or work less than 35 hours a week involuntarily, that is, due to market reasons 
such as low demand for the products and services offered. 
 
 3 
institutional context in which PROBECAT/SICAT operates, allowing for important 
distinctions between developed and developing countries. 
In the first half of the empirical part of the dissertation I investigate the success of 
PROBECAT/SICAT of realizing its potential to increase the probabilities of formal 
employment. Usually, studies on the impact evaluation of a training program in a 
developed economy would involve three main outcome variables: reduction of the time in 
job search, probability of employment and wages. I propose that for developing countries 
it is relevant to study additional variables that capture the impact of the program on the 
probabilities of obtaining formal employment; with this I aim to tackle the 
multidimensional nature of the impacts of a training program in a developing country. 
Using semi-parametric techniques, I obtain the average treatment effect of the program 
by comparing individuals from a randomized retrospective survey on ex-trainees and a 
suitable comparison group obtained from a National Employment Survey. The paper 
contributes to the existent literature in two dimensions: it acknowledges some 
methodological issues such as the presence of contamination bias and the appropriateness 
of the comparison group; secondly, it includes in the impact evaluation relevant outcome 
variables that correspond to the reality of the labor markets in developing countries.  
In the second empirical chapter I investigate the differential performance of the 
diverse types of training programs for the unemployed and underemployed in Mexico, by 
studying the characteristics of these programs on the basis of their ability to improve the 
employment prospects of the trainees. Under this scheme the modality of in-classroom 
training has completely disappeared in the last years giving space to mixed and on-the-
job training types. I set the research of the performance of each modality in a multi 
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treatment setting, where each type will be evaluated contrasting its impacts to other types. 
With this I provide additional insights on which is the most effective type of training, a 
matter on which previous evaluations of P/S as well as other programs in Latin American 










Chapter 2: Origins and evolution of the training component of the 
Mexican active labor market policies 
Brief history of the training component of the ALMP in Mexico  
 It was during the seventies that the “last attempt to make employment a 
preponderant objective of economic development… [in Mexico]”
3
 was made, according 
to R. Flores Lima, former Director General of Employment at the Ministry of Labor. This 
attempt basically consisted of the formulation of the National Program of Employment 
(Programa Nacional del Empleo), a development plan in which it was established that the 
design of future economic policies would be articulated in terms of employment creation. 
By the end of the decade, in 1978, the latest reform to the Federal Employment Law took 
place in order to create the National Employment and Training Service (SNE, for its 
abbreviation in Spanish for Servicio Nacional de Empleo).  Under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Labor (Flores Lima, 2004), the SNE was mainly established to: a) promote 
the employment of the unemployed population in active job search; b) promote the 
training and acquisition of marketable skills by the unemployed; c) promote and conduct 
formal studies of national and regional labor markets (Flores Lima, 2004; IADB, 2005). 
The SNE operates through regional offices known as State Employment Services (SEE 
for its abbreviation in Spanish for Servicio Estatal de Empleo), which runs and oversees 
the active labor market policies.   
Just a few years after the establishment of the SNE, during the last year of the 
presidential term of José López Portillo (1982), Mexico suffered a major a financial and 
                                                 
3
 Flores Lima (2004). 
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economic crisis, caused mainly by the fall of oil prices and increases in interest rates. An 
important byproduct of the crisis was a rise in the unemployment rate of 60%. As a 
response to the poor economic conditions and the lack of employment opportunities faced 
by an important proportion of the population, between 1982 and 1987 the Ministry of 
Labor, through the SNE, designed and implemented a set of the active labor market 
programs focused exclusively on training. These programs were to be known as 
PROBECAT (Programa de Becas de Capacitación para Desempleados in Spanish). and 
officially started its operations with such denomination in 1984. It was established mainly 
as an effort to reduce the frictional unemployment that afflicted the fraction of the 
population with poorer education and job skills, particularly targeting the laid off heads 
of household. In its beginnings, PROBECAT was mainly focused on workers laid off by 
industries in urban areas, starting in the capital city of the country. However it was later 
completely decentralized and operated by the SES in other regions. Each of the regional 
offices of employment was and still is considered an area of operation of the National 
Employment Service. 
The first version of PROBECAT granted 25,000 fellowships (Ibarra, 2005) to 
increase the skills and education of the unemployed to meet the requirements of potential 
employers. The program was operated and funded jointly by the Ministry of Labor and 
the Ministry of Education, and was conceived as a link between the characteristics of the 
labor market at the moment and the education supply. As such, the first modality was in-
classroom only training, and the cost of the program (teacher’s wages, learning material, 
etc.) was divided between the Ministries. Even though it was originally conceived as a 
temporary emergency program, PROBECAT gained popularity and was made 
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permanent, and by 1987 became one of the main instruments of the active labor market 
policies (ALMP) (Flores Lima, 2005). The number of fellowships awarded that year was 
more than double that of the original version of the program. During the same period, the 
World Bank started financing it, giving its support to the program until 1996.  
In 1987, PROBECAT included a mixed modality to the training options that 
combined school-based and on-the-job training. In this case, the Ministry of Labor made 
agreements with firms that wanted to cover some of their vacancies, and the on-the-job 
training was done in the firms that had agreements with the Ministry. 
Between 1995 and 2001, PROBECAT extended its modalities to include: 
1) In-classroom. 
2) Mixed in medium and large firms. 
3) Mixed in small and micro firms. 
4) Training for self employment. 
5) Local Employment Initiatives (ILE) – promoted entrepreneurship, gave 
support to small business.  
Table 1 includes a list of training courses included in categories 1, 2, and 3 for the 
State of Tamaulipas. 
During that period the program was expanded from 50,000 fellowships to 300,000 
in 1994, partly responding to requirements imposed by NAFTA. At the end of 1994, 
under President Salinas De Gortari, the program experienced its biggest increase, which 
resulted in the number of fellowships being close to 600,000 per year by December of 
1995. The last increase was attributed to political pressures, since presidential elections 
were close (Samaniego, 2005). However, given the rapid increase of the program, the 
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officials who operated it faced two potential problems (Samaniego, 2005): maintaining 
the quality of the training services; and not generating false expectations of the possibility 
of obtaining better jobs because Mexico was facing a crisis that hindered the creation of 
better positions. In addition, one of the first evaluations of the program concluded that the 
participation of an important proportion of the women, during the crisis time, was linked 
mainly to the stipend they received and not to the necessity of upgrading their skills. This 
was known as the “housewife effect” (Ibarra, 2005) and as a consequence, it was 
suggested that the participation of women was discouraged. 
 In 1997 the external funding of the program changed from the World Bank to the 
Inter-American Development Bank, which has been supporting it since. 
 
Table 1. Examples of training contents, State of Tamaulipas
In-classroom (offered July - September 1999)
Basic Software




Administrative assistant and software
Mixed in medium and big (offered January - March 2002)
Industrial sewing
Cashier
Shop Floor employee training
Furniture design and manufacture
Mixed in micro and small (offered January - March 2002)
Administrative assistant and software
Beautician
Receptionist and auxiliary accountant
Legal clerk
Auxiliary accountant and software
Engine tuning
Source: Gobierno del Estado de Tamaulipas (1999, 2002)  
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 With the change of administration in 2002, PROBECAT became SICAT (Sistema 
de Capacitación para el Trabajo, in Spanish) and the in-classroom modality disappeared. 
This occurred after officials of the program claimed that the curriculum followed by the 
educational institutions in charge of the training did not cover the skills employers 
demanded. At the same time the Local Initiatives for Employment (ILE, for its 
abbreviation in Spanish) modality was also eliminated. In the same year, the SNE 
launched three pilots: training for professionals, training vouchers, and training for 
college students about to enter the labor force. 
 Simultaneously, the mixed modalities started gaining more importance and 
became the training component with the highest representation among all training 
modalities. In 2002, combining the two mixed modalities accounted for more than 50% 
of the total number of fellowships. 
 From 2001 to 2002 SICAT experienced a reduction in the number of fellowships 
given per year, which was mainly because of (GEA Consultores, 2002): a) the 
elimination of the schooled-based and the ILE modalities, b) the new pilot programs were 
operated at a smaller scale than the eliminated modalities; and c) the federal funding for 
SICAT was reduced by 35%, which in turn reduced the federal funds assigned for the 
program in subsequent years. Figure 1 presents the number of fellowships given per year 






































































































Source:  Dirección General de Empleo, Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social. 
 
Funding and Administration of the Program 
The first rounds of training programs for displaced workers after the early eighties 
crisis were solely operated and paid for by the Mexican government. Not long after its 
first round of operations, the program started having funding problems and the number of 
trainees fell from 55,799 in 1984 to 15,629 in 1987 (IADB, 2005). Facing these 
budgetary difficulties, the Mexican government reached out to the World Bank. By the 
end of 1986 the World Bank arrived at an agreement with the Mexican government and 
consented to provide the first credit for the operation of the program. The loan scheme 
was known as the Manpower Training Project (IADB, 2005), under which the federal 
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government received a credit of 80 million dollars (Ibarra, 2005). A second credit was 
approved in 1993 in the amount of 160 million dollars, which was part of a loan project 
also funded by the World Bank, known as the first Labor Market Modernization Program 
(LMMP).  These two agreements provided PROBECAT with funds to complement those 
from the federal budget, in order to operate from 1988 to 1996.  
Starting in 1997, Phase I of the Second Labor Market Modernization Project was 
inaugurated with a loan for the operations of PROBECAT and additional smaller 
programs. This phase went on until 1999, and in 2000, Phase II was initiated. The credits 
that supported Phase I and Phase II of the second LMMP were provided by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB). As before, the Mexican federal government 
agreed to provide additional funding for these active labor market policies. In the case of 
Phase I, the IADB gave a credit of 250 million dollars, while the country supported the 
program with 167 million dollars. For the Phase II, these numbers were 200 million 
dollars and 233 million dollars, respectively, from which 125 were exclusively directed to 
PROBECAT/SICAT.  
While an important proportion of the funds to sustain and expand the operations 
of PROBECAT historically came directly from loans provided by international 
organizations, the operability and supervision of the program always remained in the 
country. The federal government, mostly through the Ministry of Labor, would come into 
agreements with the state governments, who on their part would determine the number 
and nature of training classes, specify additional requirements for participants and 
determine the conditions in which regional businesses could benefit from the program.  
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In the next chapter I give an account of the institutions surrounding 
PROBECAT/SICAT, analyzing the decentralized nature of the program and providing 
the chapters on the impact evaluation with an institutional background.  
In the chapters following the institutional chapter I present an impact evaluation 
of the program alongside two concepts: the efficacy of the program in providing 
employment with a particular emphasis on formal employment and explore the different 
effects that result from the range of training formats in existence.   
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Chapter 3: Institutional analysis 
 
Even though the main purpose of this dissertation is not to study the 
decentralization but the program itself, it is still relevant to establish a framework for the 
analysis in order to provide a deeper understanding of the effects of the 
PROBECAT/SICAT (P/S) training program for the unemployed and underemployed in 
Mexico.  
While the program and its objectives were described in the previous chapter, this 
chapter is aimed at providing an overview of some of the institutional elements that are 
likely to have a bearing in the design, functioning and effects of the P/S training program 
– in particular those related to the decentralized operation and funding of the program. 
Although we describe and briefly discuss the beginnings and first years of 
PROBECAT/SICAT, this chapter focuses mainly in the institutional background of the 
program under the Second Labor Market Modernization Project (referred to as LMMP 
hereafter) that is under the partial funding of the IADB, which corresponds to the year of 
1997 and onwards. This period in time also corresponds to the same years the impact 
evaluation in subsequent chapters contemplates. 
It is relevant to mention that in the LMMP the training element of the active labor 
market policies was packaged into a single component -known as Employment Support 
Program (ESP)- with other services for job seekers, specifically intermediary services 
such as local job banks that could  easily be accessed by the public (CHAMBATEL). The 
general objective of this component is twofold: a) to reduce the job search and hiring 
costs faced by the unemployed and the enterprises and b) to promote the employment of 
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job seekers who were trained by the program (IADB, 2001). This specific component 
was by far the most important one of LMMP, which also included two other components. 
In the original loan proposal, the ESP was set to absorb close to 80% of the total 
resources (IADB, 1996). Operationally, the ESP aimed to improve and increase the 
coverage of the National Employment Service, and to develop the link between the 
unemployed and the training and/or labor demand. 
The insights of this chapter complement the empirical analysis presented later in 
the dissertation in two main ways. First, by putting forward a detailed description of the 
environment in which the program operates, the institutional analysis improves the 
understanding of the empirical results for interested readers. In particular, this may be 
useful for those whose knowledge of the issue comes from the experiences of developed 
countries by making an explicit point of some characteristics that may be unique to 
developing economies and may also be useful to those who are not so familiar with 
evaluation analysis. Secondly, if the analysis reveals systematic institutional shortfalls in 
the design or operation of P/S, these may help explain the relative under-performance of 
P/S as compared to its counterparts in the developed and transition economies. 
While the objective is to analyze the institutional framework of 
PROBECAT/SICAT with an emphasis on its decentralized nature, it may also be of use 
to illustrate programs that operate on similar basis in Mexico and other developing 
countries. It also serves the purposes of explicitly considering some of the differences 




Decentralization and publicly funded programs 
Two opposing views on the potential effects of the devolution of power to states 
exist. Supporters of decentralization call attention to the benefits of experimentation and 
competition among regions that may lead to improvements in policy making. On the 
other hand, detractors worry about a possible “race to the bottom,” where regions will 
provide just the minimum called for by the national authority. 
The issue of how power is shared across the different levels of government is not 
a new one. In 1959, Richard Musgrave published his widely (although not universally) 
accepted Theory of Public Finance, where he set down a role for the government to fix 
market imperfections, attend to the issue of income distribution and stabilize the 
economy.  
The introduction of a multi-layered government added to this scenario the need to 
discern which level would be best suited to fulfill each task, under the assumption that 
public welfare would be the ultimate objective. Wallace Oates (1972) proposed in his 
decentralization theorem that under certain conditions, it would be welfare-maximizing to 
provide a diverse set of local outputs instead of a uniform level of output across 
jurisdictions. That is, local provision of certain goods and services tailored to the needs 
and preferences of the locality would be superior to a nationally determined provision.  
There still exists room for decentralization so that local governments, which are 
better informed about the preferences of their constituents, could provide better services, 
especially in the presence of mobile households that can sort themselves according to 
their desired level of provision of public goods, as Tiebout (1956) first advanced. The 
role of the central government in this context would then be to supply resources for local 
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provision of the public good/service, while maintaining the lead in equalization and 
macroeconomic policies.  
There are a few issues that make the implementation of the guidelines of the first 
generation, as laid down in Oates’ theorem of decentralization (1972), difficult in real-
world policy making. These are brought into the light by a new body of literature arising 
in the arena of fiscal federalism that builds on this “first generation” by including 
concepts of asymmetry of information. 
As mentioned before, at the core of this “second generation of fiscal federalism” 
is the realization that public officials may not always have the public good in mind when 
making their decisions, making it necessary to understand their motives to better 
comprehend their choices.  
Additionally, the second generation highlights the importance that asymmetries of 
information have on characterizing the relationship between the different levels of 
government. A new aspect appears here, with the realization that local policy makers may 
use their informational advantage to further their own interests.  
These two elements combine themselves to deepen the problems presented by soft 
budget constraints. Weingast (1995) stresses the fiscal irresponsibility among the lower 
tiers of government that may be brought about by heavy reliance on transfers from upper 
levels. Locally oriented policy makers that count on national bailing-out for their fiscal 
liabilities are likely to raid the commons of national resources to advance their local 
policies, even beyond the point where the marginal cost of an additional dollar exceeds 
its marginal benefit. To avoid this problem, the literature has long agreed that some sort 
of co-responsibility or reliance on own revenue (as opposed to only national resources) is 
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desirable to propitiate fiscal responsibility among local policy makers. Other strands of 
the literature [see reviews by Oates (2001) or Wilson (1999)] propose that fiscal 
competition may actually exacerbate these problems. 
This is a relevant problem in public policies dealing with training for the 
unemployed and underemployed, since governments often opt for decentralizing the 
provision of these services.  
In fact, some evidence of the institutional dependence of labor policy and 
decentralization already exists. Klassen and Schneider (2001), in their comparison of the 
Canadian and German cases, briefly review a body of literature that proposes a positive 
correlation between decentralization and labor market policy performance, although they 
warn that it is not mere decentralization that matters, but the actual institutions that 
configure its functioning. 
 
The case of PROBECAT/SICAT, a framework 
The regional employment offices of the State Employment Services (SEE) 
administer P/S following the general guidelines provided by the National Employment 
Services (SNE for Servicio Nacional de Empleo in Spanish), under the Ministry of Labor, 
and using resources that come from the national coffers and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). Programs are often not institution-neutral; it seems likely 
that the interests and particularities of these three agents (the regional agencies, the 
national secretary of Labor and the IADB) play a role in the way the program is designed 
and carried out.  
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A remarkable characteristic of the program comes from the asymmetry of 
information among the agents involved. Ideally, the agent that has the best knowledge 
about the service to be provided and its recipients should be the one in charge of its 
delivery, since this would provide the best possible allocation at the lowest cost. In this 
case, the local officials are likely to have better information on the types of training that 
would be most effective in their respective states, which firms are likely to provide better 
mixed training, how to provide the training at lower cost etc. If this is true, there are 
reasons to believe the program may be best managed at the local, as opposed to the 
federal level. This would provide support for the choice of having the SEEs administer 
the particulars of the program. 
However, this general principle runs into trouble when two elements are added: 
different objectives of agents at the local level (where the program is executed) and 
national or supra-national level (where the funding comes from); and incomplete 
information. Local executors could have different objectives in mind (reelection, 
favoritism, etc.) that could easily be concealed from the funding national or supranational 
agent. Furthermore, local officials may try to take advantage of their superior information 
to extract additional funds, even beyond the point where additional money spent in their 
jurisdiction would provide lower marginal benefits than if it was spent in another 
jurisdiction.  
Various reasons exist that might explain these types of behavior among the local 
authorities. On the one hand, the training program has an array of visible benefits that 
come with little to no cost for the local authorities. Politicians working for re-election 
reap not only the good publicity of providing assistance to unemployed or 
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underemployed voters, but also of hiring local instructors to conduct the classes, and 
making the necessary purchases for the operation of the program, as well as providing the 
local businesses with a more skilled labor force to hire from. At the same time, they bear 
little of the political cost, since no taxes or fees are collected from the trainees or the 
community. Additionally, the transfers to conduct the training may substitute some of the 
funds the SEEs might have otherwise devoted to similar activities, or may help pay for 
costs the offices would have had to incur even in the absence of the program 
(administrative help, etc).  
The central agency may have reasonably good information about some of the 
costs associated with the provision of the training services (such as, for example, the 
rental cost for classrooms or the price of supplies) but may be unsure about others (such 
as which firms would provide better training at lower cost, or the best places to provide 
practical training).  
If the funding agency was able to determine exactly the cost of providing the 
training service in each state, then, given a desired level of output, it could provide just 
enough transfers to cover the costs, thereby avoiding any excessive appropriations for 
misuse of funds while being able to fix the desired level of output. Even if the central 
authority may have good information about the prices of some of the inputs, it does not 
know the cost of some others and hence, cannot determine exactly the cost that the 
regional administration will incur to provide the training.  
Following Levaggi (2002), this can be represented graphically by depicting the 
isocosts of the two levels of government. Assuming (for simplicity) that the delivery of 
the training services requires two inputs (or two bundles of inputs), and the central 
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agency knows the cost of one, but not of the other, we can present the problem in the 
following graph, where the dashed line represents the state government’s real isocost, and 
the shadowed area represents the estimate the central government has about the costs of 
delivering the service. Note that the shaded area is always above the solid line (which 
represents the assumption that the state government is more efficient in the provision of 
training services); and that as more of the input whose price is unknown to the central 
authority is required to deliver the service, the uncertainty of the central government 
regarding the cost of training increases. 
Using its superior information the state government could “exaggerate” the real 
cost of providing the training services and use the remaining resources for its own 
purposes, hire factors at a higher price to gain the favor of the providers, etc.  
As a result of this asymmetry of information, the central government may transfer 
more resources than needed to provide the good. This excess of transfers is usually 
referred to as “informational rents” and can be considered as the “price” the higher tier of 
government has to pay for the increase in efficiency of the provision of the good. 
The exact amount of the transfer is limited above by the maximum expected value 
of provision, which will be in the contour of the cost that the central government would 
face if it were to provide the service itself. The minimum possible amount of the transfer 
is in the contour of the regional government’s actual cost of providing the service/good. 
Although very simple, figure 2 is useful in representing the potential problems the 
funding authority may face in deciding to provide training services through the SEEs.  
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We turn now to discuss how the design of the program tried to reduce the 
potentially pernicious effects of the asymmetries of information while retaining the 
advantages of decentralized execution, and point to places with room for improvement.  
 




Reducing the asymmetries of information in PROBECAT/SICAT 
It is established then that the organization of the program will have three levels: 
1) Central. The execution of the program takes place in the context of the 
existent structure of the Ministry of Labor. Specifically the Sub-
Ministry of Training, Productivity and Employment (STPE), through 
the General Office of Employment (DOE), which is responsible for the 
wunknown 
      wknown 
Source: the authors 
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credit administration and the quality of the technical advice services 
given to the states. 
2) State. The states’ governments will be responsible for the planning, 
executing and supervision of the resources that they receive, through 
the State Employment Services. 
3) Local. The state employment offices, offices of the State Employment 
Services and the Training Promotion Offices (OPC, Oficinas 
Promotoras de la Capacitación in Spanish) are in charge of delivering 
the services and giving assistance to the unemployed and 
underemployed who seek the services. 
 
The IADB was obviously aware of the potential issues derived from the uneven 
information and in the original proposal of LMPP Phase I, (IADB, 2001) it cites the 
decision of the Ministry of Labor to transfer the authorization of training plans and 
payments to states’ agent as a potential risk in terms of supervision and monitoring.  
With its decision to decentralize, the Ministry of Labor is foregoing some control 
over the uses of funds in the operation of the program. Aware of the possibilities of 
misuse, the IADB negotiates with the Ministry of Labor that the transfer of authority 
would take place in phases, in which only those states that show enough resources to hire 
personnel and a demonstrated minimum level of instruments to administer the program 
would obtain that power of authorization each year the program runs. At the moment of 
the presentation of the proposal, ten states (out of thirty-two) are cleared to hold such 
authority. In its proposal, the IADB recommends the implementation of internal financial 
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control systems to be utilized at the level of the central executor (the Ministry of Labor), 
and in the state offices in charge of the payments and authorizations. The authorization of 
fund transfers for the program financer to the states is done at the central level by the 
Ministry of Labor. Along with the responsibility of authorizing specific syllabus for 
training and payments, it is established that the state government should absorb the 
payments to the administrative personnel.  
The existence of possibilities of misuse of resources is recognized in the official 
summary of Phase I of LMMP (page 5). It is acknowledged that there is a risk in the 
operation of the ESP, whose funds (from an international organization and the federation) 
are given to the National Employment Service, so that the execution of the operation will 
be decentralized and carried out by the State Employment Services. In accordance with 
the Proposal for LMMP, in order to diminish the risk of misuse of resources by the state 
governments, who act as the agents responsible of the program, the states were to be 
audited periodically. The supervision and the inspection of spent resources would be 
done through the state divisions of the DOE and the NES, whose agents would participate 
along with the IADB in the visits devoted to spending reviews. In the case of some 
misuse being detected, the state will be object of more audits and the receipt of next 
period’s resources would be restricted to the total correction of such misuse. The specific 
way in which the corrections would take place would be determined by the Bank and the 
Mexican Government.   
Still, in practice, only a few states are visited by the representatives of the IADB 
in Mexico. For example, during the year 2001, eight states were visited, and in one of 
them, Tabasco, irregularities were detected. Although the details are unclear in the 
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official documents, the transfer of resources to the state was immediately ceased and a 
special audit was performed by a third party, a consulting firm, which evaluated the 
problems that were identified and recommended changes to improve internal controls. 
There is, however, no record of whether the changes were implemented and no mention 
of a follow-up evaluation is ever made in the official documents. 
In general, as previously discussed, a number of checks have been put in place so 
that the resources for the program are spent in accordance with the objectives of the 
Ministry and the IADB. In spite of this, a number of complaints of misuse serve as 
examples of the differing objectives of the central players and the local administrators. In 
some specific cases, official complaints from regional deputies make it all the way to the 
central agents. In one, it is claimed that through the State Employment Service, a 
proportion of the federal and international resources are being used to buy votes for the 
then official political party, PRI in Tabasco (Cámara de Diputados, 1999). In other cases, 
the specific use of the misappropriated funds is not specified; such is the case of Jalisco 
(Cámara de Diputados, 2000) and Quintana Roo (Ibarra, 2005). Because the methods in 
place are not able to completely eliminate the asymmetries of information between the 
levels of government and there is evidence of some differences in objectives, it may be 
advisable to strengthen the controls on the execution of the program and/or better identify 





PROBECAT/SICAT objectives and formal jobs 
Since the very early stages of the cooperation between the IADB and the Ministry 
of Labor, it was acknowledged that an important proportion of the Mexican labor force 
was, and is, employed in the informal sector, and that it is desirable for these workers to 
move to the formal sector because of higher productivity and better employment 
conditions. “…this sector [the informal sector] is mainly characterized by low 
productivity, low wage and low skill jobs. Workers receive little or no training and jobs 
are unstable, leading to frequent spells of unemployment…” (Page 3, IADB 1996b).  
In all official documents it is evident that the kind of employment that the IADB 
and the Ministry would like to promote with the training programs is such that the 
workers are protected, have higher productivity, and require more than just very low skill, 
i.e., employment with the characteristics of formality. Hence the importance of a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the characteristics of the employment that ex-
trainees are obtaining, so that these would serve as a base for modifications (in terms of 
the contents and training categories) that more efficiently promote the desired work 
characteristics.  Completion documents of phases I and II LMMP do not refer to any of 
the job characteristics obtained by ex-trainees.  
As stated before, another potential problem with the decentralization of the 
provision of training services stems from differences in objectives among the upper and 
lower levels. The upper levels (IADB and Ministry of Labor) state that their main 
objective is to create employment, but not any kind of employment. In the Program 
Operation Rules (STPS, 2001) the Ministry of Labor markedly qualifies that the program 
is to provide training to the unemployed and underemployed population in precarious 
 
 26 
economic situations, so that they can acquire the skills and qualifications required by the 
productive sector, with the purpose of promoting their employment and enhancing their 
employment quality. 
However, local executors may have different priorities and consider the success of 
the program in terms of more visible outcomes. In particular, quantity of employment 
(rather than quality) may be a more desirable measure of success for election-bound 
agents, since the community members may notice it more easily. 
Additionally, if providing the kind of training needed to facilitate formal 
employment is more expensive than conducting training leading to informal employment, 
it would be possible to increase the number of trainees with successful outcomes (as 
perceived by the local authorities) by investing in training not as likely to improve 
employability in the formal sector.  
Table 2 contains the set of indicators used to evaluate the success of 
PROBECAT/SICAT.  
Table 2. Indicators used to evaluate the success of PROBECAT/SICAT 
INDICATOR TYPE FORMULA PERIODICITY 
Trainees’ satisfaction Quality 
Average grade(1 to 4), where 
1=unsatisfactory and 4=fully 
satisfactory 
Half-yearly 
Satisfaction reported by 
enterprises that demand 
training courses 
Quality 
Average grade(1 to 4), where 





trainees (3 months after 
graduating) 
Impact 
Number of employed trainees 
Total number of trainees 
Quarterly 
Source: Reglas de Operación, STPS 2001 
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From table 2 we can observe that none of the three indicators that the Ministry of 
Labor uses to evaluate PROBECAT/SICAT deals with formality. The same is true for the 
IADB benchmarks of success: in the End of Operations Report of LMMP’s Phase I 
(IADB, 2000), it is stated that the two indicators used to evaluate the training 
subcomponent of the program are the percentage of trainees that find employment and 
the number of scholarships given out. Furthermore, quality of employment is displaced 
by quantity as an objective outcome of the training program, The quality of training is 
evaluated only indirectly through the opinions of the trainees and the enterprises and 
although the literature that links formal evaluations with self-reports is just starting to 
develop, serious studies such as Smith, Whalley and Wilcox (2006) suggest that self-
evaluations are “…very poor substitutes for rigorous experimental or non-experimental 
estimates of program impact”.  
Given the importance placed by the IADB and the Ministry of Labor on job 
formality, its importance for long-term effects on trainees and the potential incentives 
from local executors to concentrate on outcomes other than formality, it would be 
advisable to include measures of job formality as indicators of the success of the 
program. Making this not only an explicit objective but also a key measure of the success 
of the different types of training would provide local agents with an incentive (now 
lacking) to offer the types of training that are more likely to facilitate access to a job in 
the “formal” sector. 
This may be particularly important in the case of training provided for women. 
The empirical results in the later parts of this study show that females are more likely to 
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be employed in the informal sector or in jobs that lack the characteristics of the informal 
sector, after training, than their male counterparts.  
Another example of the disconnection between the upper and lower levels 
involved in the training stems from the selection of candidates. Given the stated 
objectives of the program, it is reasonable to believe that the funding institutions would 
prefer to provide training to those who are likely to complete the course and use the 
skills/experience acquired to obtain formal employment. However, because of the 
aforementioned potential existence of different objectives, the local executor may be 
inclined to relax the entrance requirements.  
If the program is not operating at its full capacity, accepting trainees that do not 
fulfill the requirements may not be seen as a problem, but a) the program costs could be 
reduced by reducing the number of courses offered/trainees, b)  low participation could 
signal inadequacy of the training program to the needs of the population. Artificially high 
rosters could conceal and hence prevent solving this problem.  
Indeed, some evidence exists that the entrance requirements for the program are 
sometimes not observed. Based on interviews with ex-officials of the program, (Ibarra, 
2005) it is known that in a number of cases, requirements (such as age and previous 
education) were not formally enforced, which is also evident from the after-training 
surveys with the program participants. 
Simple checks would suffice to guarantee compliance with training pre-requisites. 
However, since one of the advantages of decentralizing the training services is the 
increased awareness of the local population’s needs, it may not be advisable to enforce 
complete homogeneity in the admission process a priori. A viable alternative would be to 
 
 29 
include a procedure for the purposes of allowing deviation from the general acceptance 
guidelines, which would not need to be done in an individual basis, but on a community 
basis. This would allow a better match between the needs of the community where the 
recipients of the program live and the characteristics of the training, while providing 




Budgeting of PROBECAT/SICAT 
The funds that the IADB and the national budget devoted to PROBECAT/SICAT 
are directly administered by the Ministry of Labor, who is in charge of distributing these 
resources among the states.  The exact amounts that each state receives every fiscal year 
is approved by the Chamber of Deputies and recorded in the year’s Degree on the Federal 
government's appropriation for expenditure. 
In the PROBECAT Operation Rules 2001, (STPS, 2001) it is recognized that 
there are important differences in the demographic characteristics of each state, as well as 
in their labor markets. Moreover, it is pointed out that the operative capacity of each of 
the SES’ to effectively utilize PROBECAT’s budget varies because of the differences in 
their administrative structure, the resources available from the state government, their 
promotion strategy, negotiation ability with the private sector, etc. By accounting for 
these differences, the Ministry justifies that the amounts received by each of the states for 
the operation of the training program are not homogenous.  
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More specifically, the Operation Rules 2001 (STPS, 2001), approved by the Ministry 
of Treasury (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) and also by the Chamber of 
Deputies, dictate that the amounts received by the states are determined by the following 
formula: 
)pPr,pD,Vpo,Ee,Psb(fP iiiiiii = , 
where: 
iP  is the total budget assigned to state i .  
iPsb is the projected unemployed population, plus the projected employed 
population that does not receive any labor income or receives less than one time the 
minimum wage. These projections are based on the National Population Census and the 
national employment surveys. 
iEe  represents the number of businesses in the state, in accordance with the 
National Economic Census; this includes all firms, regardless of whether they are 
registered or not in the IMSS (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). According to the 
Rules, the number of businesses will indicate the job seeker’s probability of employment 
in that particular state.  
iVpo  equals the employed population of the state calculated via national 
employment surveys.  
iipD  corresponds to the performance indicators of the SES, such as the number 
of scholarships given the preceding fiscal year and the proportion of individuals that find 
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employment. The execution of expenditure from the previous year is also taken into 
consideration   
Finally, ipPr  is the size of the population that resides in the municipalities 
classified as having medium, high, and very high socioeconomic marginalization.  
Since the 2001 fiscal year, the actual transfer of the assignation of the resources 
takes place in two stages: a first part takes place early during the fiscal year, and after a 
mid-year review of the states’ expenditure exercise, a second transfer happens. This 
conditioning of the receipt of the second part of the transfers to a review is aimed at 
providing oversight over the way in which the program operates financially and serves as 
an opportunity to exert some control on the process. Additionally, since the reviews are 
conducted while the operations are taking place rather than ex-post, these controls have 
the potential to correct mistakes rather than to simply punish them. 
Two issues of different natures and levels of importance exist with this financing 
mechanism. An administrative issue was pointed out in the completion report of phase II 
(IADB, 2001), where the Ministry noted that an important issue arises when at the 
beginning of each fiscal year the biggest proportion of the resources for the program are 
not immediately available for the states to operate the program. The practical solution has 
been to create “bridge credits” so that the states cover with their own budget the 
program’s expenses and later on the federation provides the funds assigned to each.  
More importantly, and unmentioned by any of the agents, is the fact that although 
the Operation Rules of the training program are thorough in listing the elements that play 
a part in the distribution of the resources among the thirty-two states, the document is not 
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as careful in mentioning the exact way, or the proportions, in which each element enters 
the equation, leaving vast room for interpretation. Leaving undetermined the relative 
importance of each of the factors that condition the amount of transfers may open the 
door to misuse and may compromise the effectiveness of the guidelines for careful 
budgeting.  
Furthermore, there seems to be some inconsistency between the stated desired 
outcomes of the project and the criteria for allocating resources. The formula includes 
performance indicators based only on the amount of people trained and the number of 
trainees who gain employment after training, neither of which measure the quality of the 
job attained –or the value added by the program. 
While we did not find evidence that the states request, or otherwise directly 
determine, the amounts of transfers they receive for P/S, we found that by 2001 some 
deputies have officially complained about the unequal amounts received by the states 
they represented, but even more so about the fact that the process of money transference 
was “not transparent” (Cámara de Diputados, 2001). In April of 2001, during a meeting 
of a special Chamber of Deputies commission for employment and social protection 
issues, the Minister of Labor indicated that the distribution of resources for P/S to the 
states had, up to that point, some discretional element that resulted in the fact that some 
comparatively richer states with low rates of unemployment were receiving higher 
resources than their less advantaged counterparts. At the same time it is mentioned that 
the discretion from the federal government was supported by the actions of some states. 
An unwritten budgeting rule supported this claim: a state that executed 100% of the 
federal resources received for P/S would receive an increment of 10% in the following 
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year’s transfers, or an increment equal to the inflation rate. Furthermore, poorer states 
with lower capacity to execute the program would not be able to completely spend the 
first assignation of resources of the year, which resulted in reassignment of such 
resources to richer states for the second part of the year, generating even more 
inequalities. This process resulted in states with higher capacity of executing and the 
totality of the resources (that is, the richer states) receiving more federal resources in the 
name of P/S, in the own words of the Minister “…the programs was not focused on its 
clients…it was focused on executing all its resources…” (Cámara de Diputados, 2001). 
The April meeting of the special commission ends with a promise from P/S officials in 
the federal government to add transparency to the program’s budgeting process and 
assignment of resources. 
 
Conclusions 
In the completion report of phase II (IADB, 2001), representatives of the Ministry 
of Labor consider that the program has had fine outcomes and attributes. The report 
attributes such success to the experience of the Ministry in running the program since the 
early eighties and the extensive cooperation between this governmental department and 
the IADB.  
This suggests that experience and knowledge of the conditions of the Mexican 
labor market were put to good use and raises the question of why the decentralization of 
the program took place. Arguably, the Ministry of Labor’s experience with the program 
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suggested that efficiency gains could be achieved by approximating the executor to the 
final beneficiary of the service.  
Useful techniques are in place to oversee the management of resources at the state 
level. In fact, the devolution of training responsibilities at the time when the IADB 
became the program’s main financer may have contributed to the establishment of checks 
and controls to avoid misuse, since rather than trying to fix old problems, those in charge 
may have been able to draft new processes that could have benefited from previous 
experience, both in the IADB and at the national level. Although the budgeting 
procedures include checks and controls, some room exists for more explicit definition in 
the mechanisms that determine the amounts of the transfers.  
Additionally, the publication in 1999, after phase I of the second LMMP was 
already in place, of the first official manual of rules of operation is a good step towards 
providing a clear reference framework for the agents involved. It is interesting to note 
that during Phase I the program operated without a document of this type. 
The empirical studies conducted in other parts of this dissertation also provide 
some support in favor of the PROBECAT/SICAT training programs. However, the 
results comparing the different types of training provide some indication that more of the 
courses should consist of training in large firms. This would promote a better match 
between the training provided by the program and the specific needs of businesses. 
Some of these changes have already taken place during the existence of the 
program: when the second LMMP started [1997], a reduction in the proportion of in-
 
 35 
classroom scholarships with respect to those for mixed training took effect
4
. This was a 
response to the finding that in previous years, the percentage of individuals finding jobs 
was higher for participants in the mixed training than for those in the in-classroom 
training. A next step would consider fine-tuning the kind of mixed training to maximize 
its effectiveness. 
Also, the results regarding outcomes in terms of formality suggest that the 
inclusion of certain levels of job quality as an abstract objective of the 
PROBECAT/SICAT may not be enough. Furthermore, since local authorities might not 
share the same objectives in terms of outcome as the funding agencies, it may be 
necessary to include explicit objectives in terms of formality among the outcome 
variables used to evaluate the success of the programs. 
Notwithstanding the great reviews given to the program from both sides (the 
IADB and the Ministry), possibilities for misuse of resources exist and have been 
documented in the past (such as in the above-mentioned cases of Jalisco, Tabasco and 
Quintana Roo). These problems may be explained partially by the asymmetry of 
information and objectives among the different tiers of government involved in the 
training. Little can be done to alter the objectives of the executing agencies, but it is 
possible to create mechanisms to minimize the incentives to deviate from the program’s 
stated objectives.  
Future work could benefit from looking into the possible effects of the electoral 
cycle in PROBECAT/SICAT and exploring whether the possibility of loosely 
                                                 
4
 In particular, the percentage changed to include 80% of the training corresponding to the mixed category, 
and only 20% to the in-classroom category. 
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interpreting the funding formulae has been used to funnel resources along party lines 
across different levels of government. Another channel for future research may propose a 
detailed incentive structure for the local executors based on a reformulation of the 
measures of success of the program to include quality and not only quantity of 
employment.  
As we move into chapter II, that deal with the empirical investigation of the 
effects of training on a series of outcomes, it is important to keep in mind that the 
program does not operate in isolation from its institutional background. For example, at 
best, previous studies of P/S only take into consideration the basic requisites for entry 
into training program, detailed in the rules of operation. However, as our personal 
interviews showed, these were not the actual rules used to qualify for entry into the 
program, since discretion at the local level was allowed. By using the formal rules of 
entry, rather than the de-facto ones, these studies are using the incorrect information, 
which may affect their results. 
An interesting result when taking the institutional framework into consideration in 
the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of P/S is the fact that I find positive effects for 




Chapter 4: Training and job formality: impact evaluation of the 
training component of the Mexican active labor market policies 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the training component of one such policy in 
Mexico:  PROBECAT-SICAT (P/S). Specifically, it investigates its effects on their 
likelihood of formal employment for participants in the program. Poverty levels in 
developing economies are associated with an important proportion of the population 
working in unregulated settings, with low productive capacity, which in turn restricts the 
ability to generate higher incomes. A very desirable characteristic of an anti-poverty 
program in this background will be its capacity to weaken this poverty circle. I propose 
the consideration of supplemental outcome variables that capture the ability of the 
training to update the skills of its trainees, so that their possibilities of better work 
conditions, equated here with formal employment
5
, increase.  
I find evidence that the impact of the program is positive with respect to the 
number of hours worked and on the probability of employment for men and women, 
supporting some of the results found in the first evaluations of PROBECAT/SICAT. On 
the other hand, while the official evaluations
6
 of the program find a positive impact on 
earnings, I found no impact on the labor income of the trainees. I also show that 
participation in P/S increases the probability of employment with health benefits, which I 
propose might be due to the extension of medical benefits obtained during training. 
                                                 
5
 There is a distinction made by the ILO regarding employment in the formal sector and formal 
employment (Haussmans, 2004), here I refer to the second concept. 
6
 These are studies made to fulfill the relatively new government requirement to periodically obtain impact 
evaluations of the program. 
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Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the program has a positive impact on the 
probability of employment with informal characteristics for women, such as employment 
with a verbal contract, self or unpaid employment and work in businesses without a fixed 
address. For men and women participation in the training program promotes employment 
in micro enterprises. 
In this chapter I estimate the average effects of the program on probability of 
employment, wages, monthly income, and a set of variables, proposed in the literature, 
that differentiate formal from informal employment. The estimates are obtained by 
standard linear regression methods and semi-parametric methods: propensity score 
matching in two versions, nearest neighbor (for illustrative purposes) and kernel 
matching. I show that my estimates are unlikely to suffer from contamination biases or 
general equilibrium effects, and I also discuss future cost-benefit analyses. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature along two dimensions. 
Methodologically, it solves a number of problems in previous evaluations. First, it 
acknowledges the potential existence of contamination bias in the available comparison 
groups. Second, it recognizes both the urban and rural character of PROBECAT/SICAT 
and proposes the use of a more appropriate comparison group in such terms. Third, it 
acknowledges both the official administrative rules of the program and the de facto rules 
of program participation.  The second dimension in which this chapter complements the 
earlier literature is by recognizing the necessity of adding “formality” or “job quality” 





Evidence of Success of the Training component of ALMP 
 
In their review of impact evaluations, Betcherman, et al, (2004) indicate that, in 
general, participants of the training components of ALMP benefit from participation in 
terms of probability of employment but not in terms of higher earnings. They also find 
that the results for such programs in developing economies are even less favorable. The 
types of programs that work best are those that include some component of on-the-job 
training, where potential employers are involved in the training process. Finally, they find 
that women benefit more than men. 
Betcherman, et al, examine 49 evaluations of training programs from which 35 are for 
industrialized countries, 10 are from transition economies and finally, 4 are from 
development economies. Most of these impact evaluations are conducted by using quasi-
experimental methods.  
The authors find that especially for the long-term unemployed, training did not 
have any positive impact in industrialized economies and that the results for these 
countries seem to be positively correlated with the business cycle. It was also found that 
the programs that showed positive effects were those conducted in small-scale, on-the-job 
programs that were focused on specific labor market needs. The success of training 
programs on probabilities of employment in industrialized countries seems to vary 
significantly according with the type of training being offered. Betcherman et al, find that 
on-the-job training has some positive effects while programs with only an in-classroom 
training component did not have any effect. 
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The evaluations conducted in transition countries always present positive effects 
of training for the unemployed. This result contrasts with the mixed evidence found in 
developing economies, where the evaluations are mostly concentrated on Latin American 
training programs. Betcherman, et al, find that while the effects of the program found in 
the overall population vary from country to country and from study to study. A common 
factor is that on-the-job training implies better results than in-classroom training and that 
positive effects are mostly confined to women. 
Training and Retraining programs in Latin America 
 
 Programs with similar characteristics to those of PROBECAT-SICAT in other 
Latin American countries also constitute central components of their strategies against 
poverty.  Most of such programs are directed to the youngest segment of the population 
in the labor force, including: Peru’s and Uruguay’s “ProJoven”, Chile’s “Chile Joven” 
and Argentina’s “Programa Joven”. Colombia and Argentina additionally have training 
courses for the unemployed, which are not restricted to any age group, named SENA and 
Proempleo respectively. 
All evaluations of these programs consider outcomes, such as: the probability of 
employment, earnings or hourly wages, search time after training, and in the case of the 
Peru’s evaluation (GRADE, 2001), probability of employment in large firms. 
Galasso, Ravallion and Salvia (2001), evaluate Promempleo, an experiment 
designed to measure the relative efficacy of receiving training, receiving a voucher for a 
wage subsidy for employers, or not receiving either of the two. The authors find that 
training has no effect on employment, while obtaining a voucher has a positive effect on 
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employment, but not on wages.  They also found that these results are mainly confined to 
women and young participants.  Similarly, in the case of SENA in Colombia, a non-
experimental econometric technique is used to measure participation impacts (Medina 
and Nunez, 2001), specifically propensity score matching estimators.  The authors, 
Medina and Nunez, find no evidence of positive impacts of the program either on 
probability of employment or on wages.   
While training programs for the general population seem to have no positive 
effects according to these two pieces of research, the evidence from youth programs is 
definitely more hopeful.  Three evaluations study the Projoven (Uruguay) and Chile 
Joven experiments (For Chile: Santiago Consultores Asociados, 1998. For Uruguay: 
Naranjo, 2002, and Fawcett, 2002) and find that the impacts of training courses increase 
the probability of employment, as well as hourly wages. The positive results from these 
evaluations are in line with those found by Aedo and Nunez (2001), and GRADE (2001) 
for Argentina and Peru, respectively; both evaluations estimate the impacts of the 
programs by semi-parametric evaluation techniques. 
Training and Retraining Programs in Mexico 
In brief, evaluations of training programs in Latin America show positive effects 
of policies whose population of interest is young; nevertheless, there is no evidence of 
success when such policies are directed to the general unemployed or unemployed 
population. 
In the case of PROBECAT-SICAT there are just a handful of evaluations on its 
performance, mainly due to the inexistence of appropriate data. Table 3 presents a 
summary of the results of previous P/S evaluations. The evidence on the performance of 
 
 42 
P/S provided by these studies seems sometimes contradictory. This can be explained by 
the fact that some studies (like the official evaluations of the program) might not be 
taking into full consideration some important aspects, such as the possibility of selection 
bias, . In the cases where the studies have considered all these aspects, the differences can 
be explained by the parameters used in the evaluation, such as marginal effects in the 
case of Navarro-Lozano (2003). In what follows I describe and analyze these previous 
studies in detail. 
The first evaluation of what was then called PROBECAT responded to the desire 
of the Mexican government and the World Bank to obtain information on the results of 
the program at a time when a sizeable augmentation of it was being proposed. This first 
evaluation was performed by World Bank staff; in particular, Revenga, Riboud and Tan 
(1992) evaluate the impact of training on a very complete set of outcome or “success” 
measurements that include employment at 3, 9, and 12 months after completion of the 
program, length of unemployment at time of first job, monthly labor income, hourly 
wages and hours worked weekly. Additionally they perform a cost-benefit analysis using 
administrative data. In this study the two available training options are considered: 

















increases wages increases earnings
men: yes men: yes men: no evidence men: yes
women: no evidence women: yes women: no evidence women: no evidence
men: no evidence men: no (reduces)
women: no evidence women: no (reduces)
men: no evidence
women: yes
men: no evidence men: no (reduces)
women: yes women: yes
men in 2001: yes                  
men in 2002: yes
men in 2001: yes,    
men in 2002: yes
women in 2001: yes,      
women in 2002: yes
women in 2001: yes, 
women in 2002: yes
Navarro-Lozano (2003) men: no (reduces)
men in 2003: yes                   
men in 2004: no (reduces)
men in 2003: yes,    
men in 2004: yes
women in 2003: yes    women 
in 2004: no (reduces)
women in 2003: yes, 
women in 2004: yes
GEA (2002) 
ANALITICA (2004) 
Source: Individual studies listed in references
Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1992)
Wodon and Minowa (1999)
Aportela (1999) 
Calderón-Madrid and Trejo 




To evaluate the impact of the program the authors use a retrospective survey of a 
random sample of trainees and compare it to a group of non-participants. As a source of 
information on the trainees the authors use a follow-up survey obtained in early 1992 of 
the trainee cohort of 1990. The comparison group is obtained from the National Urban 
Employment Survey (ENEU), a quarterly panel survey that included information on 
individuals living in 16 urban communities of 100,000 or more inhabitants. The survey 
instruments applied to both groups contain the same questions on labor outcomes; in 
addition the calendar quarters used to extract individuals from the ENEU where made to 
match the timing of the information from the treated group. During this time 
PROBECAT was only available in urban areas, so the fact that ENEU does not include 
individuals living in rural areas does not affect the analysis.  
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One issue that might arise is the fact that in ENEU there is no information on the 
participation of the interviewees in the training program, hence the authors could be 
including participants in the comparison group, which would lead to contamination bias. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the magnitude of PROBECAT until 1993 was very small in 
comparison with the eligible population indicates this is not a major problem. 
The authors use two different approaches for the estimation of impacts on rates 
out of unemployment, and their continuous outcomes: income, hours and wages.  
As a first step they calculate the probability of participation using the pooled 
sample of treated and ENEU, the set of explanatory variables in this calculation follows 
strictly the official eligibility criterion for participation in the program set by the Ministry 
of Labor. Then individuals from the ENEU sample with a low probability of participation 
(where the cut point is less than 0.6) are eliminated from the comparison group. 
Incorporating the probability of participation calculated in step 1 (from the reduced 
pooled sample), the authors calculate Cox proportional hazard rates out of 
unemployment. Their results show that for men the average duration of unemployment 
for the comparison group is 30% higher than that for the trainee group; they find no effect 
on female trainees.  
For earnings, hours and wages, Revenga, Riboud and Tan use Heckman’s (1979) 
two-step estimator for sample selection models; for this purpose they recalculate the 
probability of participation for the restricted pooled sample, adding a few explanatory 
variables. With this technique they find that male trainees earn 17.7 % more than non-
trainees, and work 7.8 hours more than non-participants; however, they find no difference 
in hourly wages. On average, women who participated in the program also worked more 
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(6 hours per week), although the coefficients on earnings and wages were not statistically 
significant. Finally, for men the probabilities of employment in a large firm are, on 
average, higher than those for the untrained. 
A number of critiques can be made of Revenga, Riboud and Tan’s study. The 
authors are correct in being cautious and calculating the probability of participation to 
correct for potential selection bias. However, their choice of explanatory variables is very 
limited and includes only those indicators determined by PROBECAT officials for 
eligibility criteria; in the case of the estimation of their continuous variables it is not clear 
there is an exclusion restriction, necessary for accurate estimations. It is very likely that 
selection is not being accounted for given that other very important factors are being left 
out, such as variables that capture the labor market history of the individual, the labor 
market in which he is immersed, etc. 
Another matter to take into consideration is the calculation of the rates out of 
unemployment. The problem in the authors’ calculation consists in the potential 
existence, and non-correction, of dynamic selection bias (Eberwein, Ham and Lalonde, 
1997, Dolton, Azevedo and Smith, 2006). PROBECAT ends unemployment spells by not 
allowing individuals to keep looking for jobs (or working) while in training, in this paper 
the exit rate from unemployment is calculated from a “fresh unemployment spell” 
(Eberwein, Ham and Lalonde, 1997), that is, the unemployment spell that initiates at the 
time training is over. The selection bias would result from differential sorting by trained 
and untrained individuals into different unemployment spells, the estimation of exit rates 
out of unemployment would be misleading if the duration of the first job is not the same 
for treatment and comparison units. 
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Finally, on the estimation of the program impact on wages, hours worked and 
labor income, even when the authors do take into consideration self-selection into 
program participation, they do not recognize and take care of another selection process, 
and hence another potential bias: the selection into participating in the job market. 
 This last critique is also recognized in a reevaluation of PROBECAT conducted 
by Wodon and Minowa (1999). In this study they question the effectiveness of the 
methods of Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1994) and of a recent study conducted by the 
Ministry of Labor in 1995, which uses the same methods and obtain the same results as 
Revenga, Riboud and Tan. Wodon and Minowa (1999) propose alternative ways to deal 
with potential selection bias; specifically, they suggest an estimation procedure for 
unemployment exit rates that incorporates a calculated index of participation in which 
selection bias is eliminated by the use of an instrumental variable, namely the availability 
of training per state.  With this method, the authors find no evidence that participation in 
the training program reduces the length of unemployment for either men or women. 
Wodon and Minowa (1999) also calculate the impact of the training on wages in a 
bivariate normal selection model, employing a Heckman two–step estimator. As part of 
the first stage they determine the participation of the individual in the labor market. The 
results of their analysis suggest negative impacts of the training on wages.  
 Their work advanced the literature in two main ways: first, they recognized the 
necessity of including a behavioral model when estimating participation in the program, 
which is necessary if selection biases are to be properly corrected; secondly, they 
recognized the potential existence of contamination bias due to the fact that we do not 
know for certain whether any of the individuals in the comparison group (ENEU) are 
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non-participants. However, a critique is still in order: the authors’ idea of using an 
instrumental variable (IV) to eliminate selection bias is an appropriate one, but their 
chosen variable is not completely appropriate. Local labor market indicators, like their 
proposed IV, will have an impact on both potential outcomes (in the case of non-
participation) and probabilities of participation (Smith & Todd, 2005). Additionally, even 
when they show that the availability of the training positively influences the probability 
of participation, its marginal effect is small (0.107), which casts even more doubt on the 
appropriateness of this variable as a valid IV (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 1995). 
An important proportion of the scholarly research on PROBECAT/SICAT that 
followed the aforementioned works used the same source of information on the trainees 
and to construct a comparison group (Aportela 1999: Calderón-Madrid and Trejo, 2001; 
Calderón-Madrid, 2003; Calderón-Madrid, 2006; and Navarro Lozano, 2003). In 
particular, the source used was the Encuesta de Seguimiento de Egresados del Probecat 
(ESEP), which covers individual labor information on unemployment and employment 
spells, wages and benefits of the trainees of 1993, for the treatment group; following 
slightly different criteria for each study, the comparison group was taken from the sample 
of individuals included in ENEU. 
Aportela (1999) studies the impact of program participation on the probability of 
leaving unemployment. The author analyzes the problem with two different methods, 
hazard models
7
, and propensity score matching: in both cases a comparison group of 
ENEU is constructed considering only unemployed individuals with unemployment 
spells censored at 64 weeks at the most. For both the estimation techniques presented in 
Aportela (1999), participation in the program increases the probability of leaving 
                                                 
7
 Weibull, exponential and Cox. 
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unemployment by 20% for the mixed training type, and by 60% for the school-based 
type. An important contribution of Aportela (1999) to the literature is the recognition of 
the potentially different effects of training by gender; when the analysis is performed 
separately for male and female participants, we note that while for the former group the 
estimated benefit of participation is not significant, for women is substantial. 
Nevertheless it needs to be noted that this carefully conducted work does not expose the 
misleading interpretations that might result from the comparison of a propensity score 
matching estimations and a hazard rate model estimations. While the first method gives 
us, on average, the differential in the probabilities of employment at certain point in time, 
a level, the second method will give us a rate. A related consideration is the fact that the 
length of the first employment is not necessarily equal for individuals in the comparison 
and in the treatment group, that is, there is a possibility of dynamic selection bias if the 
treated and comparison groups are not sorted similarly into unemployment spells (Dolton, 
Azevedo and Smith, 2006).  
These previous research efforts, as the first contributions to the practice of impact 
evaluation of social programs in Mexico, constitute the stepping stones to a new and 
especially relevant branch in the literature. The following works are not only concerned 
with the estimation of impacts over the typically considered outcome variables in 
developing countries, they propose the inclusion of additional variables that would reflect 
the impacts of the program on the special characteristics of a labor market in a 
developing country. 
In Calderón-Madrid and Trejo (2001), Calderón-Madrid (2003) and Calderón-
Madrid (2006), the authors investigate the impact of participation in the program on re-
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employment dynamics, understood as  two different stages in the employment history 
after training: the estimated number of weeks necessary to find a job and number of 
weeks of employment in that job. The two estimates are obtained using multi-spell mixed 
proportional hazard techniques.  Restricting the sample of trainees and comparisons to 
those with work experience, they find evidence that given participation in the program 
women find jobs more quickly, while men do not; nevertheless, for both men and 
women, the spell of duration of first employment spell is higher than for the non-
participants. In addition, Calderón-Madrid and Trejo (2001) and  Calderón-Madrid 
(2003) present estimates of the impact of the program on post-training hourly wages 
obtained using propensity score matching, and find that the impact is negative for men 
and positive for women. While the set of independent variables used in their analysis is 
very complete, including terms of employment formality before training such as access to 
health benefits, it is not economically explained or justified. The implicit assumption of 
selection on observables, even when not justified, is suspected to be valid in this context: 
the surveys from where the treated and comparison groups are taken from (retrospective 
survey 1994 and ENEU, respectively) provide enough information to model participation 
decisions and potential outcomes. Nevertheless, the fact that the comparison group is 
extremely limited in size is worrisome, it is not clear if the matching is done with or 
without replacement, and the authors do not provide any discussion on the comparability 
of the treatment and the comparison groups before or after the matching (e.g. balancing 
tests).  
The discussion of what constitutes a policy relevant parameter is the central topic 
in Navarro-Lozano (2003). As aforesaid, one of the main objectives of the first 
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evaluations of PROBECAT was to obtain information to support the growth of the 
program; the positive report of Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1992) and STPS (1995) served 
this purpose. However, while these two studies obtain information on the average effects 
of the treatment on the treated, they do not consider marginal treatment effect on 
individuals who would participate in the program if it grew, which is the main interest of 
Navarro-Lozano (2003). The author uses the sample of male trainees cohort of 1993, and 
the unemployed men in ENEU 1993 as a comparison group, to estimate the impact of the 
training in hourly wages using two methods: matching and a selection model where 
treatment parameters can be expressed as different weighed averages of the marginal 
treatment effect (MTE), called the local instrumental variable estimator (LIVE) by 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001). Using these two methods, the author estimates the average 
treatment effect; the result produced by the matching estimator is negative, while the 
impact of treatment using the LIVE estimator is positive. As a second stage, the marginal 
treatment effect of a simulated increment in the availability of the program is estimated 
using LIVE, which gives as a result  a negative impact on wages for those individuals at 
the margin of participating.  
Navarro-Lozano (2003) contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of 
what the author calls “policy relevant” parameters, at the same time it is relevant to 
consider that the calculation of the MTE in this paper is obtained over simulated data that 
assumes an equally distributed increase in the provision of the training, which is not 
necessarily the case. Given that more information is available now and that the program 
in fact grew it would be desirable and possible to recalculate the parameter. Another 
important issue to point out is that the comparison group is restricted to those individuals 
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with work experience who were unemployed at the beginning of 1993, and had a paid job 
five quarters later. This is very restrictive considering PROBECAT did not ensure 
employment for all its trainees, and that the service was also offered for underemployed 
individuals. 
Since 1998, the National Survey on Job Matching and Continuance (ENCOPE) is 
applied to a random sample (1% sample) of graduates each year. The information 
obtained from ENCOPE has been the main source of information for two of the impact 
evaluations that private consulting firms have performed on P/S, GEA (2002) that 
evaluates the impacts of the program on the trainee cohorts of 2001 and 2002, and 
ANALITICA (2004) that presents estimation results on impacts over the cohorts of 2003 
and 2004.  These two evaluations were done to cover the government requirement of 
evaluation of the program and are not available to the public. The parameters of interest 
in both reports are the probability of employment and monthly income.  Although they 
mention using a propensity score matching technique, the estimates presented in the 
reports are those obtained by a Heckman two-step estimation of the bivariate selection 
model; it is not clear from their reports what exclusion restriction is used . The results for 
the cohorts of 2001, 2002 and 2003 are positive for men and women in terms of the 
probability of employment and monthly income; on the other hand, the impact of the 
training on the cohort of 2004 appears to be negative in terms of probability of 
employment, and positive in terms of income. A common and very serious problem in the 
reports is that the first step of their estimation considers just a handful of important 
variables, gender, education and age which, very probably, would not be enough to solve 
the selection bias problem; additionally, the calculation of the second step considers also 
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a just a few independent variables. These problems suggest that the results of these 
reports should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Contribution to the Literature 
This chapter solves a number of the problems in the previous literature: first, as 
noted before, only one of these previous studies (Wodon and Minowa, 1999) 
acknowledges the potential existence of contamination bias. If in fact an important 
proportion of the comparison groups used consists of trained individuals, the estimation 
of any of the parameters will be biased and provide misleading policy implications. The 
presence of this bias is examined in this work, and I provide the first empirical 
application of the technique proposed by Smith (2006), that solves this problem for 
matching estimation techniques. 
I add to the present literature by recognizing both the urban and rural character of 
PROBECAT/SICAT, and by proposing the use of a more appropriate comparison group, 
the National Employment Survey (ENE), to conduct an evaluation that does not uniquely 
include or give higher weights to the population trained in urban areas
8
. 
Third, to estimate the relevant parameters, this research investigates and takes into 
consideration not only the official administrative rules of program participation but also 
the de facto rules that govern elegibility at the street level. For the first time in the 
literature on P/S., I recognize the importance of the de facto rules that play an important 
role in the restrictions that the researcher should impose when defining a correct 
comparison group. The principles followed for acceptance in the program are of great 
                                                 
8
 The available data of former trainees is representative at two levels: national and by training type. Given 
that the sampling framework did not considered a rural/urban division, differentiated estimates by these 
zones will not be representative. 
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importance, because they can significantly change the characteristics of the participants 
and hence alter the outcomes provided by the training. If the actual practices differ 
significantly from the official guidelines, studies based on the latter ones may be missing 
an important piece of information that could impact their results.  
Finally, at the core of this chapter is the evaluation of the program in its ability to 
promote the employment of its trainees in more formal, higher quality, jobs. Following 
their methodological and conceptual predecessors, the relatively new evaluations in 
developing countries have considered outcome indicators pertinent to developed 
countries. Nevertheless, there are several additional measurements of a programs’ success 
that are relevant for developing economies.  
Poverty levels in developing economies are associated with an important 
proportion of the population working in unregulated settings, with low productive 
capacity, and with the production and distribution of goods and services in a small scale, 
which in turn restricts the ability to generate higher incomes (Sethuraman, 1998). A 
desirable, more so, imperative characteristic of an anti-poverty program in this 
background will be its capacity to weaken this poverty circle. This chapter advances the 
analysis of what works and what does not, when it comes to designing and implementing 
policies directed at improving the chances of formal employment.   
Participants in PROBECAT-SICAT 
Until 2004 the official requirements to participate in any of the training 
components of SICAT-PROBECAT did not change significantly. The first stage in the 
application process consisted of the interested individuals interviewing with an SES agent 
who determined, based on individual characteristics and interests, whether they should 
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apply for any of the SICAT programs. Once it was decided that an individual should 
apply for SICAT, the application consisted of a personal registration form, which was 
filled in with verifiable information. From this information it would be determined 
whether the individual met the requirements to be offered training. 
For SICAT/PROBECAT, the general requirements of participation are the following: 
1) Applying directly for one of the programs in the employment office in her state 
(i.e. register in a SES); 
2) Being 16 years old or older; 
3) Being unemployed, underemployed or not working due to firm inactivity; 
4) Covering the education level requirements specific to the course/training of 
interest. 
The SES works on a “first come, first served” system, conditional on the basic 
requirements being satisfied, although it gives preference to individuals who are the sole 
source of income for their families. The SES considers applicants who might have 
participated previously in a SICAT program, as long as the total time in a 
SICAT/PROBECAT program does not exceed 6 months over the lifetime of the 
individual. Nevertheless, is not clear whether this limitation is enforced or not. 
Once selected, the trainees are informed about the details of the program. The 
trainees receive a stipend, health insurance (in some cases this includes only accident 
insurance) and the necessary tools for the course. In the case of the health benefits and 
accident insurance, their quality, type or coverage is not specified. The provision of these 
services is not determined at the national level, but by the state offices and, in some 
cases, by the participating firms. The providers of health insurance could be of a private 
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or public nature. In the case of the latter, the trainees would have to be affiliated to the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) or similar institutions. Alternatively, 
individuals could receive health insurance from the private sector, which, in general, 
provides higher quality services and has better facilities. However, private providers will 
charge market prices for basic health insurance, while access to IMSS will be jointly 
financed by the federal government and the firm (in cases where the insurance during 
training is to be covered by the firm). For this reason it would be reasonable to believe 
that a great proportion of the health insurance will be provided by IMSS or similar public 
institutions. Nevertheless, the quality and type of medical services that the trainees would 
have access to might still be very heterogeneous. Unfortunately, I do not have 
information on the providers of such benefits.  
Additionally, while in the program, trainees are not allowed to work and might be 
suspended if they do not comply with attendance requirements. Also, for each day the 
trainees do not attend there is a deduction in their stipend. The maximum length of the 
training period varies between 1 and 3 months. Table 4 shows each modality’s official 
requirements, trainee rights, duration and supplier of the service for the modalities I 
evaluate in 2002. 
Finally, even when the requirements for each modality of the program are 
specified, in practice, individuals are not necessarily asked to provide evidence of 
coverage of each of them. Interviews with program officials conducted during the second 
quarter of 2005 revealed that the selection process is not rigid, (Flores Lima, 2005) and 
that the service is provided as long as the individual assures program staff that she is 
subject to difficult labor conditions, i.e., that she is unemployed or underemployed. This 
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de facto selection process, relative to the official requirements of the program, needs to 
be taken into detailed consideration when defining the first part of the estimation process; 
the individuals that request the service do not necessarily fulfill the official requirements. 
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Evaluation of PROBECAT-SICAT 
Outcome Variables 
In addition to the estimation of the impact of the participation in the training 
program on monthly income, hours worked and probability of employment, I propose the 
use of additional variables that will measure the impact of the program on the probability 
of formal employment, or a job in the formal sector. A question that immediately arises 
is: how to define what differentiates formal from informal work? 
Although there is no consensus on what informal employment means, 
traditionally, informal workers have been defined as those who obtain jobs in the less 
advantaged sector of a dualistic labor market (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Chandra, 1992; 
Loayza, 1994). More recent studies  such as Maloney (2004), equate the informal sector 
with the unregulated, developing country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial small 
firm sector in developed countries. Under this definition we would consider the 
selfemployed and the owners and employers of small businesses as informal workers. 
It was during the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians in 1993, 
when the first attempt to design a standardized definition of informality took place (Daza, 
2005). Informality was defined in terms of the characteristics of the “units of 
production”: the businesses and enterprises. The proposed definition for statistical 
purposes had as a base the size of the production unit, in terms of the number of 
individuals working in the business. The logic behind this definition was that the size of 
the company was correlated with its compliance with legal requirements. Nevertheless, 
this definition, by itself, is not very informative since the majority of employment in 
developing countries takes place in small scale enterprises (Daza, 2005).  
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In Mexico the National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI) defines informal work as “all those economic activities that operate using the 
resources of the households, but without becoming or constituting enterprises with a 
separated legal personality from those households” (INEGI, 2002). 
In 2002 the International Labour Organization suggested a change in the base 
concept of informal employment: from enterprise based to job based. The definition of 
informal employment was then: “[employment]…not subject to national labor legislation, 
income taxation, social protection, or entitlement to certain employment benefits for 
reasons such as: non-declaration of the jobs or the employees…” (Hussmanns, 2004). 
Given the lack of agreement among definitions, I propose a collection of variables 
that cover the most commonly considered definitions of formal jobs in the literature. 
Along with the aforementioned outcome variables (income, hours and employment), I 
will evaluate the impact of the training on the following: 
a) Employment and Health benefits: The social insurance law (Ley del Seguro 
Social (2002), Article 12) establishes that all paid employees, members of 
cooperatives and other persons determined by the executive power should 
receive access to medical benefits, provided by IMSS
9
 (Article 11 of the Ley 
del Seguro Social). Article 11 of the same law establishes that these employees 
are to receive: work related risk insurance, health and maternity insurance, life 
and handicap insurance, old age lay off insurance, daycare and other social 
benefits. All health services provided by clinics and hospitals from the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS). 
                                                 
9
 The health insurance offered by IMSS includes outpatient and inpatient care in its own hospitals and 
clinics, prenatal care, childbirth, specialists and supply of prescription drugs. 
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b) Employment with housing credit: The Constitution (Constitución Política de 
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Article 123) establishes that all individuals 
under a labor contract, irrespective of whether this contract is written or verbal, 
should receive a low rate credit that could be applied to buying, building or 
repairing a dwelling. The employer and the federal governments provide the 
funds for these credits. 
c) Employment with other cash benefits: Includes end of the year bonuses and 
others. 
d) Employed in a micro business: Following the original definition of informal 
sector by size, I examine the possibility of being employed in what in Mexico 
is defined as a micro enterprise. The official definition of a micro enterprise, in 
2002, was a firm that consists of at most 10 individuals including the employer 
(Martínez-Kasten, 2005). 
e) Employed as self-employed or without payment: The group of individuals 
working without payment is usually differentiated as working for a family 
member or not. In this case I aggregate these two classifications.  
f) Employed with a verbal contract: The survey instruments only consider two 
possibilities: a written contract or a verbal one. The possibility of the 
inexistence of a contract is not recognized, although it is reasonable to believe 
that individuals without a contract would classify themselves as having a 
verbal one. 
g) Employed in businesses without a specific residence (businesses without 
residence, hereafter): The businesses included in this group are those that do 
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not have a specific building or permanent structure exclusively used to conduct 
their activities. These include street vendors, and individuals that conduct their 
businesses from their own dwellings, using household resources as inputs. 
Appendix A presents a detailed description of the variables included as outcomes 
in my analysis.  
Evaluation questions and causality 
The following econometric analysis tries to answer the general question: what is 
the average gain for the participants of PROBECAT-SICAT with respect to the scenario 
in which no participation occurs? That is, the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), defined as: 
)1D|YY(E 01 =− , 
To determine the effect of the training on the outcome variables, I will use the 
potential outcome approach to causality proposed by Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974), in 
which the evaluation can be reduced to a comparison between two general treatments:  
the treatment of interest (treatment 1), in this case participating in any training modality, 
and the absence of training (treatment 0) on the outcome or response variable, Y . Define 
also a vector X , which includes the attributes or characteristics of the individual that are 
not affected by exposure to either of the two treatments. Additionally, define the outcome 
variable as 1Y  if the individual is exposed to treatment 1 and 0Y if the individual is 
exposed to treatment 0. Finally, define an indicator of participation as { }1,0D∈ , where 
1D =  if the individual is exposed to treatment 1 and 0D =  if exposed to treatment 0; 
then for an individual i  the observed outcome is )YY(DYY i0i1oii −+= . The causal 
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effect of the training on outcomes, defined as the difference between the outcomes i1Y  
and i0Y , can never be obtained given that for each i  we cannot observe both, i1Y  and i0Y . 
To obtain the ATT we need to estimate )1D|Y(E 0 = , which we do not observe, 
using )0D|Y(E 0 = , the average outcome of non-participants, which we do observe. The 
problem with using )1D|Y(E 1 = - )0D|Y(E 0 =  to estimate the impacts of the treatment 
instead of )1D|Y(E 1 = - )1D|Y(E 0 =  is that this will generally yield a biased result.  
This is a problem of selection bias: the sample of trainees is not random; it might 
be the case that people receive training based on characteristics that also influence their 
outcome variables (employment status, wages, etc).  
Unfortunately, there exists no experimental data from PROBECAT-SICAT. The 
alternative non-experimental method I use is a semi-parametric matching technique. 
Matching reweights a group of untreated individuals so that the distribution of their 
observable characteristics is similar to that of the group of individuals that participated in 
the treatment. After the matching, it compares the outcomes of the two groups.  
The basic underlying assumption for matching estimation is the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA). When the variables that influence both outcomes in the 
untreated case and participation are observable (captured in X ), matching techniques can 
yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment on the treated. To rightfully invoke the CIA it 
is necessary to make the case that I have a set of observed variables X, such that the 
group does not differ from the treatment group in any variable that links the participation 
in the training systematically to the non-participation outcome.  
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The matching estimation procedure additionally requires that 1)X|1D(P <=  
over the values of X , i.e., the estimation has to be performed over a common support 
region. This guarantees that all individuals in the treatment group would have an 
analogue in the comparison group. 
Specifically, for this analysis I will use propensity score matching, which implies 
the calculation of the conditional probability of participation over the vector of observed 
characteristics X, ( )xX|DP)X(P ==≡ 1 . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if it 
is possible to match on X, then it is possible to match on P(X), the propensity score; that 
is to say, if the CIA holds for X, it also holds for P(X). 
Description of Variables 
Before calculating the average impact of the program on its trainees, I sketch the 
behavioral model behind the decision to participate in the program. I start by assuming 
that a potential participant is rational and in order to maximize his expected utility, he 
will decide to participate given the set of costs and expected benefits posed by the 
program. Below I discuss in more detail the elements that play a role in the magnitude 
and direction of the potential benefits of the program, which are in turn elements in the 
determination of the participation decision. 
In a world of asymmetric information, where the prospective employee has more 
and more accurate information on his productivity than the prospective employer, 
participation in the training program might increase the probability of employment and 
possibly lead to higher employment quality (better work conditions), if having 
participated in SICAT serves as a signal of higher productivity with respect to non- 
participants (Spence, 1973).  
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Nevertheless, the training program itself is designed to actually increase the stock 
of human capital of the trainees, so that there is a real upgrade of the workers’ abilities, 
and hence a potentially higher probability of employment, pay and other benefits. 
Accumulated human capital stock at the time of the training provides a measure of 
average unobserved ability, which has implications for potential benefits and probability 
of participation in the program: higher ability persons get on average more schooling. 
Formal education is also associated with a higher average labor income (Ashenfelter and 
Krueger, 1994), which in turn implies higher forgone wages during the time of training. 
Finally, there are other social and non-market benefits of education, such as schooling as 
an input in the production of more human capital (Schultz, 1961) and a potential 
reduction in the costs of job search as schooling increases (Metcalf, 1973), etc.
10
  
Even when the data are limited in providing measurements of ability, they include 
measurements of formal education that would partly account for it, and that in turn relates 
to both participation in the program and potential outcomes. I include a set of categorical 
variables that capture the highest degree of education attained. Following the nationally 
standardized Mexican school system, these include: no formal degree, elementary school, 




Standard human capital theory implies that an individual should acquire his stock 
of human capital while at a young age so that he will have more time during his natural 
life to enjoy the returns of it (Mincer, 1997) and (Becker, 1964). All else constant, the 
expected benefits of an individual obtaining training at a younger age are on average 
                                                 
10
 For a comprehensive survey of these studies see Wolfe and Haveman (2003). 
11




higher than those if the person is older. Including age as an explanatory variable allows 
accounts for this difference. 
Gender will also make a difference on the expected net benefits of participation in 
the program. In his study of one of the first versions of PROBECAT-SICAT, Aportela 
(1999) finds that while the training does not impact the probability of finding 
employment for men, it does for the participant women. This result is consistent with 
most evaluations of training programs in developing countries, were positive impacts of 
participation in such programs are mostly confined to women (Betcherman, Olivas and 
Dar, 2004). In the empirical section I present separate estimates for men and women.  
Demographic variables will furthermore capture additional differences in the 
overall likelihood of obtaining a net benefit by participation in the program. Differences 
in the relative position in the household (i.e. head of household, spouse of head, etc.) and 
marital status, in addition to the demographic variables aforementioned, capture relevant 
and otherwise unobserved factors, such as stability and other psychological aspects that 
influence participation and potential outcomes.  
A rich set of variables that capture the past labor market experience of the 
individual, in opposition to just the inclusion of the income history or profile, is necessary 
to obtain accurate estimate of the impacts of such programs as shown by Card and 
Sullivan (1988), Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998). 
An individual’s labor market history is formed by a series of decisions and 
outcomes of those decisions that will have an effect on the direction and magnitude in 
which the training experience will affect him. Differences in participation and attachment 
to the labor market, labor earnings, full time and part time statuses, etc, have a part in the 
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reservation wage at which the individual is indifferent between accepting a particular job 
or not. On the same line, these past experiences will determine the actual average labor 
income received by an individual.  Previous employment variables will function as 
summary statistics of these characteristics, and account for the quantity, efficiency, 
transferability, obsolesce, etc. of accumulated human capital obtained while in the labor 
market (Sianesi, 2002).  
The official requirements for participation in SICAT include an occupational 
status of unemployed (and looking for a job) or underemployed (looking or not for a job). 
Nevertheless, information obtained from officials of the program and directly from 
ENCOPE suggests employment status is not a rigid determinant for eligibility. An 
additional shortcoming of the data at hand is that it only captures information on the last 
job that an individual had prior to training. This then restricts the set of variables that 
capture each individual’s labor market history to a categorical variable that indicates if 
the individual has ever worked, and variables that capture the number of weekly hours 
worked and monthly labor income in the last job. Additionally, I include a variable that 
captures duration of inactivity up to the time when training started, which will serve as a 
proxy for optimal search effort or marginal utility of leisure (Vishwanath, 1989). For the 
comparison group, I construct the duration of inactivity based on a question posed at 
what I call the “pre-training” period, which corresponds to the first half of 2002.  This 
variable captures, for those that have ever held a job, the date in which the individual left 
her last job. For those who had never held a job by that time, the duration of inactivity 
was coded as “less than one month”. Duration of inactivity will also account for 
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unobservables such as the discouraged worker effect, and expected deterioration of 
human capital skills previously acquired.  
Even when the set of variables that describes the labor history is limited in 
number, it is reasonable to assume that these variables capture, although not optimally, 
past labor market experience, if the characteristics of past jobs are determined by 
previous sets of labor choices and the decisions over them. 
  Finally, given that the program is offered at the national level, it is necessary to 
include variables that will account for differences in local labor markets, as the 
characteristics of the labor market and the institutional framework might imply 
differences across individuals living in different regions (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and 
Todd, 1998). I included two sets of variables, the first of which is a socio-economic index 
created by the INEGI, which divides the country into 7 brackets, zones placing each of 
the 32 states in a bracket, where 1 is the lower bracket, and 7 is the highest one and 
corresponds to Mexico City. The index is based on characteristics obtained from the 
census and includes indicators of dwelling quality and infrastructure, dwelling 
overcrowding, health, education and employment (INEGI, 2006). The second set of 
variables includes a set of dummies by municipality population size, the lowest bracket 
includes municipalities with less than 2,500 habitants, and the highest includes cities with 
100,000 or more habitants. These two sets of variables serve as summary statistics for 
local characteristics, and will also capture unobserved differences at the regional level in 
the availability and selection process of the trainees. 
Appendix B presents a detailed description of the variables included in the 





Since 1998 the National Survey on Job Matching and Continuance (ENCOPE) is 
applied to a 1% random sample of program graduates; it is representative at the national 
level and by modality of program. The response rate is approximately 85% (STPS, 2006).  
For SICAT, the survey is conducted during the fourth quarter of each year, during 
the months of November and December, which means that the time elapsed between the 
end date of the program and the time the survey is conducted is heterogeneous.
12
  
The survey is a retrospective personal interview survey, and the trainees are 
questioned on variables before, during and after training. It provides information on 
socio-demographic variables: age, marital status, if the individual is a head of household, 
gender, education level and economic dependants; program/classes attended, dates of 
participation, reasons for participating in the training and opinion on courses taken; and, 
finally, a set of labor market variables pre- and post-training that include wages, benefits, 
duration of employment, position, sector, and activity, hours worked, form of payment, 
reasons for leaving job, etc. The questionnaires utilized for the surveys under 
PROBECAT and SICAT are basically the same so that the outcome variables can 
reasonably be compared.  
In this chapter I focus on the ENCOPE applied to the 2002 cohort. The modalities 
offered that period were mixed in medium and large firms, mixed in small and micro 
firms and training for self-employment (see table 2). The original sample contains 2,710 
                                                 
12
 All the trainees in the 2002 ENCOPE sample started the program between the beginning of January and 
the end of May. 
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individual records (35.46% of them are male), from this sample 6.9% of the trainees did 
not finish their classes and were excluded from the analysis. Finally, I eliminated 0.7% of 
the observations from the final sample due to non-response to particular labor income 
variables. 
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE) 
As a general first criterion for choosing a survey from which to obtain a 
comparison group, I would like to choose one that has a similar-as-possible target 
population; that collects information on the same variables as the information at hand for 
the treatment group; and where the probability of participation in the training program for 
each value of X does not equal one (that is, common support).  
I use the National Employment Survey (ENE), which is a joint effort of the 
Ministry of Labor (STPS) and the INEGI. It is representative at the national level and like 
ENCOPE is a personal interview survey. Unlike the survey most commonly used in 
previous studies of PROBECAT/SICAT (ENEU), the ENE survey covers urban and rural 
communities (where urban is defined by population equal or higher to 100,000).  Starting 
in the second quarter of 2000, ENE is available on a quarterly basis and can be 
constructed as a panel. One fifth of the selected households is replaced each quarter, and 
each household stays in the sample one year and three months (5 quarters), so that labor 
market outcomes are measured every three months. ENE’s units of observation are the 
individuals in the selected households, who are 12 years old and older. 
The ENE includes information on demographic, socio-economic, and labor 
market characteristics, including information on employment status, wages, benefits, 
occupation, industry, unemployment spells, unionization, etc. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith 
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and Todd, (1998), and Smith and Todd (2005a) show the importance of measuring 
outcome variables in the same way for the treated and comparison groups. The 
questionnaire used for national employment surveys has served as base for the ENCOPE 
questionnaire, so that the questions from which the dependent variables and the 
covariates are obtained are very similar. Given the closeness in scope and contents of 
ENCOPE and ENE, I consider ENE to be an appropriate source for the comparison 
group. 
The non-response rate for both ENCOPE and ENE is approximately 15% (INEGI, 
2006).  
To temporally align the comparison group with the treatment group, I construct 
the comparison sample by including those individuals who have records in either the first 
or second quarter of ENE 2002 (from which I constructed the pre-treatment variables), 
and in the final quarter of that same year (where I obtained the post-treatment variables). 
Given the rotation characteristics of the ENE sample, this implies that the individuals 
included in our final sample entered ENE either in the last quarter of 2001 (group A), the 
first quarter of 2002 (group B), or the second quarter of 2002 (group C). I call the first 
and second quarters of 2002 the “pre-treatment period”, given that the retrospective 
questions asked to the trainees in ENCOPE refer to the time just before they started 
training. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that all trainees received training at 
some point during this period.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics and t-tests of differences in means for the 
treated and comparison groups in 2002. With the exception of a few variables, the null 
hypothesis of the difference in means being equal to zero is rejected; that is to say, the 
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mean value for each of the variables is different between the two groups being compared, 
which mean that before the matching the treated and the comparison groups do not look 
“alike” on these characteristics. 
 
Table 5. Mean Values and T-tests for the Treated and Comparison Groups
Treated Comparison t p>|t| Treated Comparison t p>|t|
Age 25.48 36.28 -21.50 0.00 28.16 35.44 -20.39 0.00
Age squared 729.05 1537.60 -19.27 0.00 902.59 1457.30 -18.81 0.00
Married 0.43 0.63 -11.92 0.00 0.49 0.37 9.32 0.00
Divorced, widow, separated 0.02 0.04 -3.34 0.00 0.05 0.18 -13.64 0.00
Head of household 0.39 0.59 -12.21 0.00 0.08 0.24 -15.02 0.00
Has never been employed 0.19 0.01 54.56 0.00 0.39 0.03 69.53 0.00
Total number of hours worked weekly 18.83 40.63 -32.32 0.00 9.80 33.63 49.54 0.00
Total number of hours worked weekly squared 941.05 2026.00 -21.07 0.00 469.49 1472.00 -31.46 0.00
Pre monthly labor income 934.14 2346.30 -22.45 0.00 359.56 1923.80 -37.01 0.00
Pre monthly labor income squared 3.10E+06 8.80E+06 -22.40 0.00 8.10E+05 6.40E+06 -13.32 0.00
Highest degree obtained
Elementary School 0.18 0.28 -7.17 0.00 0.26 0.23 2.42 0.02
Junior High school 0.43 0.30 8.46 0.00 0.38 0.25 12.20 0.00
High school 0.22 0.11 10.82 0.00 0.13 0.11 2.69 0.01
Technical degree 0.02 0.07 -6.18 0.00 0.02 0.11 -11.80 0.00
College 0.08 0.00 30.33 0.00 0.09 0.02 21.09 0.00
Length of inactivity 
Less than one month 0.60 0.91 -32.41 0.00 0.63 0.93 -41.48 0.00
Between one month and six months 0.25 0.02 43.06 0.00 0.16 0.01 38.98 0.00
Between six months and one year 0.06 0.00 22.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 19.75 0.00
Development Regions
Development region1 0.12 0.07 5.56 0.00 0.10 0.08 2.77 0.01
Development region2 0.17 0.25 -5.66 0.00 0.17 0.18 -0.69 0.49
Development region3 0.16 0.10 6.76 0.00 0.19 0.21 -1.72 0.09
Development region4 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.71 0.21 0.18 2.47 0.01
Development region5 0.11 0.23 -8.57 0.00 0.15 0.17 -2.33 0.02
Development region6 0.19 0.15 2.73 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.84
Size of Municipality (Population)
Town size<=2,499 0.01 0.00 4.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.58 0.56
2,500=<municipality size<15,000 0.06 0.05 1.18 0.24 0.08 0.03 11.37 0.00
15,000=<municipality size<50,000 0.09 0.10 -0.82 0.41 0.18 0.07 15.78 0.00
50,000=<municipality size<100,000 0.18 0.11 7.28 0.00 0.12 0.08 5.95 0.00
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
SICAT-2002 Cohort, retrospective survey Nov-Dec 2002 for Treated Group







Selection of the Comparison Group 
The ENE sample was first restricted to those individuals who had records during 
the first half of the year 2002 and the last quarter of the same year. I obtained the pre-
treatment variables of the ENE group from the records of the first half of the year, and the 
post-treatment variables from the last quarter. 
Secondly, I further restrict the ENE sample to form a comparison group of 
eligible individuals following these three criteria: 
1) Age between 16 and 75 years old 
The lower age limit is established as an official criterion, In practice, this inferior 
limit is enforced. Additionally, no trainee in the ENCOPE sample is older than 75 years 
old. 
2) Unemployed or underemployed.  
Unemployed: has actively been looking for a job in the past 4 weeks, or has not 
been looking for a job in the past 4 weeks but satisfies at least one of the 
following: 
a) Is waiting to hear back from an employment application; 
b) Looked actively for a job but could not find one (discouraged worker); 
c) Individual considers that she does not have the education/skills to qualify for a 
job. 
With this criterion, I excluded from the unemployed category those individuals 
that reported not being interested in participating in the labor force. 
Underemployed: the individual reports being employed and satisfies at least one 
of the following: 
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a) Works less than 35 hours involuntarily. In this context I defined 
“involuntarily” as the following reasons as to why the workweek is restricted: 
1) Work specifications; 
2) Low sales or production; 
3) Lack of clients or financial resources for production or sales; 
4) Deficiency of inputs, necessary vehicles and/or machinery for 
production or transportation. 
b) An optional –and official - criterion for maximum number of hours in the case 
of underemployment was that the potential participant received a monthly labor income 
of less than two minimum wages. However, only half of the trainees in the ENCOPE 
sample that stated ever holding a job reported they received no more than two minimum 
wages in their last job previous to training. This information is obtained from a question 
in the retrospective survey that requires all interviewees to discretisize their monthly 
labor income in brackets of multiples of the minimum wage. The report of monthly 
income for the ENE sample does not require all individuals to perform such 
discretization, but only to report total monthly labor income. To avoid measurement error 
I did not impose the minimum wage criterion on the ENE or the ENCOPE samples. 
Monthly labor income was restricted to a maximum of 5 minimum wages, 4800 
Mexican pesos (527.785 US dollars
13
). This to conform to the fact that 97.22% of the 
monthly labor income reported in ENCOPE was at or below this limit. The high income 
reported for the 3% left in the sample is high enough to led one to suspect some 
measurement error might be present. I impose the upper limit to avoid the inclusion of 
                                                 
13
 Exchange rate on March 1
st
 2002: 9.0946 Mexican pesos per US dollar. 
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observations with potential measurement error and to deal with potential sensitivity to 
outliers. 
3) Minimum education.  
Each training course specifies a minimum education level to be eligible to attend. 
Given that this information is only accessible by state administrators and varies 
substantially from SES to SES, I imposed a de facto minimum requirement for formal 
education. All trainees in the sample have at least one year of elementary school, 
following this fact, I require this limit for the comparison group. 
 











Appendix C presents a description of sample construction. 
 
 
I II III IV 
Pre-training Post-training 
ENE, collection of pre-training 
variables 
ENCOPE, collection of pre- and 
post-training variables (reference 
period for pre-training variables: I 
and II, just before training) 
Training starts at any point during 
the ‘pre-training’ period 





Empirical Specification and Results 
Propensity Score 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of the expected probability of 
participation in the training program for men and women, the propensity score, during the 
first two quarters of 2002. The expected probability was calculated with a maximum 
likelihood probit model; I report the average derivatives of the conditional probabilities. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
individual, i, participated in the training program during the first two quarters of 2002 and 
zero otherwise.  
Table 6 makes evident the differences in the roles that the set of explanatory 
variables play in the probability of participation for men and for women. For one, the 
probability of participation for men decreases with age, while for women increases, 
although the impact of this variable is modest in both cases. Additionally, the importance 
of never having held a job before training is only statistically significant when interacted 
with age for women, i.e, the probability of participation in SICAT for women who have 
never worked increases with age. While for men, the estimate of the coefficient of weekly 
hours worked is not statistically significant, it is for women. The sign is negative, 
reflecting the fact that women who, before training, worked longer hours would 
participate less in a training program like SICAT. For both groups the probability of 
participation increases if the individual is married relative to being single. For men, being 
the head of the household also increases the probability. 
An interesting result is the sign of the coefficients on the dummies for the highest 
educational degree attained. They indicate that having an educational degree, in 
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comparison with not having any, increases the conditional probability of participation. 
Residing in any socio-economic region different from region 7, Mexico City, decreases 
the conditional participation probability in the program. Nevertheless, living in any city 
or town with less than 100,000 residents implies an increase in the probability of 
participation relative to living in a city with 100,000 or more inhabitants. 
Inspecting the influence of the duration of inactivity on the probability of 
participation, I note that if this elapsed time is less than one month, the probabilities are 
lower. On the other hand, the sign is positive if the individual has been out of work for 
more than a month and up to a year. These should be interpreted relative to being inactive 
for more than a year (the base category). 
Figure 4 shows the propensity scores for men and women; Table 7 presents 
summary statistics for the propensity scores. These show that there is some evidence that 
the support condition (which guarantees that all individuals in the treatment group would 
have an analogue in the comparison group) holds in this dataset. Therefore, in principle, 
the chosen control group is appropriate to conduct the evaluation.  Moreover, the fact that 
more than half of the observations in both comparison groups have probabilities of 
participation below the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution of probabilities of their 
respective treated groups, supports the choice of estimation using matching methods 
rather than linear regression. In linear regression, the untreated individuals with very low 
probabilities will be assigned a relatively large weight in the evaluation. Matching 
overcomes this issue by assigning lower weights to untreated units with low probabilities 




PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported, standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Treated 
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Notes: All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level.
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
*Coefficients have been rescaled  by a factor of 1000
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Age*has never worked
Age squared*has never worked
Pre total number of hours worked weekly
Pre total number of hours worked weekly squared
Pre monthly labor income









PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported, standard errors in parentheses
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Notes: All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level.
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
*Coefficients have been rescaled  by a factor of 1000
Table 6 Cont'. Propensity Score 
SICAT-2002 Cohort, retrospective survey Nov-Dec 2002







Less than one month
Between one month and six months 
2,500=<municipality size<15,000
15,000=<municipality size<50,000











Finally, I estimated additional specifications of the propensity score, which 
included further variables’ interactions and higher degree polynomials. The magnitude 
and sign of the estimated coefficients discussed above were not responsive to the 
different specifications.  
 
 
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 7.00E-06 3.72E-08 Obs 43508 1% 4.43E-06 4.12E-10
5% 0.000 5.60E-08 Sum of Wgt. 43508 5% 0.000 1.88E-09
10% 0.000 6.70E-08 10% 0.000 4.49E-09 Obs 28750
25% 0.001 8.45E-08 Mean 0.015 25% 0.002 9.99E-09 Sum of Wgt. 28750
Std. Dev. 0.043
50% 0.004 50% 0.009 Mean 0.032
Largest Variance 0.002 Largest Std. Dev. 0.084
75% 0.012 0.747 Skewness 7.195 75% 0.023 0.830
90% 0.026 0.776 Kurtosis 68.574 90% 0.056 0.837 Variance 0.007
95% 0.045 0.805 95% 0.122 0.871 Skewness 5.083
99% 0.247 0.876 99% 0.497 0.894 Kurtosis 31.575
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 4.12E-04 5.16E-06 Obs 839 1% 0.002 1.24E-05
5% 0.004 2.39E-05 Sum of Wgt. 839 5% 0.009 4.55E-05
10% 0.008 3.94E-05 10% 0.018 1.19E-04 Obs 1551
25% 0.020 6.66E-05 Mean 0.245 25% 0.141 2.15E-04 Sum of Wgt. 1551
Std. Dev. 0.244
50% 0.204 50% 0.447 Mean 0.424
Largest Variance 0.060 Largest Std. Dev. 0.285
75% 0.377 0.971 Skewness 1.038 75% 0.663 0.972
90% 0.590 0.972 Kurtosis 90% 0.790 0.975 Variance 0.081
95% 0.782 0.972 95% 0.861 0.986 Skewness -0.063
99% 0.942 0.994 99% 0.953 0.988 Kurtosis 1.804
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
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While economic theory determines the variables to include in the estimation of 
the propensity score, X, a balancing test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Smith and Todd, 
2005b) would serve as a specification test for a given X. After the estimation of the 
propensity score, it is necessary to perform balancing tests to obtain evidence on the 
validity of the chosen form to estimate this probability. That is, that the balance between 
the two samples -- treated and untreated -- is achieved.  
The balancing test for the propensity score used in this chapter (see table 8), is 
usually called standardized differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). For each variable 
kX , the standardized difference is the difference in means between the treated sample 
and the matched comparison group sample, divided by the square root of the average of 
the variances of kX  in the two sub-samples. The common practice is to compute this 
difference for all the variables included in the matching. There is no formal criterion to 
define if the difference – or “bias” -has an appropriate size, but it is usual to follow the 
suggestion in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) that 20 is “large”. Under this criterion, Table 
8 shows that for each variable in both matched samples, the standardized differences are 
all, in absolute terms, smaller than 13. Then, the specification of the propensity score is 
“passing” the balancing test. As Smith and Zhang (2004) state, there is a wide variety of 
balancing tests that would give a different “passing grade” to the same propensity score 
specification. As of now, the conditions required by the better tests are so stringent that it 
is very likely that several forms would need to be tested, and even then it might be the 
case that the model would not pass. Nevertheless it would be appropriate to present the 
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results of more than one balancing test to support the propensity score specification. I 
leave for future work the use of more stringent balancing tests such as OLS regressions. 
 
Sample Difference Difference
Variable Treated Comparison Treated Comparison
Age Unmatched 25.48 36.28 -88 28.16 35.44 -58.3
Matched 25.91 26.67 -6.2 27.68 28.69 -8.1
Age squared Unmatched 729.05 1537.60 -82.4 902.59 1457.30 -56.3
Matched 761.55 828.38 -6.8 892.57 966.11 -7.5
Married Unmatched 0.43 0.63 -40 0.49 0.37 23.3
Matched 0.43 0.39 6.5 0.40 0.38 4.4
Divorced, widow, separated Unmatched 0.02 0.04 -13.2 0.05 0.18 -41.8
Matched 0.02 0.02 1.2 0.06 0.07 -2.5
Head of household Unmatched 0.39 0.59 -41.6 0.08 0.24 -45.1
Matched 0.38 0.36 4.9 0.09 0.11 -6.6
Has never been employed Unmatched 0.19 0.01 64.2 0.39 0.03 97.5
Matched 0.13 0.17 -12.5 0.26 0.30 -9.8
Age*has never worked Unmatched 4.15 0.15 61 10.87 1.38 75.2
Matched 2.67 3.46 -12.1 6.56 7.64 -8.6
Age squared*has never worked Unmatched 99.47 3.81 49.8 358.59 79.13 43.5
Matched 57.74 77.37 -10.2 212.45 246.37 -5.3
Total number of hours worked weekly Unmatched 18.83 40.63 -99.4 9.80 33.63 -126.1
Matched 24.11 23.05 4.8 15.19 14.53 3.5
Total number of hours worked weekly squared Unmatched 941.05 2026.00 -73.2 469.49 1472.00 -83.9
Matched 1204.00 1152.70 3.5 729.13 674.96 4.5
Monthly labor income Unmatched 934.14 2346.30 -84.5 359.56 1923.80 -119.4
Matched 1200.90 1167.40 2 560.17 605.31 -3.4
Monthly labor income squared Unmatched 3.10E+06 8.80E+06 -22.4 8.10E+05 6.40E+06 -46.6
Matched 4.10E+06 3.90E+06 0.6 1.30E+06 1.60E+06 -2.4
Highest degree obtained
Elementary School Unmatched 0.18 0.28 -26.2 0.26 0.23 6.1
Matched 0.19 0.20 -2.1 0.24 0.26 -3.7
Junior High school Unmatched 0.43 0.30 27.6 0.38 0.25 29.3
Matched 0.46 0.43 6.2 0.40 0.36 9.5
High school Unmatched 0.22 0.11 31.3 0.13 0.11 6.6
Matched 0.21 0.22 -1.6 0.17 0.17 -1.7
Technical degree Unmatched 0.02 0.07 -26.1 0.02 0.11 -38.3
Matched 0.03 0.03 -3.8 0.03 0.02 1
College Unmatched 0.08 0.00 39.5 0.09 0.02 33.8
Matched 0.03 0.03 0 0.04 0.06 -10
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
Table 8. Bias calculated by Standardized Differences, matched and unmatched samples, kernel matching








Variable Treated Comparison Treated Comparison
Length of inactivity before training 
Less than one month Unmatched 0.60 0.91 -78.8 0.63 0.93 -75.8
Matched 0.68 0.69 -1.6 0.66 0.68 -5.2
Between one month and six months Unmatched 0.25 0.02 70.2 0.16 0.01 52.8
Matched 0.21 0.22 -1.5 0.15 0.14 3.2
Between six months and one year Unmatched 0.06 0.00 31.8 0.05 0.00 26.6
Matched 0.04 0.04 -0.1 0.05 0.04 3.5
Development Regions
Development region1 Unmatched 0.12 0.07 16.6 0.10 0.08 6.7
Matched 0.10 0.09 3.1 0.09 0.07 5.7
Development region2 Unmatched 0.17 0.25 -20.6 0.17 0.18 -1.8
Matched 0.17 0.18 -2.1 0.16 0.15 1.8
Development region3 Unmatched 0.16 0.10 20.3 0.19 0.21 -4.4
Matched 0.15 0.14 3.8 0.21 0.23 -5.6
Development region4 Unmatched 0.20 0.20 1.2 0.21 0.18 6.1
Matched 0.21 0.23 -4.2 0.21 0.20 3
Development region5 Unmatched 0.11 0.23 -32.9 0.15 0.17 -6.1
Matched 0.13 0.13 0.4 0.15 0.16 -4.2
Development region6 Unmatched 0.19 0.15 8.9 0.16 0.15 0.5
Matched 0.20 0.20 0.6 0.16 0.16 1.9
Size of Municipality (Population)
Town size<=2,499 Unmatched 0.01 0.00 10.3 0.00 0.00 -1.6
Matched 0.01 0.01 1.3 0.00 0.00 1.3
2,500=<municipality size<15,000 Unmatched 0.06 0.05 3.9 0.08 0.03 22.6
Matched 0.05 0.05 1.5 0.07 0.06 1.4
15,000=<municipality size<50,000 Unmatched 0.09 0.10 -2.8 0.18 0.07 32.7
Matched 0.08 0.09 -2.7 0.15 0.13 7.7
50,000=<municipality size<100,000 Unmatched 0.18 0.11 22 0.12 0.08 13.9
Matched 0.17 0.16 3.6 0.11 0.10 3.7
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
Mean Mean
Table 8 Cont'. Bias calculated by Standardaized Differences, matched and unmatched samples, kernel matching.





To estimate the average effect of the training on the trainees I will use propensity 
score matching. Propensity score matching is a semi-parametric alternative to linear 
regression, also based on the assumption that the selection into a treatment, in this case 
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the participation in the training program, is done over observable characteristics of the 
individuals. 
Matching reweighs the distribution of observables of an untreated population, the 
comparison group, to make it similar to that of the treated population, the treatment 
group. Finally, it compares the outcomes of these two groups. 
I first use nearest neighbor matching with replacement. Even when the size of the 
comparison group sample is big enough to reasonably expect to find unique close 
matches for each treated observation, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) find that matching 
without replacement performs poorly when the sample is not infinite, so that there are not 
sufficient comparison observations similar to the treated ones. 
In his Monte Carlo analysis, Frölich (2004) shows that kernel matching 
outperforms nearest neighbor matching. I then re-estimate using kernel matching. In this 
case, for each dependent variable, I obtained appropriate bandwidths
14
 employing leave-
one-out cross validation (Black and Smith, 2004). 
For both matching types, the specification is the same, and all the covariates used 
to obtain the propensity score are used in the matching protocol. The average treatment 
effects on the treated are reported in Table 9, with standard errors reported in parentheses. 
The standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping
15
. The use of bootstrapping is 
appropriate in this context since it is necessary to include the added variance produced by 
the estimation of the propensity score to the variance from the matching estimation 
procedure.  While for kernel matching, bootstrapping is a valid procedure, Abadie and 
Imbens (2005) find that bootstrap is not valid for nearest neighbor due to the lack of 
                                                 
14
 The estimates’ signs and magnitudes are not substantially different when the bandwidth is slightly bigger 
or smaller than the optimal bandwidth. 
15
 500 repetitions. 
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smoothness. Up to today, there is no good alternative to obtain standard errors for nearest 
neighbor. Consequently the results of columns 3 and 4 in table 9 should be taken only as 
an approximation. 
As noted above, an individual can lawfully participate in the training program 
more than once
16
. On the same lines, the population of those who have not yet 
participated in the training might do so in the future. Then, the interpretation of these 
results should take into consideration this dynamic treatment assignment (Sianesi, 2004), 
where the real treatment is the participation of the individual in the program at a certain 
time. This does not preclude her from participating later, while the default not-
participation state is not obtaining training at that specific time and instead continuing to 
search for a job. 
Results 
Table 9 presents the labor market impact estimates of participating in a SICAT 
training program obtained first from standard linear regression methods and secondly by 
propensity score matching:  using nearest neighbor and kernel matching. I show the first 
four columns for informative purposes. The interpretation of the results is based on the 
last two columns, which displays the coefficients obtained by kernel matching on the 
propensity score.  
                                                 
16
 With the current information provided by the retrospective survey it is impossible to know if an 





I divide the analysis in two: first I present the typical or traditional impact 
estimates, which include probability of employment, monthly labor income and weekly 
hours worked; secondly I present my estimates using measures of job formality.  
 
Linear Regression, Nearest Neighbor Matching and Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses
Men Women Men Women
ATT
outcome 
comparison      
** ATT
outcome 
comparison      
**
Post monthly labor income* 19.05 182.93 117.62 -10.35 -3.81 1918.06 50.15 791.09
(in Mexican pesos) (111.06) (60.48) (131.76) (61.07) (103.81) (39.64)
Post weekly hours worked* 5.28 9.48 5.12 7.51 5.10 35.07 9.27 19.54
(0.63) (0.58) (1.47) (1.35) (0.99) (0.94)
Employed 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.66 0.27 0.41
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Self employed or unpaid worker -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.07
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Verbal contract 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.07 0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Health Benefits 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.14
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Housing Credits 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.09
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
In-cash Benefits 0.24 0.18 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.14
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Other Benefits 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.26 0.09 0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
In micro business 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
In business without local -0.11 0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.20 0.03 0.09
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE and ENE surveys
Notes: All estimates are significant at a 95% level except for those in gray
*This variable does include zeros
**Mean outcome in the reweighted comparison group
1/
 Coeficients for monthly labor income and weekly total hours by using OLS regression.
2/ 
Coefficients of the rest of variables not in 
1/ 
estimated using a PROBIT model. I report average derivatives.
Linear Regression
1/2/
Table 9. Average Treatment Effect - Treatment on the Treated (TT)





Traditional Impact estimates 
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My estimates of the average treatment effect show that participation in a SICAT 
training program increased the probability of employment by 20 percentage points for 
men. This estimate is considerably higher for women, who, on average, report an 
increment of 27 percentage points in the probability of employment. These results are 
consistent with previous findings in the literature (Revenga, Riboud and Tan, 1994; GEA, 
2002; Analitica, 2004), where the program is reported to have positive and statistically 
significant results on the probability of employment.  
Differences of the impacts on men and women are also evident in the estimated 
coefficients for the weekly number of hours worked. Females work, on average, 9 more 
hours due to the training, while men show an effect of half of that of the female 
participants. The sign of the estimated coefficient for women is analogous to that found 
by Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1994), who report reporting an impact of 4 work hours for 
women, and a non-statistically significant estimate for men.   
My results for the number of hours worked and the probability of employment 
suggest the program was moderately successful in 2002. Nevertheless, these estimates do 
not allow me to draw any inferences about the working conditions of ex-trainees. I shed 
some light on quality of employment promoted by PROBECAT in the following section. 
Estimated impacts on measures of job formality  
In the case of the estimates of the impact on the probability of employment with 
health benefits, for both men and women the average treatment effect is positive, 
registering an increment in the probability of obtaining a job with access to any kind of 
health care of slightly above 20 percentage points. This unexpectedly high number can 
partially be explained by the fact that one of benefits the trainees obtained during their 
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participation in the SICAT programs was basic health benefits funded by state 
governments and it is possible that an important proportion of the alumni are reporting 
this affiliation as access to health benefits. To obtain this benefit individuals would have 
to be affiliated (sponsored by the State Employment Offices) to the Mexican Institute of 
Social Security (IMSS) or similar institutions, or alternatively to a private health 
insurance provider. Nevertheless, given that publicly provided services are more cost 
effective and that, among them, IMSS is the main provider of publicly funded health 
services
17
, it is reasonable to believe it was the main provider for SICAT participants.  
A provision for IMSS beneficiaries (article no. 109 of the Ley del Instituto 
Mexicano del Seguro Social, Mexican Institute of Social Security Law), states that they 
can access the health services provided by IMSS for at least eight more weeks after they 
end the work relationship with their sponsor (in this case when the individual finishes 
training). This period can be extended by a petition from the sponsor
18
.  
In conjunction with the facts discussed in the previous paragraphs, I found there 
are additional indicators that provide some evidence of the training program updating the 
skills of trainees so that they obtain formal jobs.  That is, the estimated treatment effects 
on the probability of obtaining a position with housing benefits and other in-cash benefits 
are positive for men and women.  
It is relevant to note that for all the indicators of formality, on average, male 
trainees benefit more than their female counterparts. 
                                                 
17
 In 2000 78% of all users of publicly funded health services were affiliated to IMSS (Source: Author’s 
calculations with information Encuesta Nacional Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares,  National Household 
Survey of Income and Expenditure) 
18
 The agreements between IMSS and PROBECAT/SICAT, like the overall operation of the program, are 
done at the state level, so that the specific proof of the contract and sponsorship of health services should be 
found in State Employment Offices, from the retrospective survey we could not verify this information. 
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On the other hand, I could also find some evidence of informality, especially for 
women. For the female trainees, the treatment effect on the probability of self-
employment or employment without payment is positive and statistically significant, 
although very modest (3 percentage points). I also find that the probability of having a 
verbal contract –opposed to having a written contract- is 7 percentage points higher given 
training, with respect to not participating in the program at this point in time. 
Men and women experience a higher probability of finding employment in a 
micro business, that is 10 workers or less, if they have received training from SICAT than 
if they have not. Nevertheless, the impact is now higher for the female trainees than for 
men.  
Finally, our results show that by participating in the program, women will 
increase their probability of employment in a business/activity, where the specific work 
place, only for this activity, is not determined. Conversely, for men, the estimate is 
negative, and of higher absolute value. 
In summary, I found evidence that the SICAT training programs do have some 
positive effects on the probabilities of employment for men and women. On the same 
lines, participation improves the probability of finding employment as well as health 
benefits. Without any consideration of costs, these results suggest that the program has 
the capability to update and improve the skills of its participants. Nonetheless, I also find 
evidence that the program increases the probability of employment with so called 
informal characteristics for women. By examining the sector of activity in which ex-
trainees work, (see table 10) I observe that part of this could be explained due to the fact 
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that the proportion of women employed in sectors with informal characteristics (street 






Other farming activities 0.97 1.52
Mining 2.9 0.1
Manufacturing industry 47.51 44.48
Construction industry 4.14 0.57
Electricity, energy and water 0.97 0.1
Retail 9.94 14
Wholesale 2.9 5.24
Informal Retail 0.14 1.05
Food and drink industry 3.59 2.76




Financial services, real state and insurance 0.55 0.76
Specialized professional and technical services 10.22 7.52
Education and health services 0.55 4.48
Entertainment and recreation services 0.41 0.19
Government and public administration 0.97 0.95
Other services 1.66 9.24
Other activities 0.83 0.29
Percentage
SICAT-2002 Cohort, retrospective survey Nov-Dec 2002
Table 10. Sector of activity, employed ex-trainees
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2002  
General Equilibrium Effects and Misclassification of Treatment 
A central assumption made throughout this analysis is the absence of general 
equilibrium effects. The specific assumption is called the stable-unit-treatment-value 
assumption (SUTVA) and it implies that an individual’s potential outcome depends only 
on his participation, and not on the treatment status of other members of the same 
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population (Rubin 1980). This eliminates the possibility of general equilibrium effects or 
cross-effects (Sianesi, 2002). 
  A situation where the trainees will compete with other workers for employment 
and this competition will change the wage structure, or any other important 
characteristics of that specific labor market (which would not occur in the absence of the 
training program), will mean that there actually are general equilibrium effects and that I 
cannot credibly assume SUTVA. To investigate the existence of potential equilibrium 
effects, I inspected the relative size of the program with respect to the total active 
population. In this case, for 2002, the Ministry of Labor reports that 230,185 individuals 
participated in SICAT which corresponds to a 0.56% of the total labor force, which 
constitutes a small number of participants with respect to the rest of the population in the 
labor market. This small national percentage level allows me to credibly argue that the 
magnitude of the program is such that it would not have meaningful general equilibrium 
effects. 
Another consideration mostly ignored by the previous literature on 
PROBECAT/SICAT is the fact that the treatment variable might be misclassified. 
Misclassification occurs when actually the treated (comparison) groups did not (did) 
receive treatment. In the particular case of PROBECAT/SICAT, the surveys where the 
comparison groups were drawn from, in this and in previous studies, do not contain any 
information that would help me to determine if a particular individual had or not 
participated in any training program. The source of the misclassification is then the fact 
that it might be the case that some individuals in the comparison group are in fact treated. 
Combining the data obtained from the group of trainees - the treatment group - with any 
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of the comparison groups at hand might introduce contamination bias (Heckman and 
Robb, 1985) because the training status of some persons in the aggregated group is not 
known.  
Lewbel (2006) and Mahajan (2006) propose to employ an “instrument like” 
variable to obtain point estimates of outcomes when a regressor is misclassified, which in 
this case is the treatment condition. Lewbel (2006) establishes identification by a two 
valued instrument or a "second treatment measure" (he defines it as a variable V). Two 
conditions must be satisfied: a) V should only affect the true treatment probabilities, and 
b) the conditional, real outcomes (with or without treatment), should not depend on V. 
Inspecting the survey information at hand it was not possible to single out a variable that 
met these requirements. As a result I then examined an alternative proposed by Smith 
(2006).  
To ease the analysis I refer to the case in which all X are discrete, i.e., I restrict the 
analysis to a subgroup of relevant independent variables, all of them discrete. 
Nevertheless, the method proposed by Smith (2006) can be applied when this is not the 
case.  
There are four basic steps: First, I obtained )xX|1DPr( ==  for all values of X, 
where: 
                  )xXPr(/)1DPr()1D|xXPr()xX|1DPr( =======        (*) 
 
All the elements in (*) are known or can be calculated. In particular, to obtain the 
probability of participation, I used the National Employment Survey and the official list 
 
 92 
of requirements to calculate the total eligible population, and from the Ministry of 
Labor’s administrative records I obtained the exact number of participants. 
In a second step I calculated the mean differences between treatment and 
comparison units for each value of X. Then I adjusted the mean differences for the 
fraction of the comparison group that received treatment (obtained in the first step). 
Finally, I took the weighted average of the adjusted differences by the distribution of X. 
In my first exercise I found that the difference between adjusted and unadjusted estimates 
of the average impact of training on weekly hours worked is minimum (9.2 minutes for 
men and 25.8 for women). This small difference can be mainly explained by the fact that 
for eligible men and women, the probability of participation is relatively small: 0.008 for 
men, and 0.02 for women. 
Given this preliminary exercise, and since the probabilities of participation do not 
change while extending the analysis to include the rest of the independent variables, I can 
conclude that in this case my estimates do not include important contamination biases.  It 
is important to note that even when we do not calculate the contamination bias for the 
results presented in this research, it is possible to “sign it”: in this case eliminating the 
bias will make the calculated average treatments effects bigger. In this particular instance, 
the problem with misclassification comes from the fact that some individuals that are not 
trained are included in the treatment group, removing them from the sample would 
increase the treatment effect. 
This result does not extend to previous analyses of PROBECAT/SICAT, and a 





Comments on Cost-Benefit Analyses 
Analítica Consultores (2004) reports that the total assigned funds for the SICAT 
program at the national level for 2002 were 898, 600, 000 pesos. Using this information 
and administrative records of the number of trainees that year, I can obtain a proxy for 
the average cost per trainee, i.e., 3,903.81 pesos, which corresponds roughly to 404.3619 
US dollars. The estimation of impacts presented above shows no effect on the labor 
income that trainees receive, suggesting that it might be the case that 
PROBECAT/SICAT is not cost effective.  Nevertheless, the training does increase the 
probabilities of receiving other benefits, such as housing credits and medical insurance. It 
is not a trivial task to conduct a cost-benefit analysis using outcomes that are not 
originally measured in monetary units, mostly because such goods and services are not 
valued the same by the individual receiving them and by society. For example, it could be 
argued that is in the society’s interest that workers receive medical benefits, so they will 
be more productive, will pay more taxes, etc., while others might argue that these benefits 
are trivial for the country as a whole. In any case, a thorough analysis of how to 
appropriately introduce such benefits is necessary before conducting a serious cost-
benefit analysis of PROBECAT-SICAT. Such analysis will be the object of future work. 
 
Conclusions 
Using semi-parametric estimation methods I evaluated the average treatment 
effect of the training component of the Mexican ALMP on its 2002 cohort. I analyzed the 
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impact of the program on commonly evaluated parameters for similar programs in 
developed economies, such as labor income, hours worked and employment.  
If I had solely applied the same traditional criteria used to analyze such programs 
in developed countries, my analysis may have lead to results that would portray the 
program’s effects inadequately by missing out some aspects. Additionally, the analysis 
and report of only “traditional” success variables  could also misrepresent the program’s 
positive impacts on recipients, leading to policy changes that would be considered ill-
advised if policy makers and international donors considered a wider perspective. 
Following this logic, I additionally study the impact of the program on the probabilities 
of obtaining a position with the characteristics of what is consider formal employment, I 
use several definitions of formality that include benefits, type of contract and residence of 
business. This analysis, including variables largely ignored by the existing literature on 
evaluation of training programs in developing countries, is relevant given the prevalence 
in developing economies of employment with low productive capacity and poor working 
conditions, which are both associated with poverty. Using a retrospective survey of the 
trainees of 2002 (ENCOPE) and the National Employment Survey (ENE), I obtained 
propensity score matching estimates using nearest neighbor matching and kernel 
matching. I build on previous research by recognizing the limitations of the datasets used 
as sources of comparison samples (for example, the widespread use of a source limited to 
individuals living in urban centers) and propose a more adequate survey to build a 
comparison group.   
The main results suggest that the trainees, on average, work more hours per week 
and have an increased probability of employment with health benefits due to participation 
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in SICAT, which indicates some success for the program.  It should be noted that the 
access to health benefits might be due to the legal characteristics of the welfare system in 
Mexico, which includes extension of benefits offered as part of the training program
20
. 
Additionally, for both men and women, the training promotes employment in micro 
businesses, enterprises with less than 10 workers, including the owner. 
With respect to women, an important finding is that the probabilities of 
employment with informal characteristics show a similar increase to that of the 
probabilities of employment in micro-firms.  This finding suggests that more women 
participate in self-employment or unpaid employment, verbal contracts, and businesses 
without specific locations than their male counterparts.  These results demonstrate the 
importance of carefully considering the range of relevant outcomes in the evaluation of 
ALMPs in developing countries, at the risk of overlooking some of their effects due to 
their intrinsic multidimensional nature.  
As previously discussed, the results for women show both: strong positive effects 
in terms of probability of employment with benefits and positive impacts in chances of 
employment with informal characteristics. A plausible explanation for this evidence is 
that women that participate in the program, as the results also show, increase their 
probabilities of employment in general, regardless of the characteristics of such 
employment. A proportion of participants could be employed in jobs with formal 
characteristics, while others enter employment with informal traits. Secondly, it is 
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 Note that these results measure the direct impact of participation in the program on employment with 
health benefits. For example, in the case of women, it would not be accurate to suggest that the 
relatively high impact found on employment with health benefits might be due to access to health 
insurance through their husbands.  This interpretation would imply that the fact that women participate 
in the training increments the probabilities of them getting medical insurance through their husbands’ 




possible that a job has characteristics that might be considered formal and at the same 
time characteristics that could be considered of informal employment, an example is 
individuals that receive in-cash bonuses at the end of the year but work selling goods 
door to door.  In this circumstances it would be useful to study the impact of the training 
program over an “index of informality” of potential jobs, where the traits of the 
employment that ex-trainees access are considered in full. Given the multiple definitions 
of what constitutes informality, it would be challenging for the construction of such index 
determining the variables that conform it, nevertheless it is not impossible, this task is left 
for future work. 
Methodologically the contribution of this chapter is the consideration of an 
appropriate comparison group; taking into account and analyzing the presence of 
contamination bias and general equilibrium effects; and taking into consideration the de 
facto rules for offering training. I show that, given the proportion of the population 
participating in the program, my results are not likely to be biased by misclassification of 
the training variable and that the existence of important general equilibrium effects is 




Chapter 5:  Differential effects of training categories for the 
unemployed and underemployed in the Mexican active labor 
market policies 
Motivation and Literature Review 
Over the history of PROBECAT/SICAT (P/S), the training component of the 
Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) in Mexico, the training categories offered have 
been continuously modified based on claims of their differential ability to improve the 
employment prospects of the trainees. As a consequence of these changes, the modality 
consisting exclusively of in-classroom training has completely disappeared in recent 
years, while modalities based on mixed –or a combination between in-classrroom and on-
the-job training- have expanded.  
 However, there is little evidence in the literature to support or deny the superiority 
of any one training modality over the rest, since the literature on the evaluation of 
PROBECAT/SICAT and other Latin American programs has not consistently 
distinguished between training types. Notwithstanding its importance for policy changes, 
the literature has largely ignored the issue and as a result solid basis for policy changes of 
this nature are missing. 
 In what follows, I present an overview of the small literature that acknowledges 
the existence of different types of training, detailing the empirical methodology used in 
each case and pointing out, where appropriate, its shortcomings. 
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 In their review of all of the impact evaluations of active labor market policies in 
developed, developing and transition economies, Betcherman et al. (2004) conclude that 
for all analyzed studies the training programs that perform better are those that involve 
on-the-job training with active employer involvement.  In the specific case of Latin 
America, there is evidence of positive results for programs that target younger 
populations and offer a combination of on-the-job and in-classroom training. As 
Betcherman et al. indicate, programs that do not have age restrictions do not seem to have 
positive results for either training for self employment or in-classroom training. 
 Wodon and Minowa (1999) separately study the impacts of the training of the 
only two training categories offered in 1992: in-classroom-only (ICO) and mixed training 
(i.e., in-classroom plus on-the job training). They estimate unemployment exit rates 
incorporating a calculated index of participation in which selection bias is eliminated by 
the use of an instrumental variable. The authors also obtain estimates of the effect of 
training on wages, by employing a Heckman two–step estimator. Wodon and Minowa 
(1999) separately calculate the probabilities of participating in each specific training 
category, where the counterfactual for a participant in any specific type would then be: 
either not participating in any program; or participating in the mixed-training (for those 
participating in the in-classroom-only), or in the in-classroom only (for those 
participating in the mixed training). Evidence is presented that suggests that participation 
in any of the training types does not reduce the length of unemployment. Moreover, both 
training categories have negative effects on the earnings of their participants. Wodon and 
Minowa (1999) set a precedent in the literature of impact evaluation in developing 
countries by offering the first available study that investigates the effects of different 
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types of training separately for PROBECAT. However, it is relevant to note that the 
authors do not intend to show the relative effects, or effectiveness, of a type of training 
with respect to the other, a question of capital importance in the configuration decision of 
the training programs.  Finally, it is important to realize that their chosen instrumental 
variable, local labor market indicators,  can lead to misleading results since this variable 
will have an impact both on potential outcomes (in the case of non-participation) and 
probabilities of participation, and in consequence, selection bias might still be present in 
the estimated coefficients. 
In Aportela (1999), the author studies the impact of program participation on the 
probabilities of leaving unemployment using two different methods: hazard models
21
, and 
propensity score matching. In both cases, a comparison group is constructed considering 
only of unemployed individuals with unemployment spells censored at 64 weeks at the 
most. The comparison group is obtained from the National Urban Employment Survey 
(ENEU), a quarterly panel survey that included information about individuals living in 16 
urban communities of 100,000 or more inhabitants. An important contribution of 
Aportela (1999) to the literature is the recognition of the potentially different effects of 
the training by gender and by training category. The results of the analysis suggest that 
there are important differences on the average impact by training category and by the 
gender of the participant.  When the sample to estimate the impacts includes men and 
women, the author shows evidence that participation in the program increases the 
probability of leaving unemployment by 20% for the mixed training type, and by 60% for 
the in-classroom-only type. These results are interpreted as average impacts of the 
participation in the program with relative to not participating in any program. On the 
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other hand, when the analysis is performed separately for male and female participants, 
his results show that for men, participation in the in-classroom-only program does not 
have any effect on the probability of leaving unemployment and mixed training has only 
a modest impact. For women, the two effects are positive and statistically significant, 
although the difference in magnitude appears to be important: mixed training increases 
the probability of leaving unemployment by slightly more than 100%; while in-classroom 
increases this probability by 59%. It needs to be noted that this carefully conducted work 
does not expose the misleading interpretations that might result from the comparison of  
propensity score matching estimations and hazard rate model estimations. While the first 
method gives us, on average, the differential in the probabilities of employment at a 
certain point in time, which is a level, the second method gives us a difference in rates. A 
related consideration is the fact that the length of the first employment is not necessarily 
equal for individuals in the comparison and in the treatment group, there is a possibility 
of dynamic selection bias [the treated and comparison groups are not sorted similarly into 
unemployment spells] (Dolton et al. 2006). Lastly, Aportela considers as a counterfactual 
to receiving a specific type of training: the total absence of training, which obscures the 
effects of one kind of training compared to the rest and prevents us from drawing 
conclusions for use in the mix of ALMPs. 
On the same lines, in terms of subgroup analysis by gender and training category, 
in Calderón-Madrid and Trejo (2001) and Calderón-Madrid (2002), the authors 
investigate the average effect of participation in the program on re-employment 
dynamics, which are understood in this context as:  the estimated number of weeks 
necessary to find a job and number of weeks in that job. The two estimates are obtained 
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using multi-spell mixed proportional hazard techniques, restricting the sample of trainees 
and comparisons to those with some work experience. Calderón-Madrid & Trejo and 
Calderón-Madrid further divide the sample into country regions and by the type of 
institution that provides the in-classroom only training. In the case of in-classroom 
training, the study shows that for both men and women, participation in the training 
positively affects the probability of leaving unemployment in certain zones of the 
country. Additionally, the study shows some evidence that participation in the mixed 
category improves re-employment dynamics of men. In the case of women, the positive 
effects on re-employment dynamics were restricted to the western and northern regions of 
the country. However, the authors find no evidence of positive influences on re-
employment dynamics given participation in in-classroom training. Furthermore, 
Calderón-Madrid & Trejo (2001) and Calderón-Madrid (2003) present estimates of the 
impact of the program on post-training hourly wages obtained from a propensity score 
matching estimation, finding that the impact is negative for men and positive for women. 
The importance of this study goes further than a finer subgroup analysis, since Calderón-
Madrid & Trejo was the first study not only concerned with the estimation of impacts on 
probabilities of employment and income, but also on long-term variables.  Finally, the 
results of these two studies need to be cautiously interpreted, since while the set of 
independent variables used in their analysis is very complete, including measuress of 
employment formality before training (such as access to health benefits), it is not 
economically explained or justified. The implicit assumption of selection on observables, 
even when not justified, is suspected to be valid in this context: the surveys from which 
the treated and comparison groups are taken from (retrospective survey 1994 and ENEU, 
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respectively) provide enough information to model participation decisions and potential 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the multilevel divisions of the sample means that each of the 
analysis samples is extremely limited in size. The fact that the comparison group is 
extremely limited in size is also worrisome. In addition, it is not clear whether the 
matching is done with or without replacement, and the authors do not provide any 
discussion on the comparability of the treatment and the comparison groups before or 
after the matching (e.g. balancing tests).  
I also had access to two evaluations done to cover the government requirements 
for evaluation of the program, which are not available to the public. Following internal 
regulations, these official evaluations of P/S were entrusted to private consulting firms 
that performed impact evaluations at a general and subgroup levels. GEA (2002) 
evaluates the impacts of the program on the trainee cohorts of 2001 and 2002, and 
Analitica Consultores (2004) presents estimation results on impacts over the cohorts of 
2003 and 2004. The parameters of interest in both reports are the probability of 
employment and monthly earnings, and although they mention using a propensity score 
matching technique, the estimates presented in the reports are those obtained by a 
Heckman two-step estimation of the bivariate selection model. Also, it is not clear from 
their reports what exclusion restriction is used to identify the model. The results for the 
cohorts of 2001, 2002 and 2003 are positive for men and women in terms of the 
probability of employment and monthly income. On the other hand, the impact of the 
training on the cohort of 2004 appears to be negative in terms of the probability of 
employment and positive in terms of income. Additionally, for the 2001 trainee cohort, 
GEA finds evidence to support the view that on-the-job training or a mixed combination 
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of on-the-job and in-classroom training outperforms the option of providing trainees only 
with in-classroom training, both in terms of probability of employment and monthly 
earnings. Analitica Consultores (2004), comparing the outcomes of the different types of 
training with receiving no training, finds no evidence of differential impacts on the 
probability of employment across training types. Furthermore, the study finds indications 
of a positive effect on labor income in all of the categories; however, the magnitudes  are 
very close, with no difference between training modalities.  
In Delajara et al. (2006), the authors obtain the average treatment effect and the 
average treatment effect on the treated on the probability of employment and wages, for 
the trainees of each year from 1999 to 2004. An attractive characteristic of this study is 
the recognition of the possibilities of formal and informal employment. In this study, an 
individual is considered to have informal employment when he/she is not affiliated to the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS).  An additional interesting feature of this 
study is the division of the trainees into two groups: those that received ICO and mixed 
training, and those that receive any other type of training (training for self employment, 
vouchers for professionals, etc). This division, the authors state, corresponds to their 
interpretation of the success of the program with respect to the expectations of the 
trainees. While for the first group (called the “salaried”) a formal job is a success, for the 
second group (called the “self-employed”), a job either in the formal or informal sector 
after training would be interpreted as a success.  
Delajara et al. employ two estimation methods: propensity score matching and the 
selection on unobservables method proposed by Heckman et al. (2003), which requires 
an exclusion restriction. The researchers find that while the effect of the training on the 
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probability of employment for the “salaried” group is positive during the years under 
analysis, this is not always the case for the “self-employed” group that presents positive 
but also negative effects between 1999 and 2004. While this result is valid for both 
methods, in the case of propensity score, the estimated effects are smaller. The results of 
the estimation of the effects of treatment on wages are puzzling: while for the first 
method all the effects are negative and statistically significant, for the second method all 
are positive and statistically significant. The explanation offered by the authors is that the 
selection bias present in the evaluation problem of P/S is partly a “hidden bias”, i.e., the 
econometrician would need to control for unobservable variables in his analysis to fully 
explain participation in the program. Under this argument, the authors conclude that 
“…assuming selection on observables can be misleading…”
22
 and hence, the authors 
argue, the methods based on such assumptions, such as matching, would not lead to 
correct estimates in a serious impact evaluation of this program. Finally, findings from 
Delajara et al. (2006), using data from the last year in which all modalities existed, 
provide support for the elimination of the in-classroom-only training by showing that this 
category had negative effects on the probability of employment; while the mixed training 
type (on-the-job and in-classroom) in medium and large firms registered the largest 
positive effect on employment over their period of analysis (1999-2004). 
However, several objections to their work can be made: As a first critique, it is 
worthwhile to mention that while the authors regard their second method as “selection 
correction”, it is erroneous not to recognize that all methods for impact evaluation aim to 
correct for selection bias. Hence, matching should also be regarded as a selection 
correction method. 
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Secondly, to construct a comparison group, the authors make use of ENEU, which 
restricts this group to individuals that inhabit only urban centers. This limitation could be 
due to the fact that in an effort to eliminate contamination bias, a special module of 
ENEU on schooling and training is used to calculate the probability of participation in a 
P/S program. If this probability is higher than 0.5, the individual is eliminated from the 
comparison group. While the idea to correcting for contamination bias is a good one, the 
method used does not appear to be optimal, since the elimination of all individuals with  a 
high probability of participation might well be eliminating an important proportion of 
non-participants that do actually “look” much like participants, making them good 
comparisons.  
Thirdly, despite the fact that the employment status of the trainee is not 
specifically recorded, Delajara et al. indicate that they restrict their investigation to 
individuals that at the time of the survey are unemployed, a relatively small proportion of 
all individuals served by P/S, which includes individuals who have never worked and are 
not considered unemployed and the underemployed. Consequently, they restrict the 
comparison group further by limiting it to those individuals who have been unemployed 
for at least two weeks. Finally, while the authors assume that “…the labor market 
experience of individuals in the treatment group before starting the program is the same 
as the control group…”, there is no evidence of the use of variables that would capture 
the labor market history of the treated and comparison groups in their estimation. 
In terms of the methodology, an essential assumption of matching is the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), under which the econometrician should 
include in his analysis all the variables that at the same time determine participation in 
 
 106 
the program and potential outcomes in the case of non-participation. This assumption 
needs to be justified in the context of the data available. Unfortunately this is not the case 
in Delajara et al. The ENCOPE, a retrospective survey from which relevant information 
on the trainees is obtained, is a very rich dataset from which is possible to obtain detailed 
information on length of unemployment, reasons to take the training, etc. Nevertheless 
the study considers only a very limited set of variables, which makes the satisfaction of 
the CIA in their analysis doubtful. 
Continuing with methodology, this research piece employs nearest neighbor 
matching for their estimations. Once the most popular and widely used matching 
estimator, its application has diminished in the literature given that the use of bootstrap to 
calculate standard errors is not valid for it due to the lack of smoothness (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2005). As of today, there is no good alternative to obtain standard errors for 
nearest neighbor matching. The lack of accurate standard errors casts doubt on the 
statistical significance of the results presented in the study. 
Finally, their second method, a parametric estimation method based on Heckman 
et al. (2003) requires an exclusion restriction for which the authors propose the “number 
of scholarships per state per unemployed and quarter.” Unfortunately, the necessary 
discussion of the validity of the restriction is non-existent. Moreover, this variable, as 
stated in the text of the study
23
, might be directly related to the probability of employment 
of the trainees and not only indirectly related to it through accessibility to the program, 
which may render it inappropriate as an instrumental variable for the analysis. 
                                                 
23
 “…the resources allocated to Servicios Estatales de Empleo (SEE) in each state should be in principle 
higher the worse the situation of the labor markets there…”, p. 9. 
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Despite some differences in their conclusions, two common features are present in 
the few studies that discuss the success of the different training categories that compose 
the ALMP in Mexico and that in general undermine their usefulness as a basis for policy 
recommendations. Firstly, the authors limit the variables that measure the impact of the 
program to probability of employment, wages, and length of job search. Secondly, these 
analyses only take as a comparison for each type of training, the absence of training, i.e., 
they estimate the impacts of participation in a specific type of training relative to the non-
participation in any training category. 
On the empirical investigation of the effects of different types of training, I 
propose, firstly, that for developing countries, it is relevant to study additional variables 
of success, such as variables that capture the impact of the program on the probability of 
obtaining formal employment. With this, I aim to tackle the multidimensional nature of 
the impacts of a training program in a developing economy, where an important 
proportion of employment is in the informal sector, a situation that is highly correlated 
with poverty. Leaving these potential effects out of the analysis is likely to provide an 
incomplete or worse, misleading picture of the actual effect of these policies.  
Additionally, this chapter makes a relevant addition to the knowledge of the P/S 
program by studying of the differential effects of various training types. I improve on the 
small existing literature by providing a rigorous study of the impact of the in-class-only 
modality not only relative to the absence of training, but relative to other available 
training categories. This is an important improvement because the participants in P/S are, 
by definition, exposed to training and comparing their outcomes to individuals who do 
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not receive training does not provide adequate information for policymakers who may be 
deciding between different compositions of modalities for the ALMP. 
Regarding the more general contribution, the necessity of an evolution of the 
Active Labor Market Policies’ training components to better address the real necessities 
of their clients, the unemployed and underemployed, makes it indispensable to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the categories of training that achieve enhanced results. This 
statement is not only true for the Mexican training component but for Latin American and 
the Caribbean programs that resemble the content and background of P/S. This section of 
the dissertation attempts to shed more light on this matter.  
 
Types or modalities of training and assignment 
Types of training in P/S 
As already mentioned, four main types of training were offered as part of 
PROBECAT/SICAT in 2001. The official description of each of them follows (STPS, 
2000). 
In-classroom training 
This category was offered by educational institutions registered in the Ministry of 
Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública) and/or the Ministry of Labor 
(Secretara del Trabajo y Prevision Social). Each group includes between 20 and 30 
trainees. While on training, the participants receive a stipend, funds for transportation and 
accident insurance. Additionally, the program covers the instructors’ salaries, materials 
and basic health services for the trainees. For example, for the state of Tamaulipas, in-
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classroom training included electric installation, basic computational skills, general 
carpentry and air conditioner technician, among others (Gobierno del Estado de 
Tamaulipas, 2000). 
Mixed training in medium and big businesses 
The courses in this training type are offered following the specific request of 
enterprises that look to satisfy their labor demand, where most of the participant 
enterprises have at least 30 employers. The “mixed” label comes from the fact that these 
categories may combine on-the-job with in-classroom training, both provided by the host 
enterprise. The host businesses are in charge of designing the contents of the courses 
according to the necessities of the enterprise, instructing or covering the expenses of an 
instructor, providing proportionate health insurance and the necessary course materials to 
the trainees. PROBECAT/SICAT covers the stipend and arranges for 70% of the trainees 
to join the enterprise as employees once the training is over. All these listed conditions 
would be verified and evaluated by the State Employment Office. 
  In 2001, in the state of Tamaulipas, mixed courses in medium and big enterprises 
included industrial sewing, cashier training, furniture design and manufacture, among 
others (Gobierno del Estado de Tamaulipas, 2002). 
Mixed training in micro and small businesses 
  This category focuses on training and on generating actual labor market 
experience with courses directed to young individuals in search for employment. It uses 
the productive infrastructure of the micro and small enterprises. For the purposes of 
PROBECAT/SICAT, these have a maximum of 30 workers. This type of program 
promotes the insertion of the trainees in the businesses during the length of the training as 
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well as their continued employment after the instruction is completed. Nevertheless, the 
business owner is not under any obligation to hire them. 
  The businesses can provide the trainees with extra stipends or other kind of 
‘payments’. PROBECAT/SICAT covers the basic stipend, accident insurance and 
payments to the instructor/supervisor, who is selected and hired by the State Employment 
Office. Additionally, the program covers transportation costs if the sum of the stipend 
and these costs are not higher than the salary received by a worker of the host business 
who occupies a similar position. 
  Among some examples of the courses offered in this category are administrative 
assistant/receptionist, accountant’s assistant, automotive mechanic, beautician, etc., 
(Gobierno del Estado de Tamaulipas, 2002). 
Self-employment  
  The program for self-employment focuses on populations, whose interests and 
abilities are oriented to the development of a productive activity on their own, but who 
requires upgrading their technical and administrative knowledge and skills. The training 
follows a ‘hands-on’ approach and takes place in educational institutions. With the 
purpose of promoting the fast employment of the participants after training, in addition to 
the stipend, health insurance and coverage of transportation costs are provided by the 





Participants in P/S, assignment into training types 
In the Procedures Manual of P/S (STPS, 2001), the Ministry of Labor states that 
there are two ways in which an individual can participate as P/S trainees –in any 
category-:  
1) Responding directly to a call for participants for specific classes, courses, or 
mixed training; 
2) Being sent directly to the training by an employment advisor from the SEE 
offices. 
In both cases the interested individual would have to pass through an interview 
and a screening process at the local SEE offices to determine if she belongs to the 
population of interest, and if she has covered all of the specific prerequisites. 
While the potential trainee can state her preferences in terms of the training 
modality to attend, the SEE agents play an important role in determining two factors that 
will decide the participation of the applicant in any of the offered training alternatives: 1) 
If the petitioner would benefit by participating in P/S training
24
, and 2) The training type 
that is the best alternative. 
Although the general population of interest in P/S includes individuals who are 
unemployed or underemployed, each training type has slightly different targets: 
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sequential participation in P/S. 
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 Mixed training in medium and big enterprises focuses on active job seekers 
who require certification to access employment, or who have been displaced 
from the productive sector due to technological changes, the closing of their 
place of employment, etc. 
 Mixed training in micro and small businesses has as its target population, the 
unemployed with characteristics that place them in the population group with 
the most disadvantages in the market (youth with no labor market experience, 
among others). 
 Training for self-employment focuses on active job seekers or individuals in 
underemployment with an interest in starting a small business. 
 In-classroom training aims at the unemployed who are interested in updating 
their knowledge and labor market skills in a specific occupational group. 
In what follows, when we refer to an individual “choosing” to participate in a 
specific training type, we are considering not only personal preference, but also the rest 





As in the previous chapter, in addition to the estimation of the impact of 
participation in the training program on monthly income, hours worked and probability of 
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employment, I use additional variables that will measure the impact of the program on 
the probability of formal employment, or a job in the formal sector. 
Along with the aforementioned outcome variables (income, hours and employment), I 
will evaluate the impact of the training on the following: 
a) Employment and Health benefits: The social insurance law (Ley del Seguro 
Social (2002), Article 12) establishes that all paid employees, members of 
cooperatives and other persons determined by the executive power should 
receive access to medical benefits, provided by IMSS
25
 (Article 11 of the Ley 
del Seguro Social). Article 11 of the same law establishes that these employees 
are to receive: work related risk insurance, health and maternity insurance, life 
and handicap insurance, old age layoff insurance, daycare and other social 
benefits. All health services provided by clinics and hospitals from the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS). 
b) Employment with housing credit: The Mexican Constitution (Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Article 123) establishes that all 
individuals under a labor contract, irrespective of whether this contract is 
written or verbal, should receive a low rate credit that could be applied to 
buying, building or repairing a dwelling. The employer and the federal 
government provide the funds for these credits. 
c) Employment with other cash benefits: Includes end of the year bonuses and 
others. 
                                                 
25
 The health insurance offered by IMSS includes outpatient and inpatient care in its own hospitals and 
clinics, prenatal care, childbirth, specialists and supply of prescription drugs. 
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d) Employed in a micro business: Following the original definition of informal 
sector by size, I examine the possibility of being employed in what in Mexico 
is defined as a micro enterprise. The official definition of a micro enterprise, in 
2002, was a firm that consists of at most 10 individuals including the employer 
(Martínez-Kasten, 2005). 
e) Employed as self-employed or without payment: The group of individuals 
working without payment is usually differentiated as working for a family 
member or not. In this case I aggregate these two classifications.  
f) Employed with a verbal contract: The survey instruments only consider two 
possibilities: a written contract or a verbal one. The possibility of the 
inexistence of a contract is not classified, although it is reasonable to believe 
that individuals without a contract would classify themselves as having a 
verbal one. 
g) Employed in businesses without a specific address (businesses without 
residence, hereafter): The businesses included in this group are those that do 
not have a specific building or permanent structure exclusively used to conduct 
their activities. These include street vendors and individuals who conduct their 
businesses from their own dwellings, using household resources as inputs. 
Appendix A presents a detailed description of the variables included as outcomes 





In this chapter I investigate the differential performance of each training modality 
within a multi-treatment setting (Imbens, 2000; Lechner 2001; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; 
Sianesi, 2004), where each type will be evaluated by contrasting it with each other type, 
as well as to the option of not participating in any of the offered treatments.  
In the potential outcome approach to causality proposed by Roy (1951) and Rubin 
(1974), the evaluation can be reduced to a comparison between two general treatments: i) 
the treatment of interest (treatment 1), in this case participating in any training modality, 
and ii) the absence of training (treatment 0) on the outcome or response variable, Y. This 
is the classical model used in the microeconometric evaluation literature. It was applied 
in the previous chapter of the dissertation to obtain the average treatment effects of any 
kind of training (compared to no training) over an array of outcome variables of success. 
For this chapter, I propose to study the differential impacts by training category 
using Lechner’s (2001) generalization of the aforementioned classical approach to a 
multi-treatment situation. In Lechner’s approach, there are ( )M+1  different mutually 
exclusive states (or treatments), and the outcomes of such are denoted: { }Y Y Y M0 1, ,..., . 
Each of the individuals receives only one treatment and hence only one component of 
{ }Y Y Y M0 1, ,...,  is observed, while the remaining outcomes are counterfactuals. We 
denote participation in a particular treatment m by the variable { }S M∈ 01, ,...,  
The average treatment effects for a pair-wise comparison of treatments m and l 
can be defined by: 
( )γ 0m l m l m lE Y Y EY EY, = − = − , 
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( )θ0m l m l m lE Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S m, | ( | ) ( | )= − = = = − = , 
where γ 0
m l,
 is the expected impact of treatment m relative to treatment l for a participant 
drawn randomly from the general population and θ0
m l,
is the expected effect on an 
individual randomly drawn from the population of participants in treatment m only. 
In this chapter, I propose to estimate θ0
m l,
 for all pairs of types of treatments 
offered to the cohort of 2001, distinguishing by gender. The cohort of 2001 is interesting 
because they were offered in-classroom only training, mixed (in-classroom and on-the-
job) training in small and medium businesses, mixed training in big businesses, and 
training for self-employment. The estimation technique proposed is propensity score 
matching; specifically kernel matching with the application of a cross validation 
technique to select optimal bandwidths. In this case, the counterfactual for those 
individuals in the treatment group would be obtained directly from individuals that 
participated in other training categories. The standard errors will be calculated by 
bootstrap. 
I chose matching methods because, unlike other selection on observables methods 
such as least squares regression, matching highlights the common support problem and 
compares only those observations that are comparable. Another good reason is that 
matching permits more flexible conditioning on  the variables used. Finally, matching is 
relatively easy to understand and explain, a very desirable characteristic if we would like 
to provide policy recommendations based on the estimation results. 
Matching estimation is based on the assumption of selection on observables, i.e., 
conditional on characteristics observable to the econometrician, the treatment status is 
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independent of the untreated outcomes ( X|DY ⊥0 , where  “⊥ ” denotes independence). 
This assumption is known formally as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). 
In this multi treatment setting, we invoke CIA separately for each pair of training types 
and include in the estimation all the necessary variables that we believe would determine 
both participation and outcomes simultaneously. Matching is known for being a “data 
hungry” method, and this is related to the discussion on the CIA. In our case, the data at 
hand has enough detailed information including variables that capture the labor market 
history of the individual, that we are confident about invoking CIA for the multi-
treatment analysis. 
I also require the following common support condition: 1<)X(P , for all X . This 
guarantees that all individuals in the treatment group will have an analogue in the 
comparison group. In this specific case, I impose pair-wise common support using the 
simple mix-max rule used in Dehejia & Wahba (1999, 2002), i.e, for each pair of training 
types, we restrict the propensity scores to the highest of the two minimums and to the 
lowest of the two maximums. By restricting the propensity scores in this way, we have 
the advantage of maximizing the sample size with respect to the sample size resulting 
from imposing a general common support. 
As in the first estimation, we use propensity score matching, which implies the 
calculation of the conditional probability of participation of one training type with respect 
to another, over the vector of observed characteristics X, ( ))X(P|DE))X(P|,D(E = . 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) show that if it is possible to match on X, then it is possible to 





Description of variables and behavioral model 
The behavioral model behind the decision to participate in any training category 
rather than not participating in the program at all, described in section 4.3 of chapter IV, 
is slightly different from the one I present in  this section.  Here I describe the variables 
that enter the decision to participate in one specific training category rather than another. 
The underlying assumption is that a participant is rational and in order to maximize his 
expected utility, he will decide to participate in one or another training category given the 
set of costs and expected benefits posed by the program. It is important to remember that 
we are not considering the non-participation in this part of the dissertation. 
All categories of the training program are designed to increase the stock of human 
capital of the trainees so that there is a real upgrade of the workers’ abilities and hence, a 
potentially higher probability of employment, labor income and other benefits. 
Accumulated human capital stock at the time of the training provides a measure of 
average unobserved ability, which has implications for the potential benefits and 
probability of participation in one type of training or another. Individuals with different 
levels of education could self-select into specific types of training; for example, in-
classroom training seems to attract individuals with higher education levels. With this 
motive, I include as an explanatory variable the number of years of formal education the 
individual has acquired before training. This variable will provide a measure of ability, 
which in turn relates to both participation in the program and potential outcomes.  Having 
completed specific levels of education could also determine if a potential trainee decides 
to take one type of training or other; at the same time completed levels of formal 
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education clearly determines likely labor market outcomes. For this reason, we are also 
including dummy variables that capture the highest level of education achieved.  
Standard human capital theory implies that an individual should acquire his stock 
of human capital at a young age, so that he will have more time during his natural life to 
enjoy the returns of it (Mincer, 1997) and (Becker, 1964). All else constant, the expected 
benefits of an individual obtaining training at a younger age are on average higher than 
those if the person is older. At the same time, age might also affect income, probability of 
employment, etc. In the Procedures Manual of P/S (STPS, 2001), it is stated that some 
forms of training such as mixed in micro and small enterprises are designed to attract 
younger and more inexperienced workers, than mixed in big companies, for example.  
We include age and the square of age to control for the fact that it is likely to affect both 
participation in particular training types and outcomes.  
Gender will also make a difference on the expected net benefits of participation in 
particular training types. Most evaluations of training programs in developing countries 
show that positive impacts of participation in such programs are mostly confined to 
women (Betcherman, Olivas and Dar, 2004). It seems also to be the case that men and 
women prefer, on average, different training types. For example, in the case of P/S, the 
great majority of women (almost 40%) choose self-employment over any other training 
type, while for men this is the least popular type.  As in the previous chapter, I present 
separate estimates for men and women.  
Demographic variables will furthermore capture additional differences on the 
overall likelihood of obtaining a net benefit by participation in the program. Differences 
in the relative position in the household (i.e. head of household, spouse of head, etc.) and 
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marital status, and in this chapter only, number of economic dependents, in addition to 
the demographic variables already mentioned, capture relevant and otherwise unobserved 
factors, such as stability and other psychological factors that influence participation and 
potential outcomes.  
A rich set of variables that capture the past labor market experience of the 
individual, is necessary to obtain accurate estimate of the impacts of such program as 
showed by Card and Sullivan (1988), Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998). 
An individual’s labor market history is formed by a series of decisions and outcomes to 
those decisions that will have an effect on the direction and magnitude in which the 
training experience will affect him. Differences in participation and attachment to the 
labor market, labor earnings, full time and part time status, etc, play a role in the 
reservation wage at which the individual is indifferent between accepting a particular job 
or not. At the same time, these past experiences will help determine the labor income 
received by an individual.  Previous employment variables will function as summary 
statistics of those characteristics, and account for the quantity, efficiency, transferability, 
obsolescence, etc. of accumulated human capital obtained while in the labor market 
(Sianesi, 2002).  
The official requirements for participation in P/S include an employment status of 
unemployed (and looking for a job) or underemployed (looking or not for a job). 
Nevertheless, as stated in the preceding chapter, information obtained from officials of 
the program and directly from ENCOPE suggests employment status is not a rigid 
determinant of eligibility. A shortcoming of the data at hand is that it only captures 
information on the last job that an individual had prior to training. This then restricts the 
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set of variables that capture the labor individual history to a categorical variable that 
indicates if the individual has ever worked and variables that capture the number of 
weekly hours worked and monthly labor income in the last job. Additionally, I include a 
variable that captures the duration of inactivity up to the time when training started, 
which will serve as a proxy for optimal search effort or the marginal utility of leisure 
(Vishwanath, 1989). In this case, I include a variable that is a continuous number of days, 
and the square of this variable. This variable captures, for those who ever hold a job, the 
date in which the individual left her last job. For those who had never hold a job by that 
time, the duration of inactivity was coded as zero. Duration of inactivity will also account 
for unobservables such as the discouraged worker effect and the expected deterioration of 
human capital skills previously acquired.  
Along the same lines, ENCOPE 2001 obtained information on the reasons why an 
individual decided to participate in the training program. The survey instrument presents 
the respondent with a set of (not necessarily mutually exclusive) reasons for desiring 
training but then asks him to select only one (such as “to obtain experience” or “because 
it was recommended to me”). For our purposes, we assume that the trainees record the 
most important reason. It is reasonable to believe that the reason for participation in the 
program will contain information that affects both participation in a particular training 
category and the potential outcome associated with participation in each training 
category. 
Finally, given that the program is offered at the national level, it is necessary to 
include variables that will account for differences in local labor markets, as the 
characteristics of the labor market and the institutional framework might imply 
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differences across individuals living in different regions (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith & 
Todd, 1998). I included two sets of variables, the first of which is a socio-economic index 
created by the INEGI, which divides the country in 7 zones placing each of the 32 states 
in a zone, where 1 is the lowest zone and 7 is the highest one and corresponds to Mexico 
City. The index is based on characteristics obtained from the census and includes 
indicators of dwelling quality and infrastructure, dwelling overcrowding, health, 
education and employment (INEGI, 2006). The second set of variables includes a set of 
dummies by municipality population size, where the lowest category includes 
municipalities with less than 25,000 habitants, and the highest includes cities with 
350,000 or more habitants. These two sets of variables serve as summary statistics for 
local characteristics, and will also capture unobserved differences at the regional level in 
the availability of each training type and the selection process of the trainees. 
As a summary for the reader of the two empirical chapters, in chapter V, the few 
changes in the explanatory variables include: formal schooling and length of inactivity 
variables are continuous and the limit values of the dummy variables for size of 
municipality are slightly different. Finally, a variable that captures the number of 
economic dependents is added, as well as dummy variables that capture the main reason 
for participation in the training. 
Appendix D presents a detailed description of the variables included in the 






As stated in the first analytic chapter of the dissertation, since 1998 the National 
Survey on Job Matching and Continuance (ENCOPE), a retrospective survey, is applied 
to a 1% random sample of P/S graduates. It is representative at the national level and by 
modality of program and the response rate is approximately 85% (STPS, 2006). 
The survey is a retrospective personal interview survey and the trainees are 
questioned on variables that capture information on the time before, during and after 
training. It provides information on socio-demographic variables: age, marital status, if 
the individual is head of household, gender, education level and economic dependents; 
program/classes attended, dates of participation, reasons to participate in the training and 
opinion on courses taken; and, finally, a set of labor market variables pre- and post-
training that include wages, benefits, duration of employment, position, sector, and 
activity, hours worked, form of payment, reasons for leaving job, etc.  
In this chapter, we focus on the 2001 ENCOPE, because there were four training 
types offered during that period: in-classroom training, mixed in medium and large firms, 
mixed in small and micro firms, and training for self-employment. Unlike other years, in 
2001, two cohorts of trainees are distinguished; named the third and fourth quarter 
cohorts. In this study, we group them together.  The original sample contains 4,866 
individual records (33% of them are male) of trainees who finished their classes. Table 
11 presents the distribution of the relevant variables by gender and type of training. 
Several things come to mind when analyzing this table: for women the proportion who 
have never worked is overwhelmingly high for those trained for self-employment. This 
group has also the highest proportion of married individuals and, on average, has older 
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participants than the rest of the groups. The youngest are those trained for employment in 
micro and small businesses. With respect to development zone and municipality size, no 
major differences appear between the training types. The same pattern occurs when we 
analyze the reasons for participation in the program: the highest percentage in all groups 
report “wanted to get training” as the most important reason to participate, with “required 
for employment” as the least important reason in all cases. For men, the highest 
proportion of individuals who have never worked is found in the mixed training in small 
firms. Unlike the women, this group is on average the youngest of the four, and the one 
with the smallest number of dependents under their care. Although most of the trainees 
live in municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, this proportion is noticeably 
higher for trainees in both the mixed types compared to those in in-classroom training 
and self-employment. These differences will be formally analyzed as all the variables in 
Table 11 will be used to estimate probability of participation in each training type. A 
detailed description of the variables is included in Appendix D. 
The outcome variables are measured between December of 2001 and January of 
2002 (after all training classes are completed); the elapsed time between the end date of 
the program and the time the survey is conducted is heterogeneous.  No participants in a 
specific training type are scheduled to be interviewed first, so that the date the survey is 









medium and big 
enterprises




Number of observations 604 487 933 1,236
Age 27.88 26.36 24.56 35.04
Years of formal education 10.22 8.67 10.25 7.03
Single (%) 45.03 53.80 61.95 23.06
Married (%) 48.01 39.83 33.76 69.83
Divorced, widow, separated  (%) 6.95 6.36 4.29 7.11
Economic dependents 1.01 1.33 0.86 1.35
Head of household (%) 8.11 10.68 6.65 9.87
Has never been employed (%) 30.79 35.93 41.05 52.83
Total number of hours worked weekly* 42.61 46.27 42.35 35.76
Pre monthly labor income* 1,741.87 1,850.07 1,584.10 1,194.89
Length of inactivity in days 228.91 125.74 115.64 138.64
Highest degree obtained
No degree 2.65 8.23 3.54 23.08
Elementary School 10.76 28.19 11.70 32.06
Junior High school 45.70 45.47 40.88 33.68
High school 19.87 8.64 26.18 5.75
Technical degree 2.32 2.88 2.58 0.32
College 18.71 6.58 15.13 5.1
Development Regions
Development region1 10.60 3.90 6.22 9.95
Development region2 16.39 16.43 18.01 17.56
Development region3 21.03 20.33 16.18 14.97
Development region4 25.83 20.12 30.44 23.79
Development region5 12.25 16.22 12.75 14.08
Development region6 9.44 21.56 12.22 16.18
Development region7 4.47 1.44 4.18 3.48
Size of Municipality (Population)
Town size<=2,499 0.66 0.00 0.21 0.40
2,500=<municipality size<15,000 5.63 9.24 3.43 17.72
15,000=<municipality size<50,000 30.46 18.89 12.65 27.51
50,000=<municipality size<100,000 18.05 12.94 15.11 18.93
municipality size>100,000 45.20 58.93 68.60 35.44
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience 20.03 14.17 22.08 22.33
To obtain employment 9.27 16.43 16.51 7.44
Wanted to get training 35.43 32.44 28.08 34.55
Was recommended to take it 25.66 11.70 17.68 20.63
Required for employment 1.66 6.98 1.93 0.57
To obtain the stipend 5.46 12.32 7.07 6.31
Other 2.48 5.95 6.65 8.17
*Does not include zeros
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey







medium and big 
enterprises




Number of observations 422 383 490 311
Age 27.36 27.00 22.93 30.08
Years of formal education 10.43 9.61 10.27 8.71
Single (%) 58.77 47.52 73.67 51.13
Married (%) 39.57 48.30 26.13 46.30
Divorced, widow, separated  (%) 6.95 6.36 4.29 7.11
Economic dependents 1.53 1.96 1.11 1.83
Head of household (%) 37.91 47.26 24.90 43.09
Has never been employed (%) 19.67 12.53 34.08 24.44
Total number of hours worked weekly* 46.19 51.91 43.56 44.49
Pre monthly labor income* 2,503.35 2,749.60 1,780.02 1,912.61
Length of inactivity in days 126.05 61.31 81.10 94.51
Highest degree obtained
No degree 3.55 5.22 4.29 13.18
Elementary School 11.85 16.97 14.90 22.19
Junior High school 43.13 47.52 40.61 39.55
High school 24.17 18.02 29.39 17.36
Technical degree 4.74 2.35 3.27 1.29
College 12.56 9.92 7.55 6.43
Development Regions
Development region1 8.53 2.87 13.88 17.68
Development region2 19.19 15.40 15.51 22.19
Development region3 19.19 15.93 14.49 13.18
Development region4 23.93 24.28 34.08 23.79
Development region5 9.95 17.49 12.86 14.15
Development region6 14.69 22.45 6.94 2.89
Development region7 4.50 1.31 2.24 6.11
Size of Municipality (Population)
Town size<=2,499 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00
2,500=<municipality size<15,000 8.77 7.05 2.24 12.86
15,000=<municipality size<50,000 16.59 14.10 10.82 27.33
50,000=<municipality size<100,000 15.88 7.57 14.69 13.50
municipality size>100,000 58.77 71.28 71.63 46.30
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience 19.91 21.67 24.69 17.04
To obtain employment 11.85 19.84 13.47 13.83
Wanted to get training 37.68 29.77 31.63 39.87
Was recommended to take it 19.91 11.75 14.90 15.76
Required for employment 1.42 3.92 1.22 1.61
To obtain the stipend 4.74 9.92 7.35 6.43
Other 4.03 3.13 6.73 5.47
*Does not include zeros
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey






As a first step of the empirical analysis, I calculate the probabilities of 
participating in each training category compared to each other training category, that is, I 
estimate for training type l with respect to training type m: )X,mSlS|lSPr( =∪== . 
Where l = 1 4,...,  andm = 1 4,..., , l m≠ , and:  
1=In-classroom 
2=Mixed-in medium and big enterprises 
3=Mixed-in micro and small enterprises 
4=For self employment 
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 present the results of this estimation of the expected 
probabilities, by gender. Figures 5.1 to 5.6 for women and 6.1 to 6.6 for men correspond 
to the calculated propensity scores. 
The expected probability was estimated using a maximum likelihood probit 
model; I report the average derivatives of the conditional probabilities. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual participated in a 
training program category, and 0 if he participated in the other category in a different 
pair. The results of the remainder of the probit analyses (2 with respect to 1, 3 with 
respect to 1, etc) are not shown since the coefficients obtained are symmetric to those 
presented in the table so that, for example, all the coefficients under the label “1 with 





PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Age 0.59 3.58 -0.50
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared 0.00 -0.03 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married 8.37 2.97 -2.61
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Divorced, widow, separated 9.30 5.70 11.30
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Number of economic dependents -4.19 -1.72 -1.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Head of household -8.66 -3.28 -4.78
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Has never been employed -29.09 -4.54 4.56
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
Age * Has never been employed -0.15 -0.07 -0.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly -0.97 -0.25 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly squared 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income -0.01 0.00 0.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)













Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey.
Notes: 







respect to mixed in 
medium and big 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 




Table 12.1 A Propensity Score, Women
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 





PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Age 3.13 -4.37 -3.19
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Age squared -0.04 0.00 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married -6.99 -37.52 -3.26
(0.03) (0.11) (0.02)
Divorced, widow, separated -4.92 22.78 6.89
(0.06) (0.24) (0.05)
Number of economic dependents 1.92 8.28 0.87
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Head of household 6.53 15.45 2.59
(0.06) (0.19) (0.04)
Has never been employed 24.07 132.11 12.49
(0.11) (0.43) (0.07)
Age * Has never been employed (0.04) (0.24) 0.02
0.00 0.01 (0.00)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly 0.55 5.87 0.99
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly squared 0.00 -0.05 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income 0.01 0.05 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

















Table 12.1 B Propensity Score, Women
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Mixed in medium and big 
with respect to mixed in 
micro and small 
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to self-
employment
Mixed in micro and 
small with respect to 
self-employment
Notes: 
*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100.
College
Elementary School





PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Length of inactivity 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of inactivity squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience 18.69 9.90 -8.50
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Wanted to get training 16.79 17.17 -2.91
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Was recommended to take it 28.85 23.03 -1.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Required for employment -0.92 19.30 13.93
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
To obtain the stipend -5.00 5.80 -3.47
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Other 0.22 -7.49 -19.28
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Development Regions
Development region 1 15.83 11.40 19.53
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
Development region 2 -16.28 -6.05 8.07
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Development region 3 -16.35 0.81 14.66
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Development region 4 -8.94 2.19 9.92
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Development region 5 -18.95 3.90 2.27
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
Development region 6 -31.27199 -4.06 -3.19
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
Size of Municipality (Population)
Municipality size<25,000 -6.89 22.19 -21.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
25,000=<Municipality size<125,000 12.90 19.68 -9.25
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
125,000=<Municipality size<225,000 -27.51483 -8.03 -23.61
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
225,000=<Municipality size<325,000 -2.00 -4.20 5.56
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey.
** In this case not-divorced predicted participation perfectly, and  was excluded from the estimation.
Notes: 
*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100.
Table 12.1 A Cont'. Propensity Score, Women
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 
medium and big 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 







PROBIT, Mean Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Length of inactivity 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of inactivity squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience -13.86 -86.46 -11.28
(0.04) (0.16) (0.03)
Wanted to get training -0.31 -62.36 -14.49
(0.04) (0.15) (0.03)
Was recommended to take it -8.83 -102.77 -15.20
(0.04) (0.17) (0.03)
Required for employment 25.85 70.73 -3.99
(0.08) (0.34) (0.10)
To obtain the stipend 8.79 3.27 -5.11
(0.05) (0.19) (0.04)
Other -6.44 -56.26 -11.26
(0.05) (0.21) (0.04)
Development Regions
Development region 1 3.90 28.50 7.18
(0.11) (0.40) (0.06)
Development region 2 11.93 109.09 14.66
(0.09) (0.34) (0.05)
Development region 3 18.26 126.88 14.90
(0.09) (0.34) (0.05)
Development region 4 11.76 83.73 10.73
(0.08) (0.33) (0.05)
Development region 5 22.88 88.08 2.70
(0.09) (0.34) (0.05)
Development region 6 32.58 114.44 0.93
(0.09) (0.33) (0.05)
Size of Municipality (Population)
Municipality size<25,000 22.23 -87.20 -32.36
(0.05) (0.15) (0.02)
25,000=<Municipality size<125,000 5.24 -65.08 -20.83
(0.03) (0.13) (0.02)
125,000=<Municipality size<225,000 17.12 -24.07 -18.76
(0.04) (0.15) (0.02)
225,000=<Municipality size<325,000 -0.54 16.88 6.89
(0.04) (0.22) (0.04)
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey.
Table 12.1 B Cont'. Propensity Score, Women
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Mixed in medium and big 
with respect to mixed in 
micro and small 
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to self-
employment
Mixed in micro and 
small with respect to 
self-employment
** In this case not-divorced predicted participation perfectly, and  so was excluded from the estimation.
Notes: 




PROBIT, Average Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Age 0.23 1.72 1.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Age squared 0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married -3.09 8.10 -28.14
(0.06) (0.06) (0.22)
Divorced, widow, separated -24.60 ** 27.27
(0.11) (0.62)
Number of economic dependents -2.68 -1.42 -5.28
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Head of household -9.22 -6.67 37.79
(0.07) (0.06) (0.24)
Has never been employed -22.63 -7.66 -52.69
(0.16) (0.18) (0.57)
Age * Has never been employed 0.36 0.51 0.64
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly -1.05 -0.06 -3.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly squared 0.01 0.00 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income 0.00 0.01 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)













Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey.
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Table 12.2 A Propensity Score, Men 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 
medium and big 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 





*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100.









Table 12.2 B Propensity Score, Men 
PROBIT, Average Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Age 0.88 -0.99 -2.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared -0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married (3.13) -7.90 -8.31
0.06 (0.06) (0.06)
Divorced, widow, separated ** 25.60 **
(0.10)
Number of economic dependents (2.07) (2.69) (0.39)
0.01 0.01 0.01
Head of household (1.42) 13.75 8.87
0.06 (0.06) (0.05)
Has never been employed 20.74 25.22 -5.55
(0.13) (0.09) (0.17)
Age * Has never been employed 0.14 -0.34 -0.46
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly 0.97 0.59 -0.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre total number of hours worked weekly squared -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre monthly labor income squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)













Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to 
mixed in micro and 
small 
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to self-
employment
Mixed in micro and 
small with respect to 
self-employment
Notes: 
*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100









PROBIT, Average Derivatives reported*, standard errors in parentheses
Length of inactivity 0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of inactivity squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience 14.35 2.62 -6.65
(0.06) (0.06) (0.23)
Wanted to get training 12.97 6.90 -1.80
(0.05) (0.06) (0.21)
Was recommended to take it 23.94 7.37 23.96
(0.06) (0.06) (0.23)
Required for employment 0.87 18.51 7.84
(0.12) (0.13) (0.44)
To obtain the stipend -19.97 -10.96 -59.90
(0.09) (0.09) (0.36)
Other 15.99 -3.28 -27.43
(0.10) (0.08) (0.32)
Development Regions
Development region 1 1.73 -23.85 -8.44
(0.15) (0.09) (0.33)
Development region 2 -18.14 -10.44 39.78
(0.11) (0.10) (0.31)
Development region 3 -23.50 -15.66 88.55
(0.10) (0.09) (0.33)
Development region 4 -22.13 -22.09 30.98
(0.10) (0.09) (0.30)
Development region 5 -33.83 -26.25 -10.95
(0.09) (0.08) (0.32)
Development region 6 -30.68 -6.94 103.29
(0.10) (0.10) (0.35)
Size of Municipality (Population)
Municipality size<25,000 10.76 22.97 -78.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.21)
25,000=<Municipality size<125,000 4.90 3.95 -19.51
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17)
125,000=<Municipality size<225,000 -2.13 -9.14 34.19
(0.06) (0.05) (0.23)
225,000=<Municipality size<325,000 6.00 -12.53 17.49
(0.07) (0.06) (0.28)
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey.
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Notes: 
*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100.
** In this case not-divorced predicted participation perfectly, and  so was excluded from the estimation.
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 
medium and big 
In-classroom with 
respect to mixed in 




Table 12.2 A Cont'. Propensity Score, Men 
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Table 10.2 B Cont'. Propensity Score, Men 
PROBIT, Average Derivatives reported*, stard errors in parenthesis
SICAT-2001 Cohort, retrospective survey 
Length of inactivity -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of inactivity squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Reasons to take training
To obtain experience -8.84 -16.63 -0.65
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Wanted to get training -6.93 -16.71 -4.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Was recommended to take it -14.41 -20.30 -1.30
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Required for employment 6.35 -6.18 -5.77
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14)
To obtain the stipend 7.07 -4.05 -2.20
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Other -21.52 -33.03 0.42
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Development Regions
Development region 1 -17.19 -0.24 19.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.07)
Development region 2 7.99 25.19 14.69
(0.13) (0.07) (0.08)
Development region 3 7.55 36.14 23.74
(0.14) (0.05) (0.06)
Development region 4 -2.34 26.51 26.43
(0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Development region 5 11.31 30.01 19.79
(0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Development region 6 23.76 42.98 23.85
(0.14) (0.05) (0.06)
Size of Municipality (Population)
Municipality size<25,000 18.55 -24.93 -37.65
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
25,000=<Municipality size<125,000 -3.05 -7.68 -6.31
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
125,000=<Municipality size<225,000 -5.94 9.22 10.12
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
225,000=<Municipality size<325,000 -15.08 -9.26 14.11
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001 survey
Notes: 
*  All estimates in bold are significant at a 95% level, All average derivatives have been rescaled  by a factor of 100
** In this case not-divorced predicted participation perfectly, and  was excluded from the estimation
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to 
mixed in micro and 
small 
Mixed in medium and 
big with respect to self-
employment
Mixed in micro and 

















Source: Author’s calculations with Encope 2001 
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Figure 6.3 Propensity Score: In-classroom vs. Self-employment  
Men 
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Source: Author’s calculations with Encope 2001 
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Table 12.2 shows that for men age is only statistically significant when comparing 
mixed training in micro and small businesses and training for self-employment. As the 
applicant gets older, his probability of choosing to train to start his own business rather 
than updating his skills in a small business increases. This result is consistent with the 
rules established for participation in the two training types, where the mixed training is 
mostly targeted to younger individuals. For women, this is also the case. Moreover, my 
results suggest that the younger the applicant, the higher the probabilities of mixed 
training in small firms relative to any other type of training.  
For the two mixed training types, as well as for the in-classroom training 
category, the official rules of the program establish that, in addition to the general 
requirements to all applicants, there are minimum education level requirements, which 
are specific for the particular course offered. There is no similar formal education 
restriction for self-employment training; the only comparable prerequisite is that the 
applicant needs to show enough interest and entrepreneurial potential. On these same line 
lines, my results show that, for women, more education reduces the probabilities of self-
employment training relative to any other training type. This result could also reflect 
individuals with lower formal education perceiving self-employment to be a more 
accessible way to enter or to stay in the job market, than their more educated 
counterparts. 
Additionally, I find evidence that at each formal educational degree, with respect 
to no degree (the lowest being elementary school), men are more prone to enroll in in-
classroom training over mixed training in small businesses. This is also true when 
comparing having a junior-high diploma or a college degree with respect to no degree on 
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the probabilities of participating in mixed training in big firms compared to training in 
small firms, which is again consistent with what is stated by the Ministry about the 
population of interest for each category. Nevertheless, I do not observe the same pattern 
when I examine the results for women. At each formal educational level attained, with 
respect to no degree, women are more prone to enroll for training in smaller firms with 
respect to bigger ones. The results could be reflecting a preference of women who have 
attained higher levels of formal education for apprenticeships in small places over the 
work in a big company. 
I show that married women are more prone to participate in any training type over 
training in big firms, compared to their single counterparts. I can theorize that if marriage 
increases the opportunity cost of employment, these women might find that the most 
effective alternative is the sort of jobs that they can attain by training in-classroom, for 
self-employment or in small firms. These jobs might be more flexible in terms of 
schedules, work loads, etc. On the other hand, I also find evidence that the more 
economic dependents a woman has, the higher her probability of enrolling in training in 
big firms. In this case, we can sensibly consider that the higher the number of economic 
dependants, the greater is the necessity of a stable source of resources. The fact that at 
least 70% of the trainees in the mixed category in big businesses is hired could be very 
attractive for applicants with more responsibilities of this kind. The same line of thought 
could be applied to explain the result that shows that being a head of household increases 
the odds of joining a big business for training over any other training type. 
In terms of labor market history, although the program promotes mixed training in 
small firms for individuals with little or no labor market experience, my results show that 
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the fact that an individual has never had a job increases their chances of enrollment for 
training in big firms compared to either training in small firms or training to become self-
employed. A possible explanation is that applicants perceive the training in a big firm as 
a potential door to secure a job, once the training is completed. As we have pointed out 
elsewhere, mixed categories not only provide training but also labor market experience, 
which in this case may attract the most inexperienced applicants. 
The average derivatives obtained for monthly labor income in the last job the 
person held before training show that, for men, the higher the pay, the higher the 
probability of choosing in-classroom training or mixed training in medium and large 
enterprises, relative to mixed in small businesses or training for self-employment. For 
women, higher earnings before the training started increase the chances of training in a 
big firm, relative to self-employment classes. In terms of number of hours worked, the 
more hours on the job, the higher the probabity that the applicant will participate in 
training at a big firm, relative to in-classroom training for both men and women, and 
relative to mixed training in small firms for men and for self-employment training for 
women.  
As stated previously, the base group for the reasons to participate in the training is 
“to obtain employment”. I show that for men, the probability of deciding to participate in 
any other training category with respect to obtaining mixed training in big firms is higher 
if the individual has as his main reason to gather experience because of the training itself, 
or because someone recommended it as compared to ‘obtain employment’ as main 
reason. For women, the probability of deciding to participate in the in-classroom training 
category, compared to that of obtaining mixed training is higher if the individual has as 
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her main reason to gather experience because of the training itself, or because someone 
recommended it as compared to ‘obtain employment’ as the main reason. It is interesting 
to note the fact that when I compare the ‘big’ mixed category to self-employment 
preparation and the ‘small’ mixed category, my results show that ‘required for 
employment’ promotes the first kind of training, while all the other reasons are either not 
statistically significant or have negative signs. Individuals might perceive the training as 
a required pre-step to obtaining employment in medium and big businesses. 
In regard to the development regions and municipality size, the base groups are 
the most developed region and a population bigger than 350,000 inhabitants, respectively. 
The Ministry of Labor states in its operation rules that training for self-employment is 
focused in less urban communities
26
, which is consistent with our results, as  the 
probability of participating in this kind of training is higher in small municipalities with 
respect to any other training type. The same pattern is found when comparing ‘small’ 
mixed with ‘big’ mixed and in-classroom training. 
The results for development regions are more difficult to interpret. Less 
developed regions imply a higher probability of training in a small firm, compared to 
self-employment and in-classroom training. On the other hand, I also find evidence that 
with respect to the most developed region, being exposed to the labor market of a less 
developed region implies a higher probability of participation in medium and large firms. 
For future work it would be advisable to study each of the elements that enter the 
development index, as well as the model behind the index, to be able to better understand 
its role in promoting certain types of training and not others. 
                                                 
26
 The concepts of urban and rural are defined by population size: if less than 2,500 inhabit a community, 




Balancing tests are used to examine if the specification of the parametric 
propensity score satisfies the property that, conditional on )X(P , the distribution of X  is 
the same for the treated and the comparison groups. That is, these tests serve the purpose 
of informing the researcher if the specification chosen for the propensity score is such 
that the method succeeds in balancing the distribution of covariates in the matched 
comparison group and the treatment group. Again, the objective of this balance is that 
matching succeeds in mimicking a random experiment. Failure of these tests implies that 
the matched groups are not fully comparable, which might lead to unreliable results. 
As stated in the previous chapter, there is a wide variety of balancing tests. 
Nonetheless, for comparability with the results presented in the preceding chapter the 
balancing test conducted for the analysis by training type relies on standardized 
differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).  For each variableX , the standardized 
difference is the difference in means between the treated sample and the matched 
comparison group sample, divided by the square root of the average of the variances of 
X  in the two sub-samples. I computed this difference for all the variables included in 
each of the matching estimations.
27
 I find that for each variable in the matched samples, 
the standardized differences are all, in absolute terms, smaller than 20. Then, the 
specification of the propensity score “passes” the balancing test.  
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Tables 13.1 to 13.11 for women, and 14.1 to 14.11 for men, present the labor 
market impact estimates of participating in a P/S training program obtained by kernel 
matching on the propensity score. Here, it is important to consider that if the individuals 
in treatment m and l differ in the distribution of X, and if the treatment effect varies with 
X, then: 
θ θ0 0
m l l m, ,
≠ −  
i.e.,  the treatment effects on the treated are not symmetric (Gerfin & Lechner, 2002). For 
example, if the distribution of years of education is different for individuals that 
participate in in-classroom training and in training for the self-employed, and the 
probability of participation in one rather than the other changes with years of education, 
then the mean effect of receiving in-classroom training relative to receiving training for 
the self-employed for those individuals who receive in-classroom training will differ 
from the mean effect of receiving training for self-employment relative to receiving in-
classroom training for individuals who receive training for self-employment. 
For each dependent variable I obtained optimal bandwidths
28
 employing leave-
one-out cross validation (Racine & Li, 2003; Black & Smith, 2004). The optimal 
bandwidth minimizes the squared error of the estimates. A full account of the bandwidths 
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 The estimates’ signs and magnitudes are not sensitive to using a bandwidth slightly bigger or smaller 



















Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.1 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Employed
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses
























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.1 Average treatment effect on the treated
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses




























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.
All estimates are significant at a 95% level except for those in gray.





Table 13.2 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Post weekly hours worked 
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses
























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey
All estimates are significant at a 95% level except for those in gray





Table 14.2 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Post weekly hours worked 
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses




























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.
All estimates are significant at a 95% level except for those in gray.





Table 13.3 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Post monthly labor income* (In Mexican Pesos)
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses



























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.3 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Post monthly labor income* (In Mexican Pesos)
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses





























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.4 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Health Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses

























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.4 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Health Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses






























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.5 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Housing Credits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses


























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.5 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Housing Credits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses






























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.6 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: In-cash Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses


























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.6 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: In-cash Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses






























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.7 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Other Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses


























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey









Table 14.7 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Other Benefits
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses

























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.8 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Verbal contract
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses

























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.




Table 14.8 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Verbal contract
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses
































Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.9 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: Self employed or unpaid worker
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses


























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.9 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: Self employed or unpaid worker
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses































Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.10 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable: In micro business
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses

























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey





Table 14.10 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: In micro business
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses































Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey.





Table 13.11 Average treatment effect on the treated
Women, Variable:  In business without local
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses


























Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE survey
All estimates are significant at a 95% level except for those in gray
Treatment 
Group
Table 14.11 Average treatment effect on the treated
Men, Variable: In business without local
Kernel Maching, standard errors in parentheses















Traditional outcome variables 
Employment. The decision to participate in any mixed category rather than in-
classroom training results, on average, in a higher probability of employment. These 
results, for men and women, are consistent with the arguments offered by some program 
officials against the relative efficiency of the in-classroom type to increase the 
probabilities of employment of its participants, which in turn contributed to the 
elimination of the category since 2002. 
While the impacts of participation in the mixed categories with respect to 
participation in the in-classroom training are higher for women than for men, the 
potential explanation for these results might go in the same direction for the two groups. 
Mixed training is mostly tailored to the demands of the productive sector, where the 
entrepreneurs have an important level of decision in the length and specific kind of 
instruction that the participants will get. It is possible that the training that the participants 
of PROBECAT/SICAT acquire in the mixed categories is a mobile skill in demand in a 
particular industry, i.e., these individuals have acquired a set of skills that is in demand 
when they go back to their job search. Additionally, the enterprises where the training 
takes place are being partly subsidized to train potential employees; furthermore, the 
States’ employment services reduce the businesses’ costs of search to fill vacancies by 
recruiting and screening trainees. The reduction of these costs provides an incentive for 
the firm to hire individuals who took a PROBECAT/SICAT training class on their 
premises and under their monitoring. 
Contrary to the demand-driven mixed training courses, the syllabi of the in-
classroom training classes are not designed to fulfill any specific demand of the 
productive sector. Instead, they are based on program officials’ knowledge of the skills 
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and abilities that would make a trainee a more attractive candidate for employment. 
Nevertheless, potential employers will bear not only the costs of search, but the costs of 
additional business-specific training required for the job.  
My results show that, similarly, the participation in the mixed training programs 
rather than the self-employment program increased the probability of being employed. 
The self-employment category seeks to aid its participants by providing them with skills 
that would help them start their own business. It is reasonable to believe that the length of 
time necessary to launch such an enterprise, find the capital, find the input providers, etc., 
could be naturally higher than that of finding employment as a salaried worker that has 
been trained specifically according to what the market is demanding.  
Differences in demographic and educational characteristics could be a factor that 
explains the higher probability of employment for a woman if she takes a self-
employment class rather than an in-classroom course. The first group is older and has 
fewer years of education, which, in general, could imply more years in the labor force in 
comparison with their younger counterparts. This attachment could have given the self-
employment group important information about the market that a person with less 
experience would lack. 
As a final point, the star program in terms of probability of employment is the 
mixed category in medium and big businesses. This is not a surprise since, as 
aforementioned, this category of training is set so that a minimum of 70% of the trainees 
get to be employed by the sponsoring enterprise. It is also the case that the capacity of the 
big firms to hire new employees might be in general higher than that of a small business. 
An additional point to take into consideration is that it is probable that the skills learned 
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in big firms are more mobile than those obtained in smaller places. All these factors will 
contribute to the differences in the probability of employment once the training is done. 
Weekly number of hours worked. The estimated impacts for the weekly number 
of hours worked post-training show a somewhat similar pattern to those for the 
employment. The number of hours worked is, on average, higher for workers that 
participated in any mixed category than in-classroom training or self-employment. The 
largest impact is between training in big businesses in comparison with in-classroom 
training, being more than 10 hours a week for women. Finally, in comparison with mixed 
training in smaller businesses, mixed training in bigger enterprises increases the total 
number of hours worked per week by 6 hours for men and 13 hours for women. A good 
reason for these differences might be found in the work requirements of the jobs that the 
trainees find. For individuals that fill a salaried job more easily (ex-trainees in mixed 
categories), a week of work would imply a full time, 40 hours a week, schedule. This is 
due to the fact that employers are more willing to hire a full time employee that has 
already worked in the business or industry and is known to do a good job. On the other 
hand, for those who did not obtain training in a specific business thereby, acquiring skills 
relevant for that industry, it might be harder to find  full time work just after the training 
is done. Employers might prefer to hire them for less than  full time before they have any 
knowledge of the real ability of the employee. An additional possibility for the 
differences in hours worked is that, as we will later discuss, in-classroom and self-
employed trainees are more prone to participate in self-employment and unpaid work 
which will give them the flexibility of working fewer hours. 
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Monthly labor income. The differentiated analysis by type of training goes a step 
further from previous studies in finding that, once again, in-classroom training fares 
worse than the mixed alternatives for men and women with respect to post-training labor 
income. The ‘loss’ due to participation in the former type of training ranges from 193 to 
487 pesos, which roughly corresponds to 20.65 to 52.12 dollars per month.
29
 Now, if we 
study the different impacts by types of mixed training we find that while the estimated 
impact is not statistically significant for male ex-trainees, their female counterparts 
receive, on average, approximately 160.97 pesos more if they obtain training in a medium 
or big enterprise in comparison to training in a smaller firm: an expected result that 
logically follows the estimates for hours worked. These results might spring from the 
demand-driven nature of the mixed training; people who attend these programs are more 
likely to enter a productive sector in which there is a high demand for that specific type 
of labor, resulting in higher remuneration. 
Another interesting result is that for women, participating in training for self-
employment is still better than choosing in-classroom preparation in terms of income. By 
picking the former the participants receive on average 11.82 dollars per month more -
which corresponds to approximately 3 daily minimum wages
30
- than choosing the latter.  
Outcome variables measuring job formality 
For those men and women who chose to participate in a mixed training program 
in a  medium or big enterprise, this decision entailed, on average, an increment in the 
probability of employment with health benefits, with respect to this probability if  they 
had participated in any other type of program. The difference in the probability is close to 
                                                 
29
 We use the simple average of monthly exchange rates over 2001 as provided by the Banco de México 
(Mexico’s Central Bank). 
30
 Average of monthly general minimum wage, (STPS, 2007)  
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50 percentage points if we consider, as an alternative to the mixed training in medium 
and big companies, in-classroom training. The increase in the probability is somewhat 
around 40 percentage points with respect to training in smaller firms, and finally, 50 or 
more points if contrasted with training for self-employment. These results can be 
somehow explained by two facts: 1) 70% of the individuals who participate in mixed 
training in a firm that has at least 30 workers stays employed in this same firm; and 2) 
one of the benefits that the participants obtain when entering the training program is  full 
health insurance, which can be extended if they later are hired. Moreover, as the size of a 
firm increases, the proportion of individuals who receive any kind of medical insurance 
also increases.
31
 If the trainees in a big enterprise remain in such after the training is 
finished (or get employed in a firm with similar size), their probabilities of employment 
with health benefits are higher than those individuals that find employment in smaller 
firms. 
Contrary to previous results in which self-employment training was superior to 
in-classroom training, on average, obtaining a job that had medical benefits was more 
likely if an in-classroom course was taken. Whereas in many developed economies, an 
important proportion of the population has access to medical insurance independent of 
the kind of employment they are involved in, in developing economies this proportion is 
smaller, especially if a person is self-employed. It is sensible to think that if an individual 
participates in self-employment preparation classes, her objective is to develop as an 
entrepreneur and as such, she is under no obligation to acquire medical insurance for 
herself. 
                                                 
31
 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, primer trimestre de 2002, INEGI. 
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The same pattern of results is found with respect to the probabilities of obtaining a 
job with housing benefits, obtaining a job with cash benefits (such as bonuses at the end 
of the year, dividends, etc), or employment with other benefits. Nevertheless, the 
magnitudes of the first and last parameter mentioned, when choosing mixed training in 
big firms with respect to any other type of training, are significantly lower than those of 
the probability of employment with health benefits. This is not the case for cash benefits: 
in addition to this estimated impact being very similar between men and women, the 
estimated impacts are similar in magnitude to the impact of choosing training in a big 
firm on the probability of health benefits. 
As with the previously discussed impact estimates, the probability of attaining all 
of the benefits under consideration is higher when the individual chooses to be trained in 
a small to medium firm rather than in-classroom or self-employment training. 
Conversely, when studying the impacts on employment with health benefits, housing, in 
cash benefits, and other benefits, I find that women benefit more from participating in in-
classroom training than in self-employment instruction. Nevertheless, in all cases the 
impacts are rather small, i.e., below 10 percentage points. 
Up to this point, I have discussed parameters whose presence captures the 
formality of the employment obtained by the trainees. For example, getting employment 
with health benefits makes a particular job formal (at least under some definitions). From 
the next paragraph onwards, I will be discussing parameters whose absence signals the 
formality of the job. For example, the non-existence of a verbal contract (and hence the 
existence of a written one), indicates to us that this specific job is formal. 
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When men and women participate in training in a big firm rather than obtaining 
that instruction in a micro or small enterprise, on average, they decrease the probabilities 
of being employed with a verbal contract by 21 percentage points for females and by 30 
percentage points for males.  
On average, men increase the odds of self-employment or employment without 
payment when they decide to participate in in-classroom training versus participating in 
mixed training. As expected, this is also true when men decide to obtain self-employment 
instruction. Nevertheless, the calculated impacts are not considerably different in 
magnitude, and there is evidence showing that the impacts on the likelihood of self-
employment after training are similar for in-classroom alumni and for self-employment 
instruction alumni. Unfortunately, the estimates that directly compare these two 
categories are not statistically significant enough to discuss them. On the other hand, for 
women, it is possible to make the direct comparison, which results in evidence that 
individuals who choose self-employment instruction instead of in-classroom training do 
in fact increase their probability of this type of employment by 14 percentage points. 
The tables also show the calculated impact of participating in a certain program, 
with respect to the other three types, on the probability of being employed in a micro 
business, defined as an enterprise that has at most 10 workers including the employer. 
Participation in in-classroom training decreases the probability of finding employment in 
a micro business with respect to participation in any of the mixed training categories. 
This initially counterintuitive result does seem sensible when we take into consideration 
that 1) the variable studied is having found a job and this job is housed in a micro 
business and the probability of employment with respect to any other training type is, in 
 
 166 
general, higher for the mixed categories; and 2) the vast majority of businesses in Mexico 
are classified as micro enterprises (i.e. it is calculated that more than 90% of all 
establishments are micro (Guaipatin, 2003)). Finally,  it is reasonable to suppose that an 
important proportion of the individuals who participated in training in small and micro 
firms would stay in the same industry and type of business (after training, the majority of 
men in this category work on specialized professional and technical services, while the 
majority of women work in retail)
32
, which at the same time offers some explanation as to 
why the men in this specific type of training increase their probability of staying in a 
small business, relative to mixed training participants in bigger companies.  
Finally, as expected, for men, participation in mixed training, compared to the 
other two training alternatives, decreases the chances of being employed without a 
uniquely specified residence for work endeavors, a designation that includes street 
vendors and further activities carried on places designated for additional uses and 
purposes, such as private dwellings. As expected, for both gender groups, participation in 
mixed or in-classroom training reduces such probabilities when compared to obtaining 
self-employment instruction, making this last training category one that promotes the 
highest probability of employment without specific work residence. 
Lastly, two considerations are in order.  First, the possible existence of lock-in 
effects and second, the potentially different time paths of impacts for different training 
types.  
In the Operation Rules (STPS 2000, page3), the Ministry of Labor establishes that 
for all categories of training, the class/course duration is between 1 and 3 months. The 
specific duration would be determined as a function of the classes/training agreed upon 
                                                 
32
 See tables 15.1 and 15.2. 
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by the National Employment Service, the State Employment Offices and, when pertinent, 
with the participating businesses. At the same time, participants in all training types are 
required not to work while training. All these support the belief that the “lock in” period, 
i.e., when individuals are not looking for a job but are only training, would be, on 
average, roughly the same for all training types. 
One caveat comes from the fact that with the information available, it is not 
possible to determine if different training paths have different time paths of impacts, 
because the outcome variables are measured only once after training. It is possible that 
given that the mixed categories, specifically in medium and big enterprises, might also 
function as a way to match job seekers with employers, the impacts of these training 
types are more immediate than for the other categories. More information, more data 
points, are needed to be able to determine what type of program has the best results in the 




In summary, in this section I estimate the average impacts of participation in 
different kinds of training relative to other training types. The parameters of interest 
include the probability of employment, weekly hours worked and monthly income, which 
are the usual or ‘traditional’ parameters estimated in impact evaluations of training 
programs. In addition, this analysis goes beyond these traditional outcomes by studying 
additional measures that describe the formality or informality of the employment 
obtained after the participants have concluded their training program. This is important 
because jobs in the unprotected or informal sector are highly correlated with poverty and 
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low productivity. In this context it is then relevant to analyze not only the quantity but the 
quality of employment that P/S promotes. 
I find evidence that the most successful training type both in terms of traditional 
and non-traditional outcomes is the mixed training in medium and big businesses. This 
result is not unexpected given the fact that the ‘host’ business agrees to employ at least 
70% of the trainees. Additionally, big enterprises usually have characteristics associated 
with the formal sector, such as providing health insurance for their employees. Second in 
achieving highest probabilities of success is the mixed training program in small and 
medium businesses. For men and women, this category fares better for all outcomes 
(except one: verbal contracts) that are statistically significant, when compared to in-
classroom and self-employment training. A plausible interpretation for this result is the 
fact that the period of training itself serves not only to provide the individual with skills 
and experience demanded in formal sector industries (such as those used in small 
assembly plants), but also facilitates continued employment in the sector once the 
training is completed. The vast majority of individuals who participate in the smaller 
mixed training type are employed in the manufacturing industry. The majority of male 
ex-trainees in this category report working in specialized professional and technical 
services, while their female counterparts work primarily in the retail sector. 
The last two of the training types considered do not incorporate the double 
purpose of the mixed instruction: training plus on-the-job experience. Unfortunately, for 
this comparison only one of the estimated effects are statistically significant for men, 
which is the difference between the probability of employment without a specific place 
for business for individuals who partake in self-employment training rather than in-
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classroom training. This probability is smaller in the later training category, which in this 
case makes the in-classroom preparation superior. 
In the rest of this subsection, I only refer to the results for women’s. When in-
classroom and self-employment training are compared side by side, I find the first type is 
superior in all the additional outcomes that capture desirable “formal” characteristics 
(benefits, unique job residence, written contracts, etc). Similarly, it is superior in all but 
one of the traditional parameters: individuals who participate in self-employment receive, 
on average, higher monthly incomes than those who received in-classroom instruction. 
The main objective of the self-employment training category is to provide the individuals 
with skills that would facilitate the starting of a small business. So, unlike the in-
classroom training, the self-employment program does not center on skills specific to an 
industry/sector. As self-employed individuals with no employer or other workers, it is 
highly possible that these ex-trainees do no consider it necessary to provide themselves 
with employment benefits. This fact could partially explain why the self-employment 
trainees would on average obtain higher monthly payments than the in-classroom ex-
trainees, but their job conditions might not necessarily have characteristics that would 
include them in what the current literature considers formal employment. In short, when 
comparing these two categories, I find that those who receive in-classroom training are 
more likely to receive benefits than participants who receive self-employment training, 
but the increase in earnings is larger for the latter group.  
An important piece of information to reflect on is the differences in impacts 
between men and women. It is well known that labor market variables (participation, 
attachment, wages, etc) take, on average, different values for males and females, all else 
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constant (for a survey see Altonji and Blank, 1999). It is then highly probable that the 
impacts of the participation in one type of training with respect to another present some 
differences too. As shown in tables 15.1 and 15.2, the distribution of male and female 
participants among the different training types is unquestionably different. The modal 
training type for women is self-employment, 38% of female participants prefer to prepare 
themselves for self-employment, while the greater part of the male participants (30%) get 
trained in a mixed mode in micro and small enterprises. Behind the decision of many 
women who opt for self-employment training could very well be the high value that 
many women assign to the flexibility of not working for a boss but rather for themselves 
Women who are primary care givers of children and/or elderly members of the family, or 
who are in charge of an important proportion of the domestic activities of their 
households, might find the possibility of having their own business attractive, especially 
if the enterprise could function in the same dwelling that she and her family inhabit. 
These same considerations would enter the decision of the kind of job that a woman is 
willing and capable of performing once the training is finished.  
While the signs of the estimated effects have the same pattern for men and 
women, the magnitudes differ. For an average female participant the decision to train in a 
big firm increased her probability of employment much more than for her male counter 
part. An analogous situation is observed for hours worked, relative to any other training 
form. Nevertheless, the differences in gains in monthly income are higher for men than 
for women, which might reflect the possibility of a higher inequality in the labor market 
in terms of remuneration for males than for females. 
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Access to health benefits when comparing mixed in micro/small or self-
employment to mixed in medium/big is worse for women, i.e., if a woman decides on 
either of the two former categories rather than the latter, her probability of receiving 
medical insurance are worse than for a man who takes the same decision.  A similar 
situation is found for housing and other benefits when comparing in-class training with 
mixed training in smaller companies. 
An important proportion of women who obtained training in small businesses 
found jobs in wholesale and retail and, although this proportion is also important for in-
classroom alumni, it is smaller. Also, higher percentages of this last group of women 
work in non-specialized services such as the food and drink industry and as street food 
vendors, while their counterparts in micro and small businesses work more in specialized 
professional and technical services.  
A potential explanation for these differences is the disparity in the distribution of 
ex-trainees among productive sectors and specific activities. For example, if we 
aggregate the sectors of activity, we find that the majority of the male trainees, for all 
training types, work in either agriculture, livestock, mining, manufacture, construction, 
electricity, energy or water (Tables 15.1 and 15.2). On the other hand, the distribution of 
female participants is less homogeneous (in proportions in a sector and differences in 
those proportions). The majority of in-classroom alumni are equally distributed between 
retail/wholesale and specialized services. The graduates from the mixed training in 
medium and small firms are concentrated on  agriculture, livestock, mining, manufacture, 
construction, electricity, energy or water of activities, as well as those who participated in 
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self-employment. Finally, a third of the trainees in mixed training in micro and small 












Agriculture 1.61 0.49 1.41 3.94
Livestock 0.40 0.00 0.35 0.44
Other farming activities 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.88
Mining 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacture industry 15.32 73.90 12.83 36.54
Construction industry 0.81 0.24 1.41 0.66
Electricity, energy and water 0.40 0.00 0.18 0.22
Retail 21.77 6.83 24.25 11.38
Wholesale 2.82 1.71 5.62 1.31
Informal Retail 0.81 0.73 0.53 5.25
Food and drink industry 6.45 1.46 5.10 1.09
Street food vendors 4.84 0.24 1.41 4.38
Hotels 4.44 6.10 1.93 0.00
Transportation 1.21 0.24 0.70 0.00
Communications 0.40 0.00 1.05 0.00
Financial services, real state and insurance 2.02 0.49 2.46 0.22
Specialized professional and technical services 13.31 1.95 18.63 3.50
Education and health services 8.87 1.95 8.61 3.06
Entertainment and recreation services 0.40 0.00 0.88 0.00
Government and public administration 6.05 0.98 2.11 1.31
Other services 7.66 1.95 9.84 23.85
Other activities 0.00 0.73 0.35 1.97
Table 15.1 Sector of activity by percentage of total, employed female ex-trainess
SICAT-2002 Cohort, retrospective survey Nov-Dec 2002












Agriculture 5.79 0.58 1.64 18.06
Livestock 0.77 0.29 0.55 0.93
Other farming activities 0.77 4.37 0.00 4.63
Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacture industry 21.62 59.18 22.19 18.52
Construction industry 7.34 1.17 2.47 13.43
Electricity, energy and water 3.09 0.29 1.10 3.24
Retail 10.42 6.12 20.55 6.94
Wholesale 1.93 2.04 4.38 2.78
Informal Retail 0.77 0.29 0.00 0.46
Food and drink industry 5.41 1.46 8.49 1.85
Street food vendors 1.16 0.00 0.55 0.46
Hotels 2.70 9.04 0.55 0.93
Transportation 7.72 5.54 5.21 2.78
Communications 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial services, real state and insurance 0.77 1.75 1.37 0.00
Specialized professional and technical services 16.99 2.62 23.56 14.35
Education and health services 2.70 0.00 2.19 2.78
Entertainment and recreation services 1.54 0.58 0.55 0.93
Government and public administration 3.86 2.92 1.10 2.78
Other services 3.09 1.46 2.47 3.24
Other activities 0.77 0.29 1.10 0.93
Source: Author's calculations from ENCOPE 2001
Table 15.2 Sector of activity by percentage of total, employed male ex-trainess
SICAT-2002 Cohort, retrospective survey Nov-Dec 2002
 
 
In sum, the evidence presented by this study suggests that different types of 
training translate into different outcomes for the trainees, not only in magnitude but also 
in the variables affected by participation in the program. My results indicate that training 
programs in big and medium enterprises may be the most effective, but it is hard to 
clearly single out the “worst” type of training. Women who receive self-employment 
training may not fare better in terms of job formality than their in-the-classroom 
counterparts, but without an estimate of the monetary value of such formality it is 
impossible to know whether this difference is compensated for by the larger increase in 
post-training income.  
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The policy implications of this study for training programs in general are double. 
On the one hand, it is obvious that decisions about future programs need to consider the 
effect of training not only in contrast with the lack thereof, but also the disparate results 
of the various types of training. It is also relevant that policy makers make clear decisions 
about the types of outcomes they pursue with their actions to better tailor the programs to 
the desired outcomes.  
A few final considerations regarding this analysis are in order. Firstly, in this 
study I am only considering the average treatment effect of the program for people who 
actually participated in the program, i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated and 
not on the total population (participants and non-participants). Secondly, the estimation is 
restricted to those who completed the training, although the non-completion rates are 
small and somewhat comparable across of training types. Further analysis on the reasons 
for dropping out and if, and how, this decision varies with X is advisable. 
  Finally, a fundamental assumption made thought the analysis presented in this 
chapter is the absence of general equilibrium effects, sometimes called the stable-unit-
treatment-value assumption (SUTVA). This assumption needs special consideration 
given the potential displacement effect of some but not all the training types. In 
particular, in the case of mixed training in medium and large firms, at least 70% of the 
trainees end up staying in the job. This very important issue is mostly ignored in previous 
research on P/S. In the presence of displacement effects, this would mean that the 
probability of employment for individuals in the same labor market who are also 
unemployed or underemployed become worse. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter IV, 
the size of the program with respect to the total active population in the labor market is 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The training component of the active labor market policies in Mexico, 
PROBECAT-SICAT (P/S), was one of the first in its kind in Latin America. As such, it 
has served as model for the subsequent versions of programs that aim to aid the 
unemployed and underemployed by updating or enhancing their skills. 
In this work I examine the implementation of PROBECAT-SICAT from a 
quantitative and qualitative perspective. The main objective of this dissertation is 
twofold: first, to shed light on the elements that play a part in the success of the program 
and second, to show the importance of analyzing and evaluating social policies in their 
institutional and economic context. 
The Ministry of Labor (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social) is the main 
agency that designs and manages the unemployment reduction policies in Mexico.  The 
SICAT (Sistema de Capacitación para el Trabajo or Labor Training System), is a 
decentralized training program for the unemployed and underemployed, and is one of the 
most important active labor market policies in Mexico. Originally under the name of 
PROBECAT (Programa de Becas de Capacitacion para Desempleados), it was created in 
the early 80’s to reduce the perverse impact of the debt crisis on the labor market. 
PROBECAT existed as such for 17 years, from 1984 to 2001, financed first by the 
Mexican government (until 1986), next by the World Bank (1987-1996), and presently by 
the IADB (since 1997). Starting in 2002, PROBECAT was renamed SICAT, and several 
modifications of its original scheme were implemented – one of the most relevant being 
the elimination of in-classroom training.  
This dissertation can be broadly divided into two parts. First I present an analysis 
of the institutional context in which the program operates, in order to understand the 
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relationship between the circumstances in which the program has developed and the 
implications these circumstances have had for the program’s performance. In the second 
part I conduct an impact evaluation, demonstrating that it is relevant to include outcome 
measures related to quality of employment.  Lastly, I summarize the main findings. 
P/S is a decentralized program, administered by the State Employment Services 
(SEE), financed by the Ministry of Labor (part of the federal government) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB).  After some years of the P/S functioning as a 
centralized program, just before the Ministry started collaborating with the IADB, the 
Mexican government decided to give some decision power to the SEE. 
Following Oates’ theorem of decentralization (1972), the fact that the SEE have 
the most information about their regional labor markets and the needs of their population, 
gives some support to the decision of the federal government to have these offices 
directly administer and decide the particulars of the program.  Nevertheless, under this 
decentralized scheme there are a few aspects of P/S that might have a negative impact on 
its functions: different objectives of agents at the local,  national, or supra-national levels, 
and incomplete information that might result in informational rents. An example that 
illustrates these problems is the case of state officials who used funds assigned to P/S to 
promote political parties and to buy votes. 
To reduce opportunities to misuse P/S resources, the Ministry of Labor along with 
the IADB implemented checks and monitoring measures, consisting mainly of periodical 
audits of the states’ governments. However, there seems to be a lack of clarity about the 
particulars of these checks, since their specific form and schedule are not clearly defined 
in the official documents.  
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The same lack of clarigy exists in the procedures used for budgeting. The formula 
used to determine the amount of resources to be transferred to the states every year is 
contained in the Rules of Operation (STPS, 2001). Although the elements that play a part 
in the formula are listed in the STPS (include measures of the past achievements of the 
program, the state’s unemployment rate, etc.), the formula does not specify how each 
particular element is to be included. As a consequence, the actual budget is determined in 
negotiations between the states and the federal government. Under this design there is a 
need for more explicit rules of operation with respect to the amount of resources that the 
states receive, and a need for more specific details with respect to the methods in which 
the IADB and the Ministry will administer the audits and the consequences of such 
audits.  
The internal reviews of both the Ministry and the IADB (2001) emphasize the 
superior results obtained by P/S, where all the objectives set to achieve by the end of the 
exercise not only were fully achieved and exceeded. For the IADB the objectives are 
measured in terms of scholarships given and the proportion of ex-trainees that found 
employment. The Ministry adds to the list subjective measures of quality drawn directly 
from the opinion of the participants. Nevertheless, one objective of the Ministry and the 
IADB that, until now, has not been expressly measured is the promotion of formal 
employment, which is  unprotected, does not imply low skills labor and remuneration, 
and is not highly correlated with poverty, etc. Although both agencies recognize the 
importance of facilitating, with P/S, the insertion of unemployed and underemployed 
individuals into jobs in the formal sector, no attempts to measure the success in achieving 
this goal exist to date. 
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Nevertheless, some of the original objectives of P/S are being achieved, even 
though in various direct communications with former directors of P/S and in the 
transcripts from appearances of past Ministers and Vice Ministers the training program is 
depicted more as a direct transfer than an instrument to enhance employment 
prospectuses. The evidence that the resources of the program have been used for political 
purposes, directly or by channeling them to specific sub-groups, makes the findings of 
substantial impacts of participation in the program even more striking.  
In the second part of the dissertation, I evaluate the program with respect to its 
ability to increase the probability of employment with characteristics recognized as 
desirable and generally interpreted as elements that identify the formal sector. Due to the 
large amount of definitions for formal sector, or formality, I have chosen a collection of 
variables meant to represent the most widely used definitions found in the literature. 
Using a semi-parametric technique, I first study the effect of participation in the 
program by gender, independently of the type of training in which the trainees 
participate. Two important results suggest that ex-trainees work, on average, more hours 
per week than non-participants, and that their chances of obtaining a job with access to 
health benefits are higher. One interpretation I offer for this last result suggests that once 
the trainees have gained access to the medical benefits provided, by law, to them during 
the training, their status in the health system could be extended beyond the end of the 
training program. Due to data limitations, at the time this dissertation was completed it 
was not possible to verify which proportion of ex-trainees had the same health insurance 
provider before and after the training; as a result, this question remains for future work.  
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These first positive results indicate, along with the reports from the Ministry of 
Labor and the IADB, positive support for the way in which P/S was being conducted. 
However, I also provide evidence that for female participants the probability of 
employment in a job with informal characteristics increases relative  to women that do 
not participate. After the training women participate –on average- more in self-
employment or unpaid work, more in jobs with to verbal contracts, and more in activities 
that lack a venue that is devoted exclusively to the economic activity. Finally, I find that 
men, like women, increase their probabilities of filling a vacancy in a micro-firm, that is, 
in an enterprise that employs fewer  than 10 persons.  
I recognize that different types of training might have dissimilar effects on the 
outcomes that I study in the first estimation exercise. To complete the empirical research, 
I conducted an impact evaluation of the performance of the different types of training 
with respect to each other. For this task I used information from a retrospective survey of 
the trainees of 2001. The 2001 results are of interest because that is the last year in which 
the in-classroom training was offered. The other three training categories offered were 
mixed training in medium and big enterprises, mixed training in micro and small 
enterprises and training for the self-employment. As in the first estimation exercise I 
conducted the study for men and women separately. 
I find evidence that the champion type of training is mixed training in medium 
and big enterprises. On average, men and women who participate in this training type, 
increase their probability of employment per se and employment with desirable ‘formal’ 
characteristics, such as health and housing benefits, a written contract, etc., relative to 
what they would have experienced with other training types. This result in not surprising, 
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since the businesses that participate in this program are committed to hire at least 70% of 
the trainees.  The second best traininig type is the mixed training in micro and small 
enterprises, which increases the probability of employment, as well as hours worked, 
income, and access to quality jobs, to training for self-employment and in-classroom 
training. Although the differences between the different training types go in the same 
direction for men and women, they appear to be larger for men than for women. Even 
though the specific reasons for the disparities should be considered as a separate research 
question, we could theorize that the disparities correspond to gender-specific 
explanations: for example, women may be more inclined to obtain jobs which do not 
require specialized skills; whereas men may be less inclined to obtain such jobs.   
As we have seen, there is evidence that P/S has had some success in increasing 
the probability of employment and of employment with some benefits.  Additionally I 
show that the mixed training types have a superior performance in terms of putting 
participants in jobs with desirable characteristics.  I also found that, in general, female 
participants increase their chances of obtaining jobs with informal characteristics, such as 
unpaid or self-employment work, work without specific residence, verbal contracts, etc. 
My study shows that while mixed training promotes what is recognized as formal 
employment, self-employment promotes employment with informal characteristics, more 
so than in-classroom training, which has disappeared. 
The success of the mixed category, especially in its version in medium and big 
firms, might be attributed to a number of factors discussed in chapter V. Among those are 
that this training type functions as a response to specific demands of potential employers, 
and that it provides valuable job-experience to the trainees. In addition, the program’s 
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success found in this research might reflect the possibility that P/S works also as an 
employment intermediation program. That is, P/S serves to match job seekers with 
potential employers. This aspect of the training program varies in intensity across 
categories, with the mixed types being the most likely to operate as intermediation 
programs, and the in-classroom and training for self-employment varieties being less 
likely to operate as intermediaries. 
The interpretation of results from the impact evaluation should take into 
consideration the alternatives to employment that are promoted by P/S. For example, I 
show that participation in the program increases the probabilities of employment in 
general, but even more specifically the probability of employment with health benefits. 
To propose an adequate policy change it is necessary to reflect not only on different 
forms of underemployment or employment with certain less-than-desirable 
characteristics, but also on the possibility of unemployment. Finally, researchers and 
policy makers should be aware that the information used for this study derives from a 
one-time-only retrospective interview, and that more data  will be needed to determine 
the time paths of the impacts of the program in general, and of each training type in 
particular. 
In the estimation chapters I also discuss two issues that have largely been ignored 
in the literature on P/S. These are the issue of potential contamination bias and general 
equilibrium effects. To conduct my estimations I used information from a national 
employment survey to construct comparison groups; unfortunately from this survey it is 
impossible to identify individuals who have participated in P/S. This situation could 
potentially bias the results given that I might not have included all of the participants who 
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have received training.  To verify the extent of potential bias, I applied the method 
proposed by Smith (2006) for matching in the presence of contamination bias. This 
method employs administrative information on the eligibility rules, to then estimate the 
total eligible population. The bottom line is to calculate the mean differences between 
treatment and comparison units for each value of X, to then adjust the mean differences 
for the fraction of the comparison group that received treatment. I developed an 
application of the method for the estimation of the impact of participation in P/S on hours 
worked post training. With this example I show that differences between the adjusted and 
unadjusted estimates of the average impact on hours worked is very modest.  I explain 
that the small difference can be traced to the small probability of participation for eligible 
individuals, and that we can confidently say that our estimates are most likely not 
strongly affected by contamination bias.  
When participation in a program such as P/S has an impact on the wage structure, 
or on the distribution of any other outcome variable, it is not possible to claim SUTVA, 
an important assumption on which my results are based. SUTVA states that an 
individual’s potential outcome depends only on his participation, and not on the treatment 
status of other members of the same population. When this assumption holds there are no 
general equilibrium effects. For P/S there seems to exist a very possible risk of 
displacement, which is to say that with some men and women updating their skills and 
occupying vacancies, the non participants would face more difficulties in finding 
employment, their wages will be lower, etc. If this were the case I would need to 
incorporate the losses of non-participants to obtain a net effect of the program, and, 
accordingly, propose policy changes. Yet, in previous chapters I discuss that when the 
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proportion of participants with respect to the total active population in their labor market 
is relatively small, the possibility of its behavior having any effect to the whole market is 
likewise small. Then, it is reasonable to accept as true that the probabilities of 
displacement effect and/or general equilibrium effects for P/S are nonexistent. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
Overall, the empirical studies presented in this dissertation provide some limited 
support in favor of the PROBECAT/SICAT training programs. However, the results from 
comparing the different types of training indicate that more training courses should be 
conducted in large firms, which would promote a better match between the training 
provided by the program and the specific needs of businesses. 
Some of these changes have already taken place during the existence of the 
program: When the second LMMP started [1997], a reduction in the proportion of in-
classroom scholarships with respect to those for mixed training took effect.
33
 This was a 
response to the finding that in previous years the percentage of individuals finding jobs 
was higher for participants in the mixed training than for those in the in-classroom 
training. A next step would consider fine-tuning the kind of mixed training to maximize 
its effectiveness. 
Also, the results regarding outcomes in terms of formality suggest that the 
inclusion of certain levels of job quality as an abstract objective of PROBECAT/SICAT 
may not be enough. Furthermore, since local authorities might not share the same 
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objectives in terms of outcomes as the funding agencies, policymakers should consider 
including explicit objectives in terms of formality among the outcome variables used to 
evaluate the success of the programs. This recommendation can be extended to other 
developing economies in which there are no alternatives to unemployment such as 
unemployment insurance and temporary work funded by the government. 
I believe that the deeper knowledge of local labor markets by local authorities 
justifies the decentralization of the program. Nevertheless, the checks in place should be 
strengthened to ensure that the program continues to function in line with its goals.  A 
detailed schedule of audits, as well as a better description of their form should be crafted 
and published; all along with an official list of the measures to be taken when an audit is 
fails  I make the same suggestion for the budgeting process; a more precise formula 
would promote a clearer assignment of resources, which in turn can help to reduce the 
deviation of funds from the proper functioning of the program. 
Finally, all government programs can greatly benefit from objective and well 
conducted impact evaluations; the results of such evaluations serve as one of the most 
important inputs to design adjustments of current policies. The basic, and hence most 
central, ingredient for evaluations is data. The benefits of good data can well 
overcompensate the costs of producing it, considering the economic, social and even 
political implications of government programs. I finish this chapter by recommending 







Appendix A. Description of outcome variables 
1. Post monthly labor income, continuous variable. Captures information about the 
job the interviewee has at the time of the interview. This variable is zero if the 
interviewee does not have a job or did not work for payment. 
Similarly, for the comparison group this variable captures the income received at 
the time of the second interview (in the “post-training” period), recorded during 
the quarter of ENE 2002. For individuals who did not receive any payment for 
their work or were not working, the variable is coded as zero. 
2. Post weekly total hours worked, continuous variable. Captures information on 
the number of hours worked the last week prior to the interview. Calculated as 
days per week times hours per day. This variable is zero if the interviewee is not 
working. 
3. Employed, 1 if individual is employed at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise. 
4. Self employed or unpaid worker, 1 if the individual is self-employed or has an 
employer but does not receive any payment in exchange for the work, 0 
otherwise. 
5. Verbal contract, 1 if the individual reports having a verbal contract that 
establishes an employment agreement, 0 otherwise. 
6. Health benefits, 1 if the individual reports having medical benefits, either 
provided by the private or public sector (IMSS or ISSSTE), 0 otherwise. 
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7. Housing credits, 1 when the interviewee has access to credits to be used to buy or 
renovate a dwelling (INFONAVIT or others), 0 otherwise. 
8. In-cash benefits, 1 if the interviewee receives benefits, such as bonuses at the end 
of the fiscal year, productivity prizes, etc., 0 otherwise. 
9. Other benefits, 1 if the individual, as part of his/her job benefits receives other 
benefits that are not in-cash, housing credits or health insurance (vacations, for 
example). The variable is 0 otherwise. 
10. In micro businesses, 1 if the person is employed in a firm that employs at most 
10 people, including the employer, manager, etc. The variable takes the value of 0 
otherwise. 
11. In business without local, 1 if the person works in a firm/business that does not 
have a specific residence, exclusively devoted to its economic activities. This 













Appendix B. Description of the variables used to calculate the propensity score and 
matching estimates in Chapter 4 
All the variables were obtained from the retrospective survey carried out over the second 
half of 2002 for trainees; this is the reference period. 
1. Age, continuous, restricted both samples to individuals between 16 and 78 years 
old. 
2. Age Squared, continuous, square of Age. 
3. Highest educational degree attained, 6 dummy variables. 
No degree, (base category). 
Elementary school. 
Junior high school. 
High school.  
College degree. 
Technical degree, it includes technical degrees with different levels of formal 
education prerequisites (elementary, junior or completed high school). 
4. Length of time in inactivity (not working, i.e. without a job) before started 
training, for trainees. As for the treated sample, for the comparison group I 
construct the variable based on a question that captures the date at which the 
individual left her last job, for those that ever held a job.  
For those individuals who had never held a job by the time of the interview, for 
ENCOPE and ENE, the duration of inactivity was coded as “less than one month” 
Duration of inactivity consists of 4 dummy variables: 
Less than one month. Less than 31 days of inactivity. 
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Between one and six months. Between 31 and 180 days of inactivity, it includes 
both limits of the bracket. 
Between six months and one year. Between 180 and 365 days of inactivity, it 
 includes superior limit of the bracket. 
More than one year. More than 365 days of inactivity, (base category). 
5. Never employed, dummy variable, 1 if the individual was never employed, 0 
otherwise. 
6. Age*never_employed, continuous, interaction between age and dummy for never 
employed. Zero for people who were ever employed. 
7. Age_squared*never_employed, continuous, interaction between the square on 
age and dummy for never employed. Zero for people who were ever employed. 
8. Pre monthly labor income, continuous variable. Captures information of the last 
job the interviewee had before she started the training. This variable is zero if the 
interviewee had never worked before the training or did not work for payment. 
For the comparison group this variable captures the income received during the 
last job the individual had, recorded either in the first or second quarter or ENE. 
For individuals who had never worked by the time of the interview, or did not 
receive any payment for their work, the variable is coded as zero. 
9. Pre monthly labor income squared, continuous variable, square of monthly 
labor income. 
10. Pre weekly hours worked, continuous variable. Captures information on hours 
worked per week  in the last job the interviewee had before she started training. 
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Calculated as days per week times hours per day. This variable is zero if the 
interviewee had never worked before the training. 
11. Pre weekly hours worked squared, continuous, square of weekly hours worked. 
12. Marital status, 3 dummies. 
Single, never married, (base category). 
Married, includes married or cohabitating. 
Other, includes divorced, separated or widowed. 
13. Head of the household, dummy variable, 1 if the interviewee is head of her 
household, 0 otherwise. 
14. Development zones, 7 dummy variables. Each state is assigned with a level of 
development. Higher numbers represent higher levels of economic development, 
so region 1 is the least developed and region 7 is the most developed. 
Region 1, region 2, region 3, region 4, region 5, region 6, region 7, (base 
category). 
15. Town size, 5 population dummy variables. 
townsize1, if population of municipio<=2,499 
townsize2, if population of municipio>2,499 & <=14,999 
townsize3, if population of municipio >=15,000 & pop<50,000 
townsize4, if population of municipio >=50,000 & pop<100,000 






Appendix C. Data annex, steps for data construction 
A. Treatment Group 
The starting sample is the National Survey on Job Matching and Continuance 
(ENCOPE) of 2002.  
1. Restrict to those that reported having finished the SICAT training program. 
2. Exclude the trainees who claimed to have started training during 2000, 2001, 
2003 or 2004. 
3. Construct dependent and independent variables. 
4. Generate a variable that identifies all members of this group as treated individuals 
B. Comparison Group 
Starting samples are the first, second and fourth quarters of the National Employment 
Survey (ENE-I, ENE-II and ENE-IV) 
5. By individual identification number merge ENE-I with ENE-IV and ENE-II with 
ENE-IV, for each merged sample (merged1 and merged2) keep those individuals 
that have records in the master and slave samples.  
6. Verify that no individual is in both merged samples. 
7. Construct dependent and independent variables, use exact same names and units 
as in 3. 
8. Append merged samples to have one database for the comparison group. 
9. Generate a variable that identifies all members of this group as comparison 
individuals. 
10. Impose restrictions of age, unemployment and underemployment, income 
maximums and education (see section 5.2.) 
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C. Final Sample 
11. Append treated and comparison sample. 
12. Divide the treated and comparison sample in one sample of males and one of 
females. 




















Appendix D. Description of the variables used to calculate the propensity score and 
matching estimates, Chapter 5 
All of the variables were obtained from the retrospective survey carried over the second 
half of 2001 for trainees; this is the reference period. 
16. Age, continuous, restricted both samples between 16 and 78 years old. 
17. Years of formal education, continuous, number of years the individual obtained 
education in an accredited institution. 
18. Highest educational degree attained, 6 dummy variables. 
No degree, (base category). 
Elementary school. 
Junior high school. 
High school.  
College degree. 
Technical degree, it includes technical degrees with different levels of formal 
education prerequisites (elementary, junior or completed high school). 
 
19. Length of time in inactivity (not working, i.e. without a job) before started 
training, for trainees. Continuous variable in days. The duration of inactivity was 
coded as zero for individuals that have never worked. 
20. Length of time in inactivity squared. 
21. Marital status, 3 dummies. 
Single, never married, (base category). 
Married, includes married or cohabitating. 
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Other, includes divorced, separated or widowed. 
22. Economic dependents. Continuous, number of individuals that economically 
depend on the trainee. 
23. Never employed, dummy variable, 1 if individual was never employed, 0 
otherwise. 
24. Pre monthly labor income, continuous variable. Captures information of the last 
job the interviewee had before she started the training. This variable is zero if the 
interviewee had never worked before the training or did not work for payment. 
25. Pre monthly labor income squared 
26. Pre weekly hours worked, continuous variable. Captures information of the last 
week worked in the last job the interviewee had before she started the training. 
Calculated as days per week times hours per day. This variable is zero if the 
interviewee had never worked before the training. 
27. Pre weekly hours worked squared, continuous, square of weekly hours worked. 
28. Head of the household, dummy variable, 1 if the interviewee is head of her 
household, 0 otherwise. 
29. Development zones, 7 dummy variables. Each state is assigned with a level of 
development. Higher numbers represent higher levels of economic development, 
so region 1 is the least developed and region 7 is the most developed. 
Region 1, region 2, region 3, region 4, region 5, region 6, region 7, (base 
category). 
30. Town size, 5 population dummy variables. 
townsize1, if population of municipio<=2,499 
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townsize2, if population of municipio>2,499 & <=14,999 
townsize3, if population of municipio >=15,000 & pop<50,000 
townsize4, if population of municipio >=50,000 & pop<100,000 
townsize5, if population of municipio >=100,000 (base category). 
31. Reasons to participate in the training program, 7 dummy variables.  
Reason1, to obtain experience 
Reason2, to obtain employment (base) 
Reason3, wanted to get training 
Reason4, recommended to take it 
Reason5, required for employment 




















Employed 0.30 60.22 0.30 113.02
Health benefits 0.05 110.32 0.01 171.58
Housing Credits 0.05 149.95 0.30 163.81
In-cash Benefits 0.05 132.16 0.30 198.06
Other benefits 0.10 155.04 0.30 187.67
In micro business 0.10 159.99 0.30 205.39
In business without local 0.10 26.91 0.01 10.14
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.05 11.68 0.30 13.91
Verbal contract 0.30 74.08 0.30 100.11
Post training monthly labor income 0.05 431,061.30 0.30 398,056.50





Employed 0.30 166.79 0.30 409.33
Health benefits 0.10 178.80 0.30 342.27
Housing Credits 0.10 79.98 0.30 139.34
In-cash Benefits 0.10 166.25 0.30 313.58
Other benefits 0.10 97.88 0.30 154.05
In micro business 0.30 206.75 0.30 424.76
In business without local 0.10 36.26 0.10 75.35
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.30 29.22 0.30 49.78
Verbal contract 0.30 213.46 0.10 399.15
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 366,680.20 0.10 645,930.70







Employed 0.05 113.93 0.10 504.75
Health benefits 0.50 75.49 0.10 81.60
Housing Credits 0.50 30.21 0.10 33.27
In-cash Benefits 0.50 62.38 0.10 73.17
Other benefits 0.50 41.37 0.10 50.98
In micro business 0.30 137.38 0.10 405.49
In business without local 0.50 121.73 0.05 396.02
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 69.80 0.30 319.21
Verbal contract 0.05 119.81 0.10 241.17
Post training monthly labor income 0.05 270,720.00 0.10 432,980.70
Post training weekly hours worked 0.05 5,881.87 0.10 15,645.79
men, n= 325
In-classroom with respect to mixed in medium and big enterprises
women, n=412
men, n= 429
In-classroom with respect to mixed in micro and small enterprises
women, n=854
In-classroom with respect to self-employment









Employed 0.10 169.76 0.30 253.69
Health benefits 0.10 139.53 0.05 147.49
Housing Credits 0.10 76.02 0.10 79.07
In-cash Benefits 0.10 123.48 0.30 142.00
Other benefits 0.10 78.68 0.05 94.09
In micro business 0.10 174.18 0.30 214.03
In business without local 0.10 108.30 0.30 54.72
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 65.27 0.30 38.65
Verbal contract 0.10 151.05 0.10 144.43
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 466,803.60 0.10 400,313.10







Employed 0.10 154.91 0.30 398.94
Health benefits 0.10 172.96 0.10 333.39
Housing Credits 0.10 79.36 0.10 135.72
In-cash Benefits 0.10 161.22 0.30 307.37
Other benefits 0.01 101.63 0.10 151.22
In micro business 0.10 198.24 0.30 418.02
In business without local 0.01 35.08 0.30 75.82
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.05 29.16 0.30 48.26
Verbal contract 0.10 205.67 0.30 392.99
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 314,444.30 0.10 638,284.40







Employed 0.30 102.03 0.10 476.77
Health benefits 0.30 74.22 0.10 76.97
Housing Credits 0.30 29.52 0.30 32.92
In-cash Benefits 0.30 61.29 0.10 68.50
Other benefits 0.30 40.93 0.10 46.32
In micro business 0.05 121.89 0.10 383.91
In business without local 0.10 109.43 0.05 376.42
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 61.32 0.10 306.78
Verbal contract 0.30 113.04 0.05 227.77
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 245,111.10 0.05 407,229.00
Post training weekly hours worked 0.10 5,225.38 0.05 14,961.02
Mixed in medium and big with respect to self-employment
men, n= 252 women, n=1,050
men, n= 377 women, n=522
Mixed in medium and big with respect to mixed in micro and small enterprises
men, n= 412 women, n=838










Employed 0.30 169.52 0.30 249.44
Health benefits 0.30 134.75 0.10 144.89
Housing Credits 0.10 66.54 0.30 81.04
In-cash Benefits 0.30 118.51 0.10 140.21
Other benefits 0.30 73.19 0.30 95.01
In micro business 0.10 166.67 0.30 211.63
In business without local 0.10 99.19 0.10 51.64
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 61.82 0.30 34.66
Verbal contract 0.10 141.98 0.30 145.15
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 369,794.20 0.10 378,447.70







Employed 0.10 55.35 0.10 114.58
Health benefits 0.05 106.23 0.10 176.68
Housing Credits 0.10 141.93 0.10 203.76
In-cash Benefits 0.05 125.86 0.05 101.31
Other benefits 0.05 141.49 0.05 191.66
In micro business 0.10 145.66 0.05 212.48
In business without local 0.10 26.88 0.10 13.47
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.05 9.79 0.05 13.68
Verbal contract 0.05 72.77 0.30 100.90
Post training monthly labor income 0.01 302,044.00 0.05 398,687.40







Employed 0.10 110.21 0.05 513.58
Health benefits 0.10 72.86 0.05 80.36
Housing Credits 0.10 30.45 0.05 32.31
In-cash Benefits 0.10 61.62 0.05 71.81
Other benefits 0.07 42.33 0.05 49.80
In micro business 0.10 126.98 0.05 409.66
In business without local 0.10 114.37 0.05 404.76
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 64.75 0.30 324.43
Verbal contract 0.10 116.95 0.05 244.01
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 264,126.20 0.05 15,907.79
Post training weekly hours worked 0.30 5,846.34 0.05 395,617.60
Mixed in micro and small with self-employment
men, n= 266 women, n=1,106
men, n= 356 women, n=513
Mixed in micro and small with mixed in medium and big
men, n= 302 women, n=431











Employed 0.05 164.04 0.05 243.89
Health benefits 0.05 130.26 0.05 144.55
Housing Credits 0.05 66.53 0.05 79.96
In-cash Benefits 0.05 117.66 0.05 136.81
Other benefits 0.05 71.93 0.05 95.54
In micro business 0.30 164.97 0.05 204.09
In business without local 0.05 100.47 0.05 54.92
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.05 60.68 0.05 38.41
Verbal contract 0.05 139.82 0.05 144.44
Post training monthly labor income 0.05 429,594.50 0.05 354,853.90







Employed 0.30 55.71 0.10 112.83
Health benefits 0.10 99.58 0.10 166.52
Housing Credits 0.10 121.16 0.10 160.04
In-cash Benefits 0.10 116.69 0.10 193.29
Other benefits 0.10 130.38 0.10 186.27
In micro business 0.01 125.41 0.05 207.81
In business without local 0.10 26.80 0.10 13.17
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 11.32 0.10 13.53
Verbal contract 0.30 67.88 0.10 104.04
Post training monthly labor income 0.10 316,855.20 0.10 341,506.30







Employed 0.30 173.10 0.05 381.79
Health benefits 0.05 185.07 0.05 316.11
Housing Credits 0.10 83.28 0.05 130.61
In-cash Benefits 0.05 175.43 0.05 287.44
Other benefits 0.30 109.34 0.05 144.31
In micro business 0.05 213.91 0.05 396.00
In business without local 0.10 37.45 0.05 74.12
Self employed or unpaid worker 0.10 30.58 0.05 48.86
Verbal contract 0.05 222.45 0.05 381.57
Post training monthly labor income 0.30 417,361.50 0.05 601,320.40
Post training weekly hours worked 0.05 8,831.75 0.05 17,446.08
Self-employment with respect to mixed in micro and small 
men, n= 446 women, n=811
men, n= 350 women, n=522
Self-employment with respect to mixed in medium and big 
men, n= 280 women, n=422
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